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THE FOUNDATIONS OF UNITY

THE Manifesto of European Catholics in America published elsewhere in this number calls attention once more to the fundamental issues that underlie the present world conflict. It may be objected that after three years of war and ten years of political discussion these issues are sufficiently obvious, and that nobody in this country needs to be convinced of the evils of Totalitarianism or of the irreducible opposition between totalitarian and Catholic principles.

Nevertheless, it is always a mistake to underestimate the power of our adversaries, and it is unfortunately a mistake to which democratic peoples are especially prone. The hard facts of war have made it difficult for us to remain under any illusion with regard to the military power and resources of the totalitarian state, but we still do not realize the strength of the totalitarian appeal on the intellectual plane. For the present war is a war of ideas in the same way as the wars of the French Revolution, and if we rely like the power of the old régime 150 years ago on antiquated legal and diplomatic armaments, we are not likely to win an easy victory.

It is true that the totalitarian idea has little in common with the revolutionary idealism of the eighteenth century. It is fundamentally anti-idealistic and derives its strength from the decline of intellectual culture and the loss of the moral standards and the spiritual values which were accepted in principle even by the revolutionaries and the rationalists of the earlier period. Negative and destructive as this ideology may be, it is not without a powerful appeal to the modern mind, since it expresses in a crude and simplified form a current of thought and activity which is by no means confined to Germany or to Fascism but which exists in every country and in many different forms. We see the beginnings of this movement in the nineteenth-century materialists like Feuerbach and Marx in spite of their rationalism; and in the present century the influence of Freud and Pavlov has immensely strengthened the tendency to emphasize the importance of the irrational and unconscious elements in human behaviour. Finally we see the creation of new techniques of social control and stimulation which threaten to make society the servant of artificially induced mass emotions and other forms of psychological pressure, and thus to destroy the old conditions

of personal freedom and responsibility on which not only democracy but the whole pattern of Western culture was based.

It is therefore clear that the rise of the totalitarian mass dictatorship is not really a political phenomenon but involves deeper social and spiritual issues, which no Christian can afford to ignore. It is an issue which is at once social, cultural and religious, since it threatens alike the freedom of the personality, the freedom of the Church and the existence of Western culture in the forms which have hitherto been characteristic of it. It is in fact a world crisis of far greater magnitude than the French Revolution or the Reformation or the rise of Islam, for it involves a far more profound change in the conditions of human civilization.

It may be argued that such a transformation is inconceivable; that human nature will be protected against the extremes alike of scientific planning and revolutionary change by its innate conservatism. Nevertheless the development of industrial society during the last century has shown how rapidly man adapts himself to a completely new environment and way of life. The peasant, whose life had been bound to the soil for thousands of years and whose whole way of life had been conditioned by the unchanging cycle of the seasons and the earth, was suddenly transformed into an engineer or a factory worker and forced to adapt his existence to the demands of the machine and the world market.

If the eighteenth-century peasant could become the nineteenth-century industrial proletarian, is there any reason why the far more fluid and adaptable social type, which is the product of a century of industrialism and mechanization, should not go a step further and give birth to a new totally mechanized mass organism which absorbs and transcends its individual members?

This question is serious enough in itself, since it involves the ultimate issues of personal freedom and responsibility, but what makes the present situation so abnormal and catastrophic is the new form given to the question by the totalitarian dictatorships. For we are not being asked merely to face the consequences of mechanization and the progressive integration of mass society within the framework of our own cultural and historical traditions, we are being threatened by the impact of an alien totalitarian order which has an entirely different social tradition behind it. The cult of race and blood, the exaltation of violence and aggression and the idealization of war as the supreme law of life and the normal fulfilment of national destiny are all comprehensible in a certain historical setting and in relation to the peculiar traditions of highly specialized military societies such

as Prussia and Japan. But they do not belong to our world and their sudden irruption into our life gives us the same feeling of surprise and repulsion as if a prehistoric monster were to make its appearance in an English village.

The fact that the totalitarian idea has first manifested itself to us in this alien and unpalatable form has been an advantage in as much as it has united us in a determination to resist the evil thing, but at the same time it makes it harder for us to understand the real nature of the forces that are threatening to conquer the world. The externals of Totalitarianism—the Shirts and the slogans, the leaders and the gunmen, the concentration camps and the secret police—are all so alien and repellent to our tradition that we cannot see the solid core of social purpose that underlies them.

At the same time we must not forget that our own political institutions and ideals may appear equally unfamiliar and unsympathetic to peoples of a different social tradition. In many parts of Europe, long before the rise of Fascism, both the English and the American conceptions of democratic government and Parliamentarianism, the freedom of the individual and the freedom of the Press, appeared strange and subversive novelties which ran counter to their inherited doctrine of social order and the authority of the State. Men trained in such traditions were not necessarily totalitarian. They might even be as hostile to Totalitarianism as we are ourselves, but they were not hostile to it in the same way and for the same reasons, they were not hostile to authoritarianism, or military discipline, or to the social prestige of a military caste, and therefore they were prepared beforehand to accept just those aspects of the totalitarian state which we find most strange and repellent.

Nevertheless the essence of Totalitarianism is not to be found in these things. Totalitarianism is not simply a new assertion of the authority of the State; on the contrary it is a force which is hostile to authority as well as to freedom. Its essence is to be found in the denial of Law no less than in the denial of liberty, and its goal is the creation of a new mass organism which swallows up the State as well as the individual in the undifferentiated unity of the herd.

There are therefore two distinct issues involved in the present conflict, although the stress of war has temporarily forced them together. There is, in the first place, the opposition of democracy and constitutionalism against autocracy and militarism. This is an old conflict which has divided Europe for centuries but in the past it was not a fundamental conflict, since both parties shared a common religious and cultural tradition and

acknowledged a common ground in morality and law. But in the new conflict with Totalitarianism there is no longer any common ground. It cuts to the very root of civilization and does not leave the very simplest human relations and moral values intact.

This issue is so deep and far-reaching that it cannot be dealt with according to the traditional categories of our political and social thought for it destroys the whole ideological structure within which the latter were developed. It is, in fact, only on the religious ground that the totalitarian challenge can be met, for what is at stake is not a form of government or an economic system, but simply the human soul. And it is only when it is viewed on this plane that the real spiritual nature of Totalitarianism becomes apparent. It is anti-Christian not merely because it is in opposition to the Christian faith or to Christian moral principles, as many other systems have been before. It is anti-Christian in a deeper and more absolute source, as a reversal of the Christian process of salvation. Christianity is primarily concerned with human souls. It is a doctrine of salvation which claims to change human nature from within and to make man a new creature by the infusion of the Divine Spirit and a member of a new society, which is more than a society since it is a higher spiritual organism animated by the Divine Life.

Totalitarianism is also concerned with the soul. It seeks to transform human nature from without by physical and psychological conditioning. It absorbs the individual personality into the life of a unified mass organism in which and for which alone he exists. It offers men deliverance from insecurity, deliverance from responsibility, deliverance from the burden of freedom. "They will come to us," says the Inquisitor in Dostoevsky's famous vision, "in the end, and they will lay their freedom at our feet and say to us, 'Make us your slaves but feed us.' They will understand themselves at last that freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together. And they will rejoice that they are again led like sheep and that the terrible gift that had brought them such suffering is at last lifted from their hearts."

What Dostoevsky did not realize, however, was that the new men would not be subtle and disinterested philosophers, but carrierists who exploited the new techniques of social control in the same way as the nineteenth-century men of business had exploited the mechanical inventions of an earlier stage of science. That is the immediate danger which we have to face, and consequently the deeper issues that are involved in Totalitarianism are obscured by the immediate task of defending the elementary decencies of civilized life against the new type of international

gangsterdom. Yet it is obvious that the fact that we are defending the simple rights of national existence and international order does not prejudice our right to oppose the spiritual evils of Totalitarianism or lessen our responsibility to do so.

There has been a tendency in some quarters to argue that a nation that is fighting for its existence has no business to talk of spiritual issues, as though body and soul were mutually exclusive instead of parts of one substantial unity. Yet on the other hand it is true that patriotism is not enough, and that it is always possible

"propter vitam vitæ perdere causas".

At this time, therefore, more than at any time in our history we need spiritual leadership and a clear vision of the issues which confront England and Europe and the whole world; for it is probable—it is almost certain—that the decisions of the next few years will determine not only frontiers and the balance of power, but our way of life and the form of our civilization.

If England and the British Commonwealth are to play their part in the post-war world, it is essential that we should attain a high degree of national unity—not merely unity of resolution in resistance to aggression, which we already possess in good measure, but the unity of vision which is alone capable of creating an enlightened public opinion and which does not allow itself to be deceived by the slogans of political opportunists.

The first point on which we need clear thinking is the question of Democracy, for though there is no issue which is more central to the present conflict, there is no word in our current political and sociological vocabulary which has generated so much loose thinking and ideological confusion.

Both our enemies and ourselves agree that we stand for the cause of Democracy: it is the only point on which we are agreed; but when it comes to defining the meaning of the word not only do we differ from our adversaries but we also differ from our allies and from one another. Its literal definition, "government by the people", is wide enough to cover the most diverse and incongruous political systems. But we are justified historically and practically in using it to describe the particular system of popular government by representative or parliamentary institutions, developed in Western Europe and America during modern times. In this sense it is clearly distinguished on the one hand from the governments of the old régime which appealed to the divine right of kings or the inherited privileges of a noble caste, and on the other from the new mass dictatorships which have revolted against the whole tradition of constitutionalism and personal liberty, as well as against the freedom of dis-

cussion and the representation of minorities. Taken in this sense, Democracy is indeed the central political issue of the present war, and when we say we are fighting for democracy we are indeed defending a political system of tradition on which the very existence of the British Commonwealth and the United States depends. But if we go further and identify democracy with everything that promotes the prosperity of the people, we leave the basis of agreement on which the democratic system is based.

As Dr. Ernest Barker writes in his exhaustive discussion of the democratic system which we hope to deal with more fully in a later number : "Democracy does not mean the well-being or the prosperity of the people, but a method of the government of the people ; and a democratic measure is a measure which originates from, or tends to promote, such a measure of government—not a measure which tends to increase the amount or to rectify the distribution, of prosperity or wellbeing."*

If democracy is understood in this third sense—as whatever serves the good or supposed good of the whole—it becomes a kind of total democracy, which has all the distinguishing marks of genuine Totalitarianism, as we see in the case of the French Revolution, where the dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety and the Reign of Terror were established in the name of the general will and the common good.

Democracy in the historic sense necessarily involves the toleration of diversity of opinion and consequently of opposition. It therefore excludes the Single Party system, which is in fact the essential characteristic of the totalitarian state. On the other hand, it involves the co-operation of parties within the constitutional framework, since no party can claim an exclusive monopoly of power. Consequently though a democracy is superficially disunited, it possesses a wider and deeper basis of social unity than a totalitarian state which is the state of a single party and which is morally weakened by the existence of a repressed opposition that is a potential source of revolutionary activity.

Nevertheless it is obvious that a democracy loses this advantage if the division between the parties becomes too wide. The success of democracy depends on the co-operation of the different parties, yet their opposition and conflict must also be genuine; otherwise politics become an insincere game which only interests the politicians. For this reason democracy demands a much higher standard of political education and social toleration than any other form of government. It is a fragile system which can only work in a morally integrated society, for it requires

* *Reflections on Government*, by Ernest Barker. (Oxford, 1942, p. 315.)

loyalty not only to our own party and our own leaders but to our opponents also.

It is here that Fascism has proved such a formidable enemy. From the beginning it carried the technique of total war into the political forum, and by doing so it created a state of tension and conflict, which made it impossible for democracy to function.

The fact that it is our political system itself that is threatened and not the principles or interests of any particular party changes the whole character of the modern political problem. In fact, it shifts the centre of gravity outside politics to the more fundamental issues which were formerly regarded as non-political—as common ground to men of all parties and opinions. What is at stake today is not merely political freedom but the preservation of the human foundations on which that freedom rests. The same forces which make it impossible for the political parties to function freely and to collaborate for common ends also destroy the freedom of the non-political associations—whether economic, cultural or religious—and thus leave no outlet for free personal decision and action.

But the real source of the evil is not to be found in the absolutism of the state, but in the exclusivism of the totalitarian *party*. For the conditions of freedom are already destroyed by the latter, before it has captured the machinery of the State. The first step in the totalitarian assault on freedom is the appeal to violence and the loosening of the bonds of law, and when this has been achieved the capture of the State by the most aggressive and most unscrupulous party follows as a matter of course.

It is the tactics of Totalitarianism to convert the limited and rational conflicts of a civilized society into unlimited ones, by appealing to the irrational forces of hatred and fear and suspicion. And it is a mistake to ignore the strength of such weapons, for it is much easier to defeat a false idealism than to meet a propaganda which deliberately seeks to exploit the forces of evil and to fan every latent spark of hatred and dissension. There is no lack of elements of discord in every human society, and one of the most formidable resources of Totalitarianism has undoubtedly been its capacity to convert these psychological waste products into social explosives which can be deliberately utilized for political ends. The way in which the Nazis have used anti-Semitism is only the most notorious and obvious example of this technique. It can also be used in a much more subtle and elaborate way to undermine the whole structure of a rival party or state. No doubt such methods have always been employed on a small scale and, as it were, intuitively by governments and revolutionaries alike. But their systematic organization on a large scale

with all the resources of modern psychology and scientific method creates a new situation which cannot be compared to anything that existed in the past.

The attempt to meet this weapon with similar methods inevitably leads to a deterioration of standards and values which may have an even more disintegrating effect than the attack from without. Yet if civilization is to be preserved, it is above all things necessary to find some way of dealing with this evil. The obvious antidote to the tactics of disintegration and conflict is the strengthening of the bond of social unity, for if a society or group is sufficiently united it cannot be disintegrated by artificial means, however cunningly they are employed. Yet it must be questioned whether the traditional qualities that make for social unity—the virtues of the good citizen, loyalty, patriotism, comradeship, good faith and good will—are sufficient in themselves to do this. They are the natural and instinctive qualities of a healthy society rather than creative forces. They need to be preserved by a faith in something more than the society itself and by a spiritual will that transcends the bonds of common blood and common interests. In the last resort the tradition of our civilization is a Christian one, and though this tradition has become so weakened and obscured as to be almost invisible, it is still the ultimate bond of our social unity and the foundation of our spiritual order.

The return to this tradition is a long and difficult journey and it is only too easy to conclude that it is impossible. But in that case let us be under no illusion. The road that leads our civilization away from Christianity leads it away from humanity also. The pleasant byways of humanitarian culture in which the mind of the nineteenth century lingered are closed and deserted. If we reject the Christian tradition we may find that there is no alternative but "to follow the counsel of the wise spirit, the spirit of death and destruction, and therefore to accept lying and deception and to lead men consciously to death and destruction and deceive them all the way, so that they may not notice where they are being led, so that the poor blind creatures may at least think themselves happy". We can no longer dismiss these words as apocalyptic fancies, for we see them fulfilled to the letter in the world today. If our civilization denies its Christian tradition and inheritance, it still bears the burden of them in an inverted form... It becomes not a humanist or secular or even pagan civilization, it is an apostate civilization—an anti-Christian order.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

IN FACE OF THE WORLD CRISIS

TOTALITARIANISM.

I. THE present world crisis which has reached its climax in the war *is the outcome of a threat to free human society more grave than any that has ever yet arisen in the history of civilization. This threat is totalitarianism.*

Except for a few outward appearances, totalitarianism has nothing in common with those authoritarian regimes which Christian peoples have known in the past. It is even lower in the civilized scale than the most primitive forms of the ancient City, before the development of Greek philosophy and of Roman law. It is fundamentally in conflict with the Christian Gospel which has made known to us the inalienable dignity of the human soul. Its social and political action is based on a philosophy which denies the transcendence of the human person whether in relation to matter, or to nature, or to society; it spreads in the wake of this philosophy. Its raw definition is to be found in the writing of Japanese educationalists: "The individual is not an entity but depends on the whole, arising from and kept in being by the State." Italian Fascism sums up its doctrine of the nation's state in a formula which is no less extreme: "Nothing outside or above the State; nothing against the State; everything in and for the State."

The historical materialism of Marxism requires for its world triumph *the destruction of religion and of the family; of all that which protects the human person and prevents his complete absorption in the social mass.* The biological materialism of Nazism is *equally destructive*, but it is combined with a *counter-religion rooted in the forces of pride and of instinct and with the will to world-domination of a race which shows its superiority over others by oppressing them.*

It is essentially incompatible with that "order" and with those traditional values which it invokes in its defence, for it is itself the inevitable result of those processes of corruption which have long been at work in the modern world. It opposes to Christianity the fundamental denial of the unity of the human race and of the brotherhood of men as children of the same Father and redeemed by the same Christ.

Through its technique of propaganda and the efficiency of its party and military organization it has made itself much more efficacious than communism as the instrument of the anti-Christian revolution.

The present war has immediate as well as indirect causes in the social, political, and economic spheres, but it is the manifes-

tation, on the international plane, of a deeper conflict between the nations, of a fundamental disagreement concerning the very principles of civilization.

It is therefore in the light of these principles that the war aims of the belligerent groups reveal their ultimate significance.

WAR AND DEMOCRACY.

II. *What are we fighting for? Is it democracy?* Yes, if we understand by that *the political and social life of a community of free men*. No, if we are thinking only of *particular systems or forms of government* such as those which existed in certain European countries before the war. Although these forms are inspired by democratic principles, they are only particular manifestations conditioned by historical circumstances and do not exhaustively express these principles themselves. Not that we should underestimate their value in Europe or in America. In France, for instance, the Third Republic coincided with a movement which expressed itself not only in the sphere of arts, letters, and science, but in such concrete achievements as the Colonial Empire and the victory of 1914-18. It is the condition of civilization that every people should be free to create the institutions best suited to their own character and to the changing needs of time. But there are *certain principles which must never be questioned*; such are those which maintain that social relations must be based on justice and those which assess the *rights of the human person* to which, in fact, democracy in particular, through its system of universal suffrage, has given political expression.

Liberty—that is to say the right of the body politic and of its members to choose the means of attaining the end which is proper to their nature; the *equality* of citizens before the law and in sharing the common burdens of life; *civic friendship or fraternity* which is based on justice and presupposes not only our common humanity, but more deeply, as we Christians should well know, the brotherhood of all men in Christ—a friendship higher and more universal than civic friendship, because it is founded in God and in divine love or charity; these are principles which the democracies are right to invoke, though they have been wrong in too often failing to understand their true basis or to put them into practice. These principles have their purest source in the Gospel and are the foundation of the Christian ideal of civilization; *their denial today represents a tragic retrogression from this ideal.*

WAR AND CAPITALISM.

III. *Are we fighting for the preservation of capitalism?* We can admit that capitalism has greatly contributed to the material development of civilization. It has enabled the individual—to

the extent that he owned the means of production and used them at his will—to increase his power over things and to develop his initiative. But its anarchical conception of economic liberty, the premium it has put on material wealth, the concentration in the hands of a few, and without moral guarantee, of economic power, the inhumanity of its whole economic conception, whose outcome is the creation of a proletariat and of class war, cannot be justified by any sane system of ethics or by any economic or political philosophy which is genuinely concerned with the common good. If therefore certain "plutocratic" interests are today fighting for their own ends under cover of war, this is a coincidence accidental to the real issue and obviously made transitory by the destruction and the changes brought about by the war itself: *it can bind neither our judgement nor our action nor our will to social reform.* Furthermore, the errors and deviations of capitalism are less radical, less "total" in their opposition to Christian principles, than those of the totalitarian doctrines and regimes.

THE REAL ISSUE IN THE STRUGGLE IS CIVILIZATION ITSELF AND THE CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN IT.

IV. Lastly, it is true that the armed revolution which threatens the world does not aim directly and openly at the destruction of supernatural faith; nevertheless its temporal aims are bound up with the establishment of a *radically anti-Christian order*.

Our immediate concern is therefore *the relation of our faith to civilization*. Our faith necessarily informs our conception of the social order. We have the duty to act as Christians in the whole of our social life and to create institutions which are in keeping with the Christian idea of society and which favour the spiritual life of its individual members. It is therefore not enough that the Church should preserve the integrity of its dogma; or that it should practise its rites or administer its sacraments under conditions which are in any case rendered insecure by any form of totalitarianism. The Church and we, the faithful, must continue to have the power to make of the Gospels the ferment of the social order. What is therefore at stake is the freedom of the Church and of Christians in the world, *their right to fulfil their most urgent social duties; as well as the principles of Natural Law which are presupposed and confirmed by Revelation.* Once these are destroyed, *the essential mission of the Church* for the salvation of souls will be openly and ruthlessly attacked.

When totalitarians, accused of designs hostile to religion, claim that they are slandered and that they have no wish to attack Christian faith or practice as such they deceive themselves (if we admit that they are sincere) and they deceive us. The

perseverance and the frightful cruelty of the systematic persecutions, particularly in Poland, throw a vivid light on this question. Naturally the ministers of religion are accused of misusing their sacred office and of interfering in politics; but the Pharisees obtained the condemnation of Christ on similar grounds.

The truth is that the whole spiritual attitude on which the totalitarian New Order is based is fundamentally hostile to Christian faith and life.

Totalitarianism attacks Christianity at its very roots by denying and blaspheming Charity and Mercy, and by sacrificing everything to the pride of Power. Wherever Christianity is vital, it is necessarily a danger to those régimes, and they are compelled to attack it. Persecution could only be avoided at the cost of *making sterile the faith of the Christians and of corrupting the Catholic world from within*—at the cost of what the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon has called *the de-Christianization of the Church itself*. Even where they assume less extreme forms and are introduced under a disguise, the totalitarian regimes inevitably seek to carry out this policy, which is more fatal to religion than open persecution. *There is no more dangerous illusion than the belief that totalitarianism can be Christianized. The totalitarianisms which are striving to conquer the world today can only triumph on the ruins of Christianity.*

To sum up, this war is not merely a political or economic struggle; it is a war for civilization and, since it involves the spiritual and religious principles of civilization, it is also a religious war. We must even say that no greater spiritual crisis has arisen since the beginning of the Christian era. For this crisis is not caused, as so often in modern history, by the denial of some part of the Truth. Marxist totalitarianism is based on the absolute denial of God; it is an attempt to construct a total order of mankind on the basis of atheism and materialism. Fascist totalitarianism is based on the deification of the national state. Nazi totalitarianism is based on the deification of the race and of "blood" and on a fundamentally pagan conception of the world and of life which necessarily involves the denial not only of the traditional Judeo-Christian conception of God and of Christ and of sane philosophic reason, but also the denial of the human person, the denial of justice and of right, and the setting up of the cult of violence and hatred as a *positive and religious principle*.

That is why the conflict is radical and universal. That is why Nazism cannot arrest its course, even if it so wished. That is why the hope of survival under its aegis of civilization anywhere in the world is a delusion.

What is at stake in the present conflict is the very life of man as man, the existence or the destruction of the elementary bases of the Natural Law and of civilized life, the maintenance or the destruction of the essential principles of Christianity in the lives of nations and the very possibility of tending towards a Christian order.

OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE RUSSO-GERMAN CONFLICT.

V. The present conflict between German National Socialism and Russian Communism raises a conscience problem for Christians. Like all questions which concern particular cases, this practical problem is bound up with specific facts. We propose the following considerations for its solution.

(1) In the life-and-death struggle which the free peoples are waging it is an unhoisted-for boon that Russia, instead of remaining neutral, should have thrown her military strength and the immense energy and patriotic courage of her people *against the common enemy—Nazism*. Russia has been attacked by the Nazis. The Russian people are defending their soil. In assisting them the Allies are acting in accordance with the law of nations.

(2) A Russian victory as such will not deprive the democracies of their freedom of action and will not close to the Christian elements, which are at work in them, the possibility of further development. The best way for the Western world to prevent the spread of Marxism in its midst is to remove the pretext of Communism. It is not easy to distinguish between the alliance with Russia and with Communism, but it is not impossible.

(3) Lastly, Russia's re-entry into the Western comity of nations is an historical event of paramount importance, which itself increases the hope of victory for civilization. The ferment of Christian forces is still active in the Russian people. A just and generous attitude on the part of Christians will assist the inward process of transformation which may already be at work in it, and through which, without a return to the social structures of the past, it may free itself from the spiritual and political evils of the present time.

THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF FUTURE INSTITUTIONS.

VI. It is, of course, impossible today to make a blueprint of the institutions which will be set up after the war. Too many unforeseeable circumstances will condition them; moreover, civilization, like Christianity, is not bound up with any one régime. But it is possible and necessary to assert their great underlying principles which have been emphasized in the teachings of the Church since the time of Leo XIII.

The answer to totalitarianism must take into account the

total order of human life. This order must be based firstly on the rights and liberties of the human person; and secondly on the need to organize these liberties on the various social planes in view of the common good.

In the light of these principles it is easy to recognize the errors of anarchical individualism and liberalism on the one hand and of exaggerated nationalism on the other, and to see that they have a large share of responsibility for the present crisis. These evils call for far-reaching reforms. But these reforms must ensure more truly and more completely *the essential liberties of the human person and the equality of all citizens before the law*, and they must restore to morality the pre-eminent place which belongs to it in social, economic, political and international life.

THE ROLE AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY.

VII. It is possible that, as some of us believe, a particularly vigorous authority is necessary in view of the actual disorganization in Europe. But the circumstances which condition the mode of its exercise do not change the basis of political authority nor the end for which it exists. To exercise power is to administer the common interests of the people—*vicem gerens multitudinae*—and the people cannot give up its responsibility or its control over its own destiny without at the same time renouncing its human dignity. On the other hand we are all convinced that *the role of the workers and peasants*, provided they are conscious of their responsibilities and inspired by an ideal of liberty, *will be of decisive importance in the social and political reconstruction of the world*.

THE AUTONOMY OF ECONOMIC GROUPS AND THE POLITICAL LIBERTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON.

VIII. The future States must be given a structure which is more in keeping with the new social realities and with the rights and liberties of the human person. There is no doubt that certain elements of the social order—the family, cultural and professional groups, regional, national and linguistic communities—have not had their proper place in the liberal and individualistic organization of society. In particular, the economic groups and the forces of labour have lacked the means of representation and of expression proportionate to their importance or appropriate to their function in the community. The solution does not lie in the direction of a corporatist dictatorship or of a paternalist State. *The recognition of the social dignity of the worker and of the liberties of the groups and associations subsidiary to the State is an essential condition of any true reconstruction.*

If it is to correspond to the structure of modern society the State must co-ordinate the activities not only of its individual members but of its component groups, and it must be strong enough to enforce its laws even against the most powerful among them. At the same time its power of co-ordinating must not be used to absorb these groups into the State or to interfere with the freedom and authority which belong to them in their own sphere. These groups must be regarded as the organs of the civic community and not as the organs of the State.

It is necessary to maintain *a clear distinction between the political and economic orders—between the political structure of the State and the economic organization of society*. The political structure of the State must be founded primarily on the recognition of the rights of the human person in the political sphere. The life and organization of the body-politic are of a higher order than those of the economic groups. The political structure of the State must be based on the political rights of its citizens; the political life of the State must express the minds and wills of the people who have the right freely to choose their rulers and to be represented in the deliberating assemblies.

Freedom of Conscience

We must insist on the importance in the life of society of what is known as *freedom of conscience*. The adherence to a religion is an act of conscience guided by the light of reason and of grace. The State has no right to dominate or to control the conscience of its citizens. The Churches which, in the present state of religious division, claim the allegiance of souls, must be free to practise their ritual, to preach their doctrines, to train their members and to exercise their apostolate without interference from the State. The theological basis of civic toleration in religious matters is provided by the Christian teaching on the act of faith which is a free gift, freely accepted by the soul and which cannot be produced by external constraint.

Anti-Semitism is not Christian

IX. *We strongly protest against all measures of discrimination against any race or religion and we declare with Pius XI that "it is impossible for Christians to have any part in anti-Semitism".* By attacking the people of whom Christ was born anti-Semitism shows its anti-Christian roots. Any doctrine which, either through error or through hatred, deprives men of their natural rights on account of their religion or race is contrary to Christianity.

If individuals or groups belonging to a particular race or religion act in a way contrary to the common good, the offenders must be punished according to their individual responsibility, and no preventive measures must deprive any individual of his natural rights or of the conditions of a free, dignified and human life which it is the function of the State to ensure to everyone. All laws of exception or of discrimination are unjust. We, as Christians, know that it is our duty to care not only for ourselves but for all our brothers, and the abominable racial, religious and political persecutions of today wound each one of us in so far as we are members of Christ.

Freedom and Independence of Nations

A just order of society must take into account the freedom and growing independence of nations. The two ideas of freedom and autonomy on the one hand and of solidarity and interdependence on the other need not be irreconcilable if they are not made absolute.

"Any international understanding which is to be properly guaranteed and reasonably secure of permanence requires a due recognition of the basic principles of international law and a determination to abide by them. These principles enjoin that each nation shall be allowed to keep its own liberties intact, shall have the right to its own life and economic development; further they enjoin that any pact which has been solemnly ratified in accordance with the rights of nations shall persist, unimpaired and inviolable." (*Encyclical Summi Pontificatus*, 20 October, 1939.)

"An assurance for all nations great or small, powerful or weak, of their right to life and independence is", therefore, "a fundamental postulate of any just and honourable peace. The will of one nation to live must never mean the sentence of death upon another. When this equality of rights has been destroyed, attacked, or threatened, order demands that reparation shall be made, and the measure and expense of that reparation is determined, not by the sword nor by the arbitrary decision of self-interest, but by the rules of justice and reciprocal equity." (*Christmas Allocution of Pope Pius XII, 24 December, 1939*.)

On the other hand, "the notion which assigns unlimited powers to the State is not only an error that brings fatal consequences to the internal life of a society and to its chances of healthy progress; it is equally disastrous to the relations of peoples with one another. It breaks the bonds which ought to unite commonwealths, it robs international law of all its vigour, it makes

them almost incapable of living together on terms of peace and goodwill. Mankind, by a divinely appointed law, is divided into a variety of classes, peoples and states, which do not depend on one another, so far as the ordering of their internal affairs is concerned. But they are bound by mutual obligations in law and in moral right; they form a vast community of nations, which is designed to promote the general good of the race. They are governed by special rules, which preserve unity amongst them and advance, from day to day, their happiness." (*Summi Pontificatus.*)

Therefore "between nations assured of their freedom and independence" (*Christmas Allocution, 1939*) there must arise moral and juridical links which express their solidarity. This solidarity is the stronger the more highly developed the civilization.

This interdependence manifests itself in the *cultural sphere*. Every culture is marked by the local, historical and psychological conditions which have favoured its development; yet each one represents a particular expression of values which are common to all of them because they are essentially human and are part of the common heritage of mankind.

It shows itself in the *economic sphere*. Every nation has the right to appropriate for its own use the soil which it occupies, together with its resources; yet, at the same time, the natural resources of the world have a common destination; they cannot be developed without the collaboration of all and they must be used for the good of all.

It shows itself in the *sphere of social progress*. The development of new techniques of production and the consequent increase of the material resources of civilization have made possible a general improvement in the conditions of life, which must be organized in accordance with justice. But there is a danger that society may be crushed and dehumanized under the weight of economic machinery. Only through international collaboration can modern society hope to arrive at a solution of these problems and to protect itself against the dangers inherent in its world economy.

It shows itself in the *international sphere*. No modern State can claim to be absolutely independent. Not only in those questions which involve their own interests—such as security, mutual aid against aggression, international justice and international administration—but in those touching the protection of the interests of their individual citizens, they are dependent on one another. The idea of absolute autonomy must give way to the principle of *collaboration and of collective organization* which corresponds both to political necessity and to Natural Law.

In every sphere—cultural, economic, social and political—the new forms of organization must express the bonds of solidarity. This solidarity, which has shown itself increasingly in the past, is today transforming the community of nations into a true society which requires positive organization and before which the individual States must give up their claim to absolute sovereignty. The new institutions must provide the means of expressing and of fulfilling the new social needs. Moral precepts must be defined by juridical rules applied and sanctioned by international organs.

The Organization of Freedom

Thus, on the one hand, organization should emerge from the exercise of freedom which is the underlying principle of national, economic, cultural and political institutions, while, on the other, the organization of liberties should lead to the establishment of order—an order which is really new as compared with the chaos left behind by political and economic individualism or with the hegemonies built on the destruction of freedom which are the outcome of Communism, Fascism and Nazism. The underlying principle and the end of such organization must be the good of the human person which is the good of humanity.

We firmly believe that no true peace or prosperity can be achieved without the observance of these principles.

The lesson of Totalitarianism is that we must go back to the first principles of the Christian conception of the world which is, for us, the basis of action. The neglect of these fundamental truths has favoured the progress of Totalitarianism and has too often made our own action fruitless. Through concentrating on what is inessential in politics and economics we have too often failed to keep in mind what is essential and all-important. Reason has denied itself by denying the transcendency of the absolute or by worshipping false absolutes; force alone remains. The very errors of the totalitarian systems make us more aware today of the value of these first principles ; it is only by reasserting them and by attaching ourselves to them with our whole being that we can oppose to the dynamism of the false prophets the unconquerable power of the liberating Truth.

This Manifesto was written at the time when the United States, attacked in their turn, entered the war against the Axis Powers. The moral and spiritual meaning of the struggle has been clearly brought out by President Roosevelt in his speech to the American episcopate: "The United Nations seek to work for the restoration of an international order in which Christ

guides the hearts of individuals and of nations." We, Europeans of all nations residing in the United States, wish to express our solidarity with the great American Democracy and our will to co-operate with all our strength in the efforts of U.S.A., Canada, and the other countries of the New World for the common victory which means also the victory of our peoples and the liberation of Europe.

The signers of this Manifesto are Catholics from Europe now working in North America. Among many names we select the following:

CHARLES BOYER (French).
 M. A. COUTURIER, O.P. (French).
 J. T. DELOS, O.P. (French).
 J. V. DUCATILLON, O.P. (French).
 SIR PHILIP GIBBS (British).
 WALDEMAN GURIAN (Russian).
 OSCAR HALECKI (Polish).
 DIETRICH VON HILDERBRAND (German).
 HELEN ISWOLSKY (Russian).
 HENRI DE KERILLIS (French).
 AUREL KOLNAI (Hungarian).
 JACQUES MARITAIN (French).
 RAISSE MARITAIN (French).
 PETER MOMMERSTORG (Dutch).
 ALFRED NOYES (British).
 BAUDOIN SCHWARZ (German).
 FRANK SHEED (British).
 YVES SIMON (French).
 LUIGI STURZO (Italian).
 THOMAS MICHELS, O.S.B. (Austrian).
 SIGRID UNSET (Swedish).
 AUGUSTE VIATTE (French).
 PAUL VAN ZECLAND (Belgian).

THE CATHOLIC ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH TRADITION

EVERYONE who studies, however superficially, the history of England is inevitably struck by the strange divergence of our laws, politics and social traditions from those of our Continental neighbours, a divergence which cannot wholly be explained by our geographical isolation. The survival into modern times of aristocratic rule and leadership under demo-

cratic forms, and the widespread liberty of speech and writing combined with a profound respect for law and order, puzzle and intrigue almost every foreign observer of our life and institutions. The "free constitution" which has so long been the boast of England was not the offspring of the Revolution of 1688, still less was it the outcome of the Protestant Reformation: it is at least seven centuries old, and its origins must be sought far back in our country's Catholic and mediaeval past.

The field in which England differs most strikingly from her European neighbours is that of Law. Two great systems of law have in the course of history exercised an incalculable influence on mankind. One was that of Rome, which survived the fall of the Roman Empire and became the basis on which the legal institutions of most of the great nations of modern Europe have been built. The other is the Common Law of England, which arose in this country in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and which has been carried by the progress of British imperial expansion into almost all corners of the globe. It is necessary to explain how this latter system arose and in what important respects it differed from its Roman rival.

It has been well observed that Rome thrice conquered the world, first by her arms, secondly by her religion, and thirdly by her law. In its early days Roman law may not have been vastly superior to other contemporary legal systems, but the astonishing spread of Roman military and political power over the whole Mediterranean region and beyond transformed the law of a single city on the Tiber into that of the entire civilized world of the West, until there came a time when men could conceive of no other law save that of Rome. The decrees of the Senate and the edicts of the Emperors were obeyed over a vast domain from Scotland to Syria. But no attempt was made to reduce to order and system the huge chaos of legislation which had slowly grown up in the course of centuries until the Roman Republic had given place to the totalitarian World Monarchy of the Caesars. When the law was finally codified the Roman people had long ceased to govern themselves and were inured to the absolutism of their autocratic Emperors. Many of the great jurists who took a leading part in this codification were natives of the Oriental provinces of the Empire, where Western notions of constitutional freedom were quite unintelligible. To them the Emperor was the source of all law. Hence when the complete Civil Code was issued by Justinian in the sixth century it contained a maxim applicable to then existing political conditions which was to exercise a dark and fateful influence over the future of Europe. This

maxim read: *Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem* ("What pleases the Prince has the force of law").* In short, law was a mere expression of the ruler's will. These six Latin words have formed the basis of many a despotism, and their effect is visible around us today.

But Justinian's Code was destined never to be administered in our country, for when it was published Britain had ceased to form part of the Empire and had been abandoned to Anglo-Saxon invaders from North Germany. These ruthless barbarians wiped out almost all trace of Roman civilization from this island. When the "second Roman conquest" took place, when, that is, Pope Gregory sent St. Augustine to convert the heathen Anglo-Saxons to Christianity, little remained to show that the land had ever obeyed the mandates of the Caesars. In no other province of the West was the destruction of Roman culture more complete, a fact from which flowed a most significant result. The Church, the only civilizing agent of those days, could set to work to build up in England on virgin soil a law more closely conforming in many respects to Christian ideals in politics than existed anywhere else in Christendom. On the Continent, in France, Italy, Spain, South Germany and elsewhere, Roman law was never wholly extinguished; the barbarian kings drew up codes directly based upon it, and when from the eleventh century onwards more settled conditions succeeded the wars and invasions of the Dark Ages, the study and use of the Justinian Code itself was revived first in Italy and then in other countries of Western Europe. The Church strove to Christianize this pagan law, with but fair success. It was long before divorce ceased to be granted in the civil courts. So enormous was the prestige of Rome and her law that the Church authorities themselves succumbed after a time to one of its most obnoxious features. Roman law had permitted the torture of suspected criminals: this practice was taken over by the Inquisition, with unhappy results.

Now the Catholic conception of Law differed considerably from that of the Roman jurists. To the pagan there was no appeal beyond Caesar; to the Christian Caesar himself was subject to the law of God, as St. Ambrose told the Emperor Theodosius, when the latter was made to do public penance for the massacre of Thessalonica. True law was the expression not of the will of the prince but of the will of God. The Middle

* The full context of this celebrated passage is as follows; "Sed et quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, cum rege legia, quae de imperio ejus lata est, populus ei et in eum omne imperium suum et potestatem concessit. Quocumque ergo imperator per epistolam constituit, vel cognoscens decrevit, vel edicto praecepit, legem esse constat." *The Institutes of Justinian*, lib. i, tit. ii, 6.

Ages had no use for the tyrant; the Popes pronounced sentence of excommunication and deposition against many a royal sinner, and theologians gravely debated the merits and methods of tyrannicide. St. Thomas fully recognizes the right and even the duty of resistance to tyranny. The teaching of the mediaeval theologians, in the words of Sir William Holdsworth, "made for that theoretical supremacy of right, legal or moral, which all through mediaeval history we see both in public and private law. We may rightly regard this as the real and lasting debt which our modern law and politics owe to the law and politics of the Middle Ages. If the nations of Europe had not been thus trained and drilled by mediaeval thinkers to acknowledge the supremacy of the idea of right, the struggle of the succeeding centuries between the nations of modern Europe would have been far more bitter—so bitter that they might well have proved fatal to the continued development of Western civilization."* Yet only in England did this doctrine of the rule and sovereignty of law become of practical effect instead of remaining an abstract proposition to be debated in the schools. To see why this was so we must look a little into the history of England in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The Norman Conquest gave England a unified and centralized government such as no other country of Western Europe possessed till many years later. William the Conqueror, with the prestige of a brilliant military victory behind him, was in no mood to share his power with his barons, as other kings were compelled to do in the days of feudalism. He and his successors laboured to build up a strong central government, to keep the baronage in subjection, and to set up all over the land courts of justice staffed by the King's judges and not by judges appointed by some local landowner. The revived study of Roman law was then in full swing on the Continent; William's great minister, Lanfranc, had studied it at Pavia, and in 1139 Vacarius arrived in England to lecture on it at Oxford. The Norman and Plantagenet kings, being absolutists at heart, welcomed it as tending to strengthen the royal power, and the great legal reforms of Henry II were intended to destroy as many as possible of the rival jurisdictions of feudalism and to replace them by one law common to the whole country and administered by the King's own representatives. Henry, however, attacked the Church courts as well as those of the barons, and his unsuccessful

* *A History of English Law*, vol. ii, pp. 131-2. Bishop Stubbs long ago pointed out that the continued survival all through the Middle Ages of numerous small states in the midst of powerful kingdoms is a striking testimony to the mediaeval respect for law and right; a fact worth noting in the circumstances of today.

conflict with St. Thomas of Canterbury was the first serious blow to the prestige of the Angevin Monarchy.

Had Henry II been succeeded by strong and clever monarchs like himself, England might well have become an absolute monarchy, as the other great states of Western Europe were destined to do. But when he died in 1189 the monarchy rapidly declined. Richard I spent nearly all his time abroad on the Crusade. John, who succeeded him, rendered himself universally odious by his tyranny, cruelty and misgovernment. Thanks to his incompetence, nearly all the overseas territories of the Angevins, including Normandy, were lost to the French. This loss was a blessing in disguise. It forced the barons to choose between England and Normandy. Most of them had estates on both sides of the Channel. They could now either give up their Norman estates and keep their English ones, in which case they became Englishmen themselves in a generation or so, or they could give up their English estates and keep their Norman ones, in which case they became Frenchmen and passed out of English history. The distinction between "Norman" baron and "Saxon" peasant tended to disappear, and in consequence a strong national "English" patriotism grew up in the thirteenth century.

John's folly checked for ever the trend of the monarchy towards absolutism based on Roman law. It united against him the three chief classes of mediaeval society : the clergy, the baronage, and the merchants. The clergy had not forgotten the murder of St. Thomas, and John's violent quarrel with Pope Innocent exasperated them still further. The barons were eager to recover their former powers, but realized they could achieve nothing without the co-operation of the other two classes. The merchants of the big towns had been badly treated by the King and joined in the movement against him. All three classes, led by a patriotic churchman, Archbishop Stephen Langton, united against John and forced him to sign Magna Carta in 1215. That celebrated document, "the first great charter of English liberties", did not, as later enthusiasts pretended, contain provisions for trial by jury and Habeas Corpus procedure, but it was a striking and effective nationwide protest against arbitrary interference with personal liberty and with the rights of property, two things always dear to the hearts of Englishmen.

The long reign of John's son and successor Henry III (1216-1272) was of crucial importance in the evolution of English law and liberty. Henry was not like his father, a cruel tyrant, but he was weak and incompetent and surrounded himself with

foreign favourites whose presence and practices affronted the rapidly rising national feelings of the people. During his minority the judges in the new courts set up by his grandfather, Henry II, proceeded to lay down, interpret and administer a law which, though a few features are admittedly borrowed from Roman law, is yet peculiarly English. For the absence of a continuous Roman tradition in England prevented the wholesale reception of Roman law, and as there was no authoritative text, such as the Justinian Code, to refer to, lawyers acquired the habit of appealing to previous judicial decisions which seemed to bear on the case under consideration. While the Continental courts grew more and more bound to the rigid text of the Civil Code, English law became self-developing and "broadened out from precedent" to "precedent". National feeling since the loss of Normandy grew at such a pace that jealousy was felt not only of Roman civil law but even of the Canon law of the Church, codified in the previous century in Gratian's great *Decretum*. When at a Council held at Merton in 1235 it is proposed to change the bastardy laws in order to bring them into conformity with the Canon law, the barons protest in a famous phrase *Nolumus leges Angliae mutare* ("We do not wish the laws of England to be changed"). English conservatism—one might almost say English Toryism—is already born. But the Common Law of England was as yet a plant of tender growth, and its Roman rival, with all the prestige of its mighty past, might yet have triumphed over the presumptuous upstart had there not arisen at this critical juncture a great priest-lawyer whose writings gave the Common Law a standing which enabled it to repel for ever the *third* Roman invasion of our country.

The man who was to establish fundamental principles of English law which have never been seriously contested from that day to this was Henry de Bracton, and if, as is probable, he was born and educated at Bratton Fleming, near Barnstaple, the liberties of England may be said to have sprung from a Devonshire village. His teacher in law and perhaps in theology (for the legal and clerical professions were not yet separated and judges were invariably churchmen) was William of Raleigh, who held the living of Bratton Fleming before becoming a judge of the King's bench and bishop of Winchester. Bracton's outstanding abilities marked him out for rapid promotion. In the Church he became successively rector of Bideford, arch-deacon of Barnstaple, and chancellor of Exeter Cathedral, appointments all within his native county. In the law he became a justice in eyre and judge of assize for the south-western coun-

ties, and he served on various legal commissions during the troubled period of civil war at the end of Henry III's reign. Though never a partisan, Bracton may be supposed to have had some sympathy for the baronial party, and it must not be forgotten that he was the contemporary and perhaps the adviser of Simon de Montfort. He died in 1268 and was buried in the nave of Exeter Cathedral.

Bracton's fame rests upon his treatise on the laws of England (*De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae*), a work which "had no competitor either in literary style or in completeness of treatment till Blackstone composed his commentaries five centuries later".* Its popularity is attested by the fact that nearly fifty MSS. of it exist, all dating from before 1400, that numerous summaries and epitomes of it were circulated among several generations of law-students, and that when it was first printed in 1569 it enjoyed, as it were, a second "life", was eagerly read by jurists and politicians, and was quoted on both sides as a recognized authority during the conflict between the Stuart Kings and their Parliaments in the early seventeenth century. The book took many years to compile and was never finished. Its statements were copiously illustrated by actual cases which came under Bracton's notice on the bench and which he summarized in the famous Note Book discovered by Sir Paul Vinogradoff in the British Museum in 1884 and published by Maitland three years later.

The most important part of this book from our point of view is its discussion of the relation of the King to the law. Bracton was a priest and a theologian as well as a lawyer, and while admitting that the King is supreme ruler of the country and has no peer, he none the less holds strongly the Catholic doctrine that the law has an independent existence of its own, and—this is the crucial point—the King himself is subject to it. "*Ipse autem rex,*" he says, "*non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem. Non est enim rex ubi dominatur voluntas et non lex.*" (*De legibus*, f. 5b.) No political maxim ever made a deeper impression on English public life than Bracton's forthright dictum: "The King is under the Law, because the Law makes the King." No greater contrast could be imagined between this and the *Quod principi placuit* of the Roman lawyers or the teaching of the later theorists of sovereignty from Bodin onwards, who held that "Loy est le commandement du souverain touchant tous les sujets en général." The one led ultimately to the constitutional and democratic movement of modern times, the other to the unrestrained absolutism of king

* Holdsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

or dictator. But what if the King refused to be bound by the law and played the tyrant? Bracton, writing in the age of Simon de Montfort and in a country irritated by the follies and misgovernment of Henry III, declares that the baronage and all those who form part of the Curia Regis may then restrain him. So did his contemporary St. Thomas hold that a ruler who failed in his duties towards his people and grievously oppressed them could and should be resisted by the chief men of the kingdom, a doctrine which led Acton to describe the Angelic Doctor as "the first Whig". But Bracton's apparently simple statement was to have tremendous repercussions on English politics in later years. The modern theory of sovereignty had not yet been invented, but when the question came to be asked: Where does the sovereign power in the English State reside? the answer obviously could not now be: In the King alone, but, In the King and his Curia. But Parliament was an offshoot of the Curia Regis, whose legislative powers it inherited; hence the later jurists decided that sovereignty resided in "the King in Parliament". Such was the origin of the "mixed constitution" of England, in which the powers of the Crown were restricted by the elected representatives of the nation.

Bracton lived long enough to see the first faint beginnings of Parliamentary government in England, for Simon de Montfort's famous "Parliament", containing elected representatives of the boroughs, met in 1265, three years before the great jurist's death. It is not perhaps an exaggeration to regard the representative principle as a peculiarly Catholic one. In the ancient world it was virtually unknown, since the great Oriental monarchies (Babylon, Assyria, Persia, etc.) were arbitrary despotisms and the city republics of the Classical Mediterranean world were used to their citizens taking a direct part in the government of these tiny states and could not conceive of the idea of delegated authority. The great Church Councils were in a sense the first Parliaments, and the representative gatherings which assembled at intervals in the thirteenth century (the Fourth Lateran 1215, and the two Councils held at Lyons in 1245 and 1274) and spoke and acted in the name of all Catholic Christendom, must have familiarized Western Europe with the idea of representation. By 1300 Parliaments were springing up everywhere, in England, in France, in the Spanish kingdoms. Yet their active careers were short, and in a century or so they had faded into impotence and oblivion. The authority of a Cortes or a States-General diminished rapidly in face of the growing autocracy of the Crown. Only in England did Parliament advance from strength to strength, until it acquired almost complete control

over taxation and legislation. In the fifteenth century Sir John Fortescue, Chief Justice of the King's Bench in the reign of Henry VI, wrote a sketch of the laws and constitution of England which might with a few alterations pass for a description of our government today, so little essential change has there been in the structure of the English State since the Middle Ages. After commenting on the limitations of the King's power and on the authority of Parliament, he continues : "The Statutes of England proceed not from the Prince's pleasure as do the laws of those kingdoms that are ruled only by regal (i.e. absolute) government . . . for so much as they are made not only by the Prince's pleasure, but also by the consent of the whole realm . . . and if it fortune those statutes, being devised with such great solemnity and wit, not to fall out so effectually as the interest of the makers did wish, they may be quickly reformed, but not without the consent of the commons and states of the realm, by whose authority they were first devised."* Nor did the remarkable political freedom of England escape the notice of foreign observers such as Philip de Comines, who, writing about 1490, remarked that "of all the countries in the world with which I am acquainted, the government is nowhere so well managed, the people nowhere less subject to violence and oppression, nor their houses less liable to be destroyed and demolished by war than in England".† Foreign praises of the English Constitution did not begin with Voltaire and Montesquieu in the eighteenth century.

The reasons for the survival of a free government in England when the rest of Europe, with few exceptions, was sinking into dependence on the will or whim of a despot have often been enumerated. The geographical insularity of the country protected it from invasion and did away with the necessity of maintaining a strong standing army, always the firmest prop of arbitrary government. The barons, being too weak to fight the King alone, were compelled to seek the alliance of the rising mercantile class, whereas on the Continent the merchants were protected by the King against baronial oppression and hence supported him against the great feudatories. The English law of primogeniture, by which landed property descended to the eldest son alone and was not divided equally among all the children as was provided by Roman law, had the effect of reducing the younger sons of barons to the status of mere commoners and prevented the growth of a true order of nobility in England. On the Continent all the sons of peers were themselves peers;

* Fortescue, *De Laudibus Legum Angliae*, c. 18.

† *Mémoires*, liv. v., c. 18.

in England the younger sons held only "courtesy" titles, had no right to sit in the House of Lords, but were eligible for election to the House of Commons. In England only the more important tenants-in-chief of the King received a writ of summons to the House of Lords; the less wealthy or influential formed a kind of lesser, non-titled aristocracy, the country gentry, the knights of the shire. These men, not being eligible for a seat in the House of Lords, were often chosen by their tenants at the elections in the county courts as representatives for the Commons, and thus the Lower House came to consist not only of middle-class "burgesses" (the Tiers État of foreign Parliaments) but also of country gentlemen. Thus the English Parliament was never rigidly divided into three "Estates" (clergy, nobility, and commons), and the dividing line between the various classes in the community was always blurred, never sharp and well-defined. A rich merchant might become a peer, and high-born knights and squires sat with drapers and grocers on the benches of the House of Commons.

But these reasons, though important, are by themselves insufficient to explain the divergence of English from Continental political development. It was the Common Law which created and protected the freedom of England, and it was Bracton who gave that law the strength to stand firm against its Roman rival. Had there been no courts to dispense Common Law, there could have been no Parliament to deal with common politics. The earliest M.P.s came to Westminster as suitors in the King's Court, carrying with them petitions from their constituents, the suitors in the county courts, praying for a redress of grievances. When it was found that many of these petitions covered the same field and dealt with grievances common to all, Parliament became a political arena, rather than a court of law, for "while individual grievances are matters of law, national grievances are matters of politics".* Hitherto there had been many "liberties", but no liberty. There were the liberties of the Crown, the liberties of the barons, the liberties of the Church, the liberties of the chartered town, and so forth. One man's liberty was another man's servitude, and it was the Common Law which gradually created the notion of a "liberty" common to every Englishman. Between Parliament and the Common Law the closest alliance has always existed. The former was long known as the "High Court" of Parliament, and the House of Lords is to this day the Supreme

* Pollard, *The Evolution of Parliament*, p. 60. Elsewhere Professor Pollard notes that the greatest merit of Parliamentary government is that "it substitutes the force of argument for the argument of force".

Court of Appeal in Great Britain. The Common lawyers championed Parliament from the first; no quarrel between them and the two Houses has ever been recorded, and no judge has ever declared invalid an Act of Parliament.

When, towards the end of the thirteenth century, priests ceased to be lawyers and the law became a specialized, secular profession, judges, barristers, and advocates formed themselves in mediaeval fashion into guilds and established themselves in the Inns of Court, which have formed for nearly seven centuries a "judicial university", where the Common Law has been taught to successive generations of students. Roman law has been studied academically at Oxford and Cambridge, but it was never allowed to touch the practice of the courts, where the Common Law reigned supreme, ultimately to establish itself in the British Dominions and in the United States, in lands which Bracton never knew. The maxims which that great priest-lawyer laid down concerning the sovereignty of law have never been seriously challenged in our land and are the true foundations of English liberty. On the Continent, where Roman law won the day, it has been a different tale. Two examples will suffice.

Speaking of the France of Louis XI, Fortescue says: "If anyone be impeached for a state crime, though by his known enemy, it is not usual to convene him before the ordinary judge, but he is very often examined in the king's own apartment, or some such private place; sometimes only by the king's pursuivants or messengers: as soon as the king, upon such information, shall adjudge him to be guilty, he is never more heard of; but immediately without any formal process, the person so accused and adjudged guilty is put into a sack, and by night thrown into the river by the officers of the provost-marshal, and there drowned: in which summary way, you have heard of more put to death than by any legal process. . . . Other things of a like irregular nature or even worse are well known to you, during your abode in France and the adjacent countries; acted in the most detestable, barbarous manner, under no colour or pretext of law than what I have already declared."* After a lapse of nearly five centuries, what do we find in modern Germany, a country where a wholesale "reception" of Roman law took place at the end of the Middle Ages? On the famous "Night of the Long Knives", 30 June, 1934, hundreds of German citizens were dragged from their beds, carried off to prison courtyards, where, terrified, bewildered, and utterly ignorant of the nature of their supposed crimes, without the faintest

* Fortescue, *De Laudibus*, c. 35.

semblance of legal process, they were shot down like dogs. A few days later, in a speech to his puppet Reichstag, Hitler declared: "For twenty-four hours I was the Supreme Court of the German nation." *Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem.* "What pleases the Fuehrer has the force of law!" If such horrors are unthinkable in this country, it is because great Catholic jurists such as Bracton taught us long ago to respect the rule of law, and a series of fortunate circumstances or historical accidents ensured that their teaching should be translated into actual practice. As the law of any country is but the reflection of the philosophy of its legislators, we may truly claim that the Common Law of England was built upon sound Catholic foundations. The freedom we defend today against a cruel and arbitrary tyranny is assuredly no abstraction, but a real and positive achievement which, whatever the ultimate fate of our nation and empire, may well remain for all time England's greatest contribution to the heritage of humanity.

J. J. SAUNDERS.

THE BENEDICTINES IN POLAND

POLAND owes the beginnings of her Catholic faith and civilization to the Benedictines. As in the case of England, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Scandinavia and the Germanies, the Benedictines were the pedagogues by whom infant Poland was reared into nationhood. The purpose of the following pages is to show not only the debt which Poland, and indeed the Slavs in general, owe to the Black Monks in the heroic age of their missionary endeavour, but also the varying fortunes of several of the different Benedictine Branches in the later centuries of Polish history.*

* Polish Benedictine history has not yet been systematically written; but there is abundance of available information scattered in mediaeval sources. Besides Mabillon's *Annales O.S. Benedicti* and DD. Mittarelli's and Costadoni's *Annales Camaldulenses O.S. Benedicti*, the following works will be helpful: Kentyński, *Codex Diplomaticus monasterii Tineensis*, 1876; *Annales Lubinienses*, 1143-1175; in M.G.H., *Script.* XIX, 578-580; Bielowski, *Mon. Poloniae Hist.*, T.I., p. 154; T. III, p. 619; T. IV, p. 220; T. VI, p. 385; M.G.H., *Diplom.*, T. II, p. 482 sqq.; *ibidem*, *Script.*, T. XXIV, p. 224; Abraham, *Organizacja Kościoła w Polsce do potony wieku XII*, Lemberg, 1890; L. Kulczyński, *L'Organisation de l'Eglise de Pologne avant le XIII siècle*, Grenoble, 1928; Th. Chavot, *Les Monastères de Cluny en Pologne*, in *Ann. de l'Acad. de Mâcon*, XV, 1850, pp. 15-20. Then there are the five works published by the eighteenth-century Polish Benedictine abbot, Stanislaus Seczygielski: *Aquila Polono-Benedictina*, Cracow, 1663, pp. 376 in 12 (a most interesting medley of Polish Benedictine memories); *Calendarium Benedictinum*, *ib.*, 1663; *Tinecia, seu Historia monasterii Tineensis*, O.S. Benedicti, *ib.* 1668, in 4; *Pbarus Benedictina universum Orbem irradians*, *ib.*, 1669; *Liber Pentlicus de Commendatariis Regularium Praelatis* (a better title is given in the introduction: *De miseriis Regularium sub commenda existentium*), Vilna, 1681, pp. 200 in 12.

From the eighth to the twelfth century the frontiers of the Holy Roman Empire, South and East of the Baltic, swarmed with peoples, still pagan and uncivilized, who belonged to a common stock known to their German neighbours as the Slavs. As soon as most of the German tribes had received the Christian faith, owing chiefly to the titanic efforts of St. Boniface and his English Benedictines, the monks turned their eyes eastwards to that welter of pagan peoples inhabiting the basins of the Danube, Vistula, Dnieper, and the Oder : Wends, Czechs, Poles, Russians, and Magyars. Their evangelization was repeatedly undertaken by the German abbeys of Fulda, Kremsmunster, Salzburg, Niederaltaich, and St. Emeram of Ratisbon. Moreover, political considerations prompted the German Emperors, especially the Ottos and St. Henry II, to foster the apostolic enterprise of the monks. But no lasting results were achieved until the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century. The first monks who evangelized Poland came from Fulda.* Mieszko (Mieczyslaw) I (962-992) was converted to the Faith by Jordan, a German Benedictine, who became the first bishop of Poznam. He was succeeded in the see by another Benedictine, Unger, probably abbot of Memleben.† Most of the people seem to have followed their King into the Christian fold, though the sequel showed that this conversion was from loyalty rather than conviction.

The history of the decisive evangelization of Poland—as also of that of Bohemia and in part of Hungary—centres round St. Adalbert of Prague, venerated to this day by the Polish people as their Apostle, and this although the Saint stayed only about eight months at Gniezno.

Adalbert, born at Prague in 956, was a Czech. His native name was Woytiec, “Help of the Army”, but he took the name of Adalbert when he received confirmation at the hands of St. Adalbert, also a Benedictine, archbishop of Magdeburg. Raised in 983 by the Emperor Otto II to the see of Prague, he became greatly discouraged by the apparent ill-success of his labours and obtained from Pope John XV permission to resign. Then, with his brother Gaudentius (Radim, Radzyn), he became a Benedictine in the monastery of Saints Boniface and Alexius on the Aventine Hill in Rome. After five years of monastic life the pope ordered Adalbert back to Prague. He left for Bohemia accompanied by his brother and a colony of monks. Twice he tried his fortune among his countrymen and twice he had to

* L. Kulczysky, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

† M.G.H., Diplom., T. II, p. 482, n. 75; B. Gams, O.S.B., *Series Episcoporum*, Leipzig, 1931, p. 347.

abandon them. After the second failure he turned his steps towards Poland, accompanied again by his brother and other companions. They were received with great honour by Mieszko's son, Boleslaus I (992-1025), and worked most successfully among the Poles for several months, but while on a missionary expedition to Danzig, Adalbert was martyred by the Prussian pagan priests on 23 April, 997. Boleslaus had the martyr's relics translated to the church at Gniezno, which thus became the national shrine of the Poles. The martyr's brother, St. Gaudentius, was chosen in A.D. 1000 first metropolitan of Gniezno.* He died in 1006.† Before his martyrdom St. Adalbert had established a Benedictine abbey in Poland.‡ The sources speak also of another monastery at Kazimierz, near Poznam.§

St. Adalbert had been a familiar figure in Rome and in other parts of Italy, where at that time St. Romuald, a friend of the Martyr, was engaged in building hermitages and monasteries under the Benedictine Rule. The news of the Apostle's martyrdom was received in Italy with unbounded enthusiasm, especially among the Camaldoleses. St. Romuald himself set out for the mission to the Slavs accompanied by twenty-four companions. He never reached his goal, but some of his disciples pressed on and established themselves near Gniezno, where they seemed to have admitted to their ranks several recruits from among the native population. In 1004 five Camaldoleses—Saints Benedict, John, Isaac, Matthew, and Christinus (or Christian), usually styled "The Five Polish Brethren"—were put to death by robbers and were canonised some centuries later by Pope Julius II.|| About the year 1020 two more Benedictines, Saints Andrew Zoerard and Benedict, both Poles, died at Zobor, the former a natural death, the latter slain while praying at the tomb of his former companion.¶

It was owing partly to the moral backing he received from the monks that King Boleslaus succeeded in making himself independent from foreign rulers and in declaring Poland a kingdom. However, after his death in 1034, there was a pagan reaction, which destroyed much of what had been achieved. This persecution closed the first period of the Benedictine apostolate in Poland.

* Dobner, *Mon. Hist. Bohemiae*, T. III, Prague, 1774, p. 15.

† B. Gams, O.S.B., *op. cit.*, p. 347.

‡ Bielowski, *op. cit.*, T. I., p. 154, etc.

§ I b., T. VI, p. 385.

|| Dom Mittarelli and Dom Costadoni, *Annales Camaldulenses O.S. Benedicti* Vol. I, Venice, 1762, pp. 246 sqq. *et passim*.

¶ Bollandists, July, T. II, p. 669; July T. IV, pp. 326-338, *et alibi*.

The second period begins with the accession of Casimir I, the Restorer (1040–1058). Casimir is said by some writers to have been a monk of Cluny* and to have been dispensed from his vows by Pope Benedict IX on account of the need of the Polish nation, now a prey to anarchy. Whether or not this be true, Casimir was certainly on intimate terms with the Cluniacs.

The restoration was soon in full swing. Monks were summoned from all quarters, particularly from France, and in all probability also from the Walloon abbey of St. James of Liège,† which had recently adopted the Cluniac Custumary. The bishop of Liège, Herman by name, was an uncle of King Casimir. St. James was then, we are told, renowned for its schools, to which students came from many parts of the world, notably from Poland.

From 1040 to 1140 a score or so of Benedictine abbeys, six of them Cluniac, were founded in Poland. The most important of these was the monastery of Saints Peter and Paul at Tyniec, near Cracow.‡ It was wealthy and observant and seems to have exercised some sort of jurisdiction over the other Polish abbeys. Its abbot was certainly styled *Archabbas*. Aaron, a Frenchman, who was the first to bear that title, was raised to the see of Cracow (1046–1059)§ by King Casimir. The cathedral chapter of Cracow, in the beginning at any rate, was made up half of monks, half of secular clergy. The monks came from the Belgian abbey of Stavelot.|| Another great centre of Benedictine life was the abbey of Our Lady of Lubin, near Poznam, founded about the year 1048, probably by St. James of Liège. Lubin was the monastic home of the first Polish chronicler, Martin Gallus (beginning of the twelfth century).¶ The abbey of Saints John the Baptist and Benedict at Mogilno, diocese of Gniezno, was founded in 1064. These and all the other Benedictine abbeys were subject to the Polish sovereign, who either appointed the abbots direct or exercised the right of confirming the election. Each abbey had a school attached; the most famous of all was that of Tyniec. The Cluniacs were regarded, particularly by the nobility, as the élite of the monks.**

* Cf. *The Historians' History of the World*, Vol. XXIV, *History of Poland*, London, 1908, p. 14. Most recent writers deny that Casimir was ever a monk.

† Dom Berlière, *Une Colonie de Moines Ligériens en Pologne au XII^e siècle*, in Rev. Béné, 1891, pp. 112–114; ib., 1896, pp. 112 sqq.

‡ Cf. S. Seczygielski, *Tinecia* (v. *supra*); Kentrzynski, *Codex Diplomaticus monasterii Tineensis*, 1876; Mabillon, Ann., IV, p. 398.

§ B. Gams, O.S.B., *op. cit.*, p. 347.

|| Cf. *Les Cahiers de St. André*, St.-André-lez-Bruges, May, 1938, p. 65.

¶ Cf. *Annales Lubinenses* (v. *supra*); also J. Paech, *Die Geschichte der ehemaligen Benediktinerabtei Lubin*, 1908.

** Cf. Th. Chavot, *Les Monastères de Cluny en Pologne*, in *Annu. de l'Academ. de Mâcon*, XV, 1850, pp. 15–20.

The Black Benedictine nuns entered Poland at an early date, probably from the nunnery of St. George at Prague, which had been founded in 987 by Bl. Milada, a sister of the Duke Boleslaus II of Bohemia. She was blessed in Rome as abbess of the new foundation by the Pope himself. In the Acts of the martyrdom of the Five Polish Brethren there is mention of some *sanctimoniales* praying at the place where the Martyrs had been put to death. Presumably they were the first Benedictine nuns in the land. The earliest actual foundation of which we have documentary evidence is that of Riga in 1186. Others followed: at Staniatki in 1228, under the jurisdiction of Tyniec; at Lomza (1274); at Culm (1274); at Schönwald (1330), etc.

In the wake of the Cluniacs came the Cistercians. In 1143 the German abbey of Altenberg, of the line of Morimond, founded Wongrowitz, in the diocese of Gniezno. Several other foundations were made in the course of the same century: Lad (1146); Sulejow (1177); Wachock (1179); Koprzywnika (1185), etc. As in most other parts of Northern Europe, the Cistercians played a great part in Polish economic life as colonists and agriculturists. They also claim several outstanding personalities of Polish history, the most important being St. Vincent Kadlubek (Kadlubko—"of the Roses"), second Polish chronicler and bishop of Cracow (1208-1218). He resigned his see and joined the Cistercians at Jedrzejow, where he died in 1223.* The Cistercian nuns also flourished in Poland. We find during the thirteenth century Bl. Benigna, a nun at Vratislaw, who died in 1241 (feast, 20 June); St. Hedwig (*d.* 17 October, 1243), daughter of Count Berthold IV of Andechs, educated by the Benedictine nuns at Kitzingen, married (1186) to Henry I, Duke of Silesia and Poland, and, in her widowhood, nun at the Cistercian convent of Trebnitz, which she had founded, and where another saintly nun, (Bl.) Gertrude of Trebnitz (*d.* 1270), became abbess; and finally, St. Cunegundis (*d.* 24 July, c. 1290), Duchess of Poland and Cistercian nun at Sandeez.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries may be described as the period of the *Commendam*. Those who wish to learn the evils that it brought to the Polish Benedictines may read the pages of Abbot Stanislaus Seczygielski in his *Liber Penthius* mentioned above. It makes a sad reading. The abbot describes what he had himself experienced. Let it be remembered that the commendatory abbots were forced on the monks, and that

* B. Gams, O.S.B., *op. cit.*, p. 349: "S. Vincentius Kadlubek, 1208-1218 (*d.* 8 mart. 1223) . . . qui anno 1246 *Sanctis adscriptus est. Annales Poloniae primus historicorum P. conscripsit.*"

they were mostly lay people or parasite ecclesiastics who lived on the revenues of the abbeys and completely neglected the welfare of the community.

But even this period is not one of unredeemed barrenness. Tyniec was still a powerful centre of spiritual life. At Lubin we find the saintly Benedict Kostka (*d. 1540*), who died in the odour of sanctity and who has been given the title of *Beatus*.^{*} He was a relative of young St. Stanislaus Kostka. Among the nuns there was one who distinguished herself as an ardent champion of the Catholic cause against Luther: this was Anne Toschel (*d. 1582*), Benedictine abbess of Riga, who is said to have died in her 130th year. She too has been given the title of *Beata* by popular veneration.[†]

Meanwhile, throughout Europe, the Benedictines, both Black and White, were busy in grouping themselves into monastic Congregations in order to withstand the prevalent evils of the times, particularly that of the Commendam. In 1580 the Polish Cistercians came together and formed the Congregation of Poland, which counted fifteen abbeys and three convents with a common house as a college for the young professed. Much more important, and indeed one of the most noteworthy of all the European Black Benedictine groups of that period, was the Congregation of the Holy Cross of Poland, which, when canonically erected by Pope Clement XI in 1710, had already been in existence for about a century. About the year 1610 Casimir Radziwill had invited the Cassinese monks from Italy to restore the Lithuanian abbeys; the Cassinese answered the summons and in addition refounded the two houses of Holy Cross and Castrum Cassinense. These two abbeys, together with a Lithuanian and seven Polish monasteries, coalesced into one Congregational unit—*Congregatio Benedictino-Polonica Castro-Cassinensis*. Naturally enough it retained much of the spirit of the Italian Cassinese. It was noted, particularly during the eighteenth century, for the holiness and learning of its members.[‡]

The Camaldoleses of the Congregation of Monte Corona, founded by Bl. Paul Giustiniani, established their first hermitage on Mount Argentine, at Bielany, near Cracow, in 1609, also at the invitation of Radziwill. By the middle of the eighteenth century they had opened seven more houses.[§]

* Mgr. Holweck, *A Biographical Dictionary of the Saints*, 1924, h. 1.

† Mgr. Holweck, *op. cit.*, h. 1.

‡ Cf. Dom Th. Lecissotti, in *L'Italia Benedettina*, Rome, 1920, p. 46.

§ The story of these foundations is most interesting. Cf. Abbot Dom Placid Lugano, *La Congregazione Camaldolesa degli Eremiti di Monte Corona*, 2nd ed., Rome, 1908, *passim*. There is also a copious bibliography for the Polish houses.

The revival of the Polish Black Benedictine nunneries makes a romantic story. The heroine of the restoration was Mother Magdalen Morteska. The ancient nunnery of Culm, which at one time had an average of 250 nuns, was in 1570 almost deserted. In 1578 Magdalen Morteska received the habit there, and, after a short novitiate of scarcely six months' duration, was professed and made abbess (1579). She at once embarked upon her life work by enforcing a diligent observance of the Holy Rule with the addition of a rather uncompromisingly severe customary. As a result there were over one hundred professions within two decades. The original rigour was somewhat toned down by Mother Morteska herself in her Constitutions, which were approved by Clement VIII in 1605. One interesting innovation introduced by Mother Morteska was the foundation of a seminary for the training of future chaplains and directors of convents: this measure yielded excellent results. The nuns were employed in education. The new observance, called *Reformatio Culmensis*, spread rapidly throughout the land, and from 1579 to 1631 produced eight fresh foundations or restorations in Poland and six in Lithuania.

Finally the French Benedictine nuns of the Perpetual Adoration opened a house and college at Warsaw in 1688 and another at Lwów in 1716. Both have survived to this day.

Unfortunately the majority of the abbeys and nunneries listed above failed to survive the partition of Poland in the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic suppressions. In 1806 a group of German monks, driven from their monasteries, made a heroic attempt, under the leadership of Dom Gregory Th. Ziegler, who died in 1852, bishop of Linz, to revive the Benedictine life in Poland, but in 1810 they were expelled from the country. However, since 1880 numerous Poles have joined German, Belgian, Austrian and American abbeys, and after the first World War several successful attempts have been made to replant the Benedictine Order in Poland. In 1922 the Czech abbey of Emaus in Prague, of the Beuronese Congregation, recovered what was left of the old abbey of Lubin, and on 17 October, 1929, Cardinal Hlond solemnly blessed the new monastic buildings. The Community then numbered some thirty to forty members—all Poles.* In 1936 the Belgian abbey of St. André established the “Internat Sw. Benedykta” at Rabka, in Southern Poland, which gave great promise of future prosperity.†

* Dom Romanus Rios, *Boletín de Información Benedictina*, 1930, Barbastro, p. 272.
† *Les Cahiers de St. André*, 1938, pp. 65-70.

The Camaldoleses still retain their hermitage on Mount Argentine at Bielany, several of whose monks from 1920 to 1926 attended the Benedictine University at Sant'Anselmo in Rome.* The Community is very large, very fervent, and entirely Polish.

The Cistercians, too, succeeded in remaining at the old abbey of Mogila (Clara Tumba), near Cracow, which had been founded in 1222. Moreover, in 1918, they were able to restore the abbey of Szczyrzyc (Mons Ciricii), founded in 1234 and suppressed in 1794.†

Finally, by decree of the Holy See, signed 14 January, 1933, the Polish Black Benedictine nunneries of Lomza, Lwów, Kieswiez, Przemysl, Staniakty and Wilno, were grouped together into the Congregation of the Immaculate Conception of Poland.‡ Each convent is autonomous with an abbess for life, vows of stability, independent administration and its own novitiate; but every six years a chapter is convened and one of the ruling abbesses is elected Abbess-President for twelve years and is given two of the other abbesses as Assistants. She makes a canonical visitation of every convent. The Congregation is also helped by the services of an Abbot-Visitor, chosen by the Holy See from among the Benedictine abbots: he visits each convent every six years and is present at the General Chapter as ecclesiastical adviser. The nuns for the present take only simple perpetual vows. Moreover, there are still the two convents of the Perpetual Adoration at Warsaw and at Lwów and a nunnery of Armenian Benedictines attached to the Mechitarist Congregation.

We say, there are still. But we may well ask whether they have survived the German occupation of their land. There is little doubt that both monks and nuns have suffered, and suffered grievously. However, as this short sketch has shown, the Polish Benedictines have learned to suffer persecution for Christ's sake and also to bide better times. Let us hope that the day is not far distant when the sons and daughters of St. Benedict may be free once more to work and pray for Poland and in Poland.

ROMANUS RIOS, O.S.B.

* See *Litterae Annales Collegii Sti. Anselmi de Urbe*, Rome, 1920-1926.

† *Catalogus Generalis . . . Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis*, Rome, 1931, pp. 53 and 100.
‡ Dom R. Rios, *ut supra*, 1933, pp. 271 sqq.; *Annales O.S. Benedicti*, Subiaco, 1931, pp. 82, 220-224; 1932, pp. 196-197.

ENOCH AND HIS ANGELS

DURING Mr. Winston Churchill's historic visit to Washington, he and the President found to their delight that they shared an unusual interest in the Upper Nile. Mr. Roosevelt asked his guest to autograph an old copy of Churchill's *The River War*, and the author declared that his host was the only person he knew who had read the book which had originally inspired the Prime Minister's interest in the Sudan as a boy, James Bruce's *Travels to Discover the Source of the Blue Nile*.

This James Bruce of Kinnaird, Esquire, had aroused considerable excitement in Oxford in 1773 when news arrived that the first British visitor to Ethiopia had not only traced the Blue Nile to its source but had recovered the lost *Book of Enoch*. Indeed, a certain Dr. Woide was in such a flurry when he heard that a transcription of *Enoch* was already in the Bibliothèque Royale that he repaired at once to Paris, and this despite the assurance of Mr. Bruce that he was bringing another copy of *Enoch* to the Bodleian. But to be among the very first to scan the precious document seemed well worth a trip across the Channel to the impetuous don, whose erudite curiosity hurried him in wig and cocked hat from the Isis to the Seine. Yet, such are the vicissitudes of fame that, as Mr. Churchill avers, there are very few today who have ever heard of either Bruce or Enoch.

It certainly meant very little to a New York audience in 1940 when Maxwell Anderson closed his play, *Journey to Jerusalem*, with a purported quotation from the *Book of Enoch*, read by the boy Jeshua.

A city is but the outer hull or garment
Of the faith which dwells therein. . . .

There was once a city
Whose walls were destroyed by music blown against them,
But the walls of every city are raised up
By music, and are held foursquare in the sun
By a peoples' singing.

The lines were palpably the modern poet's, but the mention of Enoch aroused the curiosity of one member of the audience, and I owe my introduction to Bruce and the prophet to Mr. Anderson's spurious quotation. But most of all I have enjoyed meeting Enoch's angels.

The first Enoch mentioned in the Bible is the son of Cain, but the prophet who is supposed to speak in the *Book of Enoch* is descended from Adam's third son, Seth. This Enoch, father to Methuselah and great-grandfather to Noah, is quoted in the

Book of Zohar in the Jewish *Kabbala* and also in the *Epistle of St. Jude*:

Dearly Beloved, I was under a necessity to write to you to beseech you to contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints. For certain men are secretly entered in—ungodly men, turning the grace of our Lord unto righteousness and denying the only sovereign Ruler and Our Lord, Jesus Christ. . . . Now of these, *Enoch* also the seventh from Adam prophesied, saying: "Behold the Lord cometh with thousands of His saints to execute judgement upon all and to reprove the ungodly for all the works of their ungodliness, whereby they have done ungodly and of all the hard things which the ungodly have spoken against God."

It thus appears that Mr. Anderson was justified in assuming that Christ as a boy had read the *Book of Enoch*, as it then apparently enjoyed both popularity and reverence. It seems quite possible that the Mother of the Zebedees may have been recalling God's promise to Enoch about the righteous, "I will place each one of them on a throne of glory", when she begged of Our Lord that her sons might sit on His right hand and on His left hand in His kingdom. Certain it is that the early Christians continued to read *Enoch*, as Iraeneus, Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria all refer to him, but the doubts harboured by Origen culminated in the rejection of the whole book by SS. Augustine and Jerome. Even the *Epistle of St. Jude* suffered suspicion for a time for its mention of *Enoch* whose writings were never included in the Jewish canon. Not a single copy of the prophecies is known to have been in existence in the Middle Ages, and the last reference to them occurs in the eighth century, when an ambitious Byzantine clerk, George the Syncellus, prepared a comprehensive digest of events from Adam down to Diocletian. For eight hundred years after Syncellus the waters of oblivion close over *Enoch*. It was a Renaissance scholar, an opponent of Erasmus, by the proud name of Julius Caesar Scaliger, who unearthed Syncellus' cosmic chronicle, but, since the quotation from *Enoch* did not include the verse in *St. Jude*, nothing was proved and *The Book of Enoch* continued to tantalize the learned. Among these a traditional rumour persisted that a copy of *Enoch* might be found in Ethiopia, but it was not till another three hundred years had passed that a descendant of the royal Bruce brought the fabled realm of Sheba's queen into the orbit of modern travel.

James Bruce of Kinnaird had both the curiosity and the diligence required of a linguist. Soundly grounded in Latin and Greek at Harrow, he neglected Blackstone for a study of the Italian poets in Edinburgh, and having acquired French, Spanish and Portuguese during his travels as a wine merchant,

he turned to the languages of the Orient. In Holland he was able to collect books necessary for the study of Arabic, to which he later added Hebrew, Chaldaic and Syriac; he also acquired Ludolf's dictionaries of Amharic and Geez, the living and dead languages of Ethiopia. Taking too seriously—as royal ingratitude was later to prove—a hint from Lord Halifax that preference was certain to come to the traveller who discovered the Nile's sources, Bruce employed himself as Consul for Algiers in polishing his Arabic, mastering his Amharic dictionary and in being tutored in the diseases of Northern Africa and their care by a British surgeon and physician. Thus instructed and armed with a medicine chest, a dispensary and some treatises, “I flatter myself,” says Mr. Bruce, “that I did not occasion a greater mortality among the Mahometans and Pagans abroad than may be attributed to some of my brother physicians among their fellow-Christians at home.” Dressed as an Arab, but confessing himself to be a Christian physician, Bruce made careful drawings of the classical ruins along the coast so famous in 1940, being shipwrecked in Benghazi, where the Arabs were dying of famine but were too lazy to go fishing. He finally entered Ethiopia from Massaua in Eritrea, and the success of his medications on the royal family undoubtedly saved him from death in many unpleasant forms, as his hosts were apt to blind or flay such of their enemies as they did not keep in cages, while corpses strewed the street in front of the palace in Gondar. It was two years before Mr. Bruce could make good his escape across the desert to Egypt, but he brought with him the location of the fountains of the Blue Nile as well as transcriptions in Geez of the most noteworthy Abyssinian MSS. and three copies of the *Book of Enoch*, which was there, sure enough, in the Ethiopic Bible just before the *Book of Job*. On his return to Scotland, after flattering receptions in Paris, Rome and London, Mr. Bruce undertook a translation of *Enoch*, but soon lost interest in it, as did the Coptic enthusiast, Dr. Woide. “I fancy that Dr. Woide was not much more pleased with the conduct of the giants than I was” is Bruce’s comment. Still imprisoned in Geez, the *Book of Enoch* then lay for another fifty years on the shelves of the Bodleian till Richard Lawrence, Professor of Hebrew and later Archbishop of Cashel, made a translation with notes in 1833. Since then there have been three versions in German, one in French and another in English as late as 1893 by R. H. Charles.

Modern scholarship rates the *Book of Enoch* as a compilation of older MSS. and, from the length of the days in different seasons described in the calendar, the editor is judged to have lived in Egypt rather than Palestine. The identity of “Enoch” thus re-

mains misty but, whether he was author or editor, wrote Aramaic or Egyptian, lived 2000 or 200 B.C., he possessed a continuous and passionate interest in angels.

The first books are concerned with those mysterious verses in *Genesis*:

The sons of God seeing the daughters of men that they were fair, took to them wives of all they chose. . . . Now giants were upon the earth in those days. For after the sons of God went into the daughters of men and they brought forth children, these were the mighty men of old, men of renown.

Enoch describes the vision in which he saw the wicked angel Samyaza lead down to earth two hundred angels with seventeen prefect angels who bound themselves with horrid execrations to follow out his designs on Mt. Hermon. Then taking to themselves mortal wives, these renegade spirits began to initiate them in the art of sorcery and incantation. "The rebellious spirits were the inventors of Astronomy and Divination as Enoch delivers the account," notes Clement of Alexandria. The natural sciences were not wholly neglected, such as the uses of roots and the classification of trees, but fecund seeds of mischief were sown by a prefect angel, Azazyel, who instructed mankind in the forging of swords and weapons, in the fabrication of mirrors and the workmanship of ornaments and bracelets and even troubled to suggest to women such devastating details as the beautifying of eyebrows. Here is the root of Tertullian's enthusiasm for Enoch as the African ladies worried the rugged moralist sorely with their vanities. How portentous and helpful it was for him to be able to say on good authority that plucked eyebrows, jewels, dyes, mirrors, and all the other appurtenances of luxurious African boudoirs could be traced directly to Satan's minions, the fallen angels!

In his sermon on "The Dress of Women", Tertullian thunders:

"Those same Angels who introduced gold and silver and the mixture of colours which advance the lustre of female beauty, are now condemned by God as Enoch informs us."

Then to Enoch was also shown the eternity of punishment meted out to those same Sons of God, the unfaithful Watchers of the Heavens, who deserted their celestial office for mortal lusts. Looking down on the quantity of blood being shed on earth in the days when the giants were destroying and eating both animals and men, the great Archangels said one to another, "The souls of those who are dead cry out and complain to the great court of Heaven."

And the Most High, the Great and Holy One said to Raphael:

"Bind Azazyel, hand and foot, and cast him into darkness."

To Enoch was vouchsafed leave to examine the infinite abyss in which lay the fallen Watchers where those stars, which had not followed their proper orbit, form the fiery barrier.

"And the Angels who kept not their principality but forsook their own habitation, He hath reserved under darkness in everlasting chains unto the judgement of the great day,"

is St. Jude's version. "The catastrophe of the giants and the justice of the catastrophe fully satisfied me," remarks Mr. Bruce.

If Mr. Bruce had continued his translation, he would have learned what friendly guides Enoch found in the Archangels. With them he stepped behind the scenes in Heaven. In the timelessness of eternity he faced the mysteries of creation. He saw in the primal waters, Leviathan, and on the new-made land, Behemoth, which were to provide food for the children of men. He beheld the Fountain of Righteousness which never fails, and the Tree of Knowledge, "a species of tamarind, bearing fruit which resembles grapes exceeding fine". At the extremities of the earth, he marvelled at the Twelve Gates of the Winds; and Uriel explained to him the progress of the moons and showed him the receptacles of the hail and snow and dew. Enoch noted that the frost has its angel and that a good angel is in the hail. A solitary spirit dwells in the snows which surround it like vapour and is called refrigeration. Still more angels guard the mists and regulate the rains. Always the flutter of their wings is near. They keep count of the tender new leaves; they are watching over them even when they wither and fall. One can feel the heat of the long Egyptian summer which was parching Enoch's pen as he wrote a message to his readers to have confidence, for, says he, "while you seek for a covered and shady spot from the burning sun, while the earth is scorched with the fervid heat and you become incapable of walking up on the ground or the rocks", even then the angels are keeping their watch of the seasons in their invariable course. It must have been a relief to turn from those burning sands to a vision of the rivers of Paradise, running clear as hyacinth, where the air is sweet with the clean perfume of holiness and the firmament is filled with angels—myriads and myriads of them—while through them pass on their majestic missions, the radiance of Michael and Raphael and Gabriel and the Cherubim and Seraphim and Orphanim surround the inconceivable beauty of the Throne, "and these are they who never sleep".

The Archangels also confided to Enoch the office to which each one of them was assigned : Uriel is the dread guardian of Clamour and Terror ; Raguel and Sarakiel have the awful mission of punishment to both the dwellers on earth and the luminaries of Heaven ; to Michael is confided the care of the nations and of human virtue, and, with true prescience of what that duty might mean, Enoch calls him Michael the Patient ; Raphael, the healing one, watches over the souls of men and their sufferings and Gabriel tends the Cherubim and Paradise. To envision Gabriel winging his way down to Nazareth straight from the blazing glory of the celestial choir seems to crown the story of his visit to the little Virgin.

One angelic picture conjured by Enoch seems unique in its description of the two angelic attendants by the High Throne who pass to messenger angels long ropes with which they fly down to measure the deeds of the righteous. Twice Enoch makes mention of these golden strands which seem to bind so closely the souls of the meek to the high arch of Heaven. In his *Gospel of St. John*, Lord Charnwood has dismissed *The Book of Enoch* as "a rubbishy collection", but only to one other poet do the hovering wings of the angels over the world seem to sound so near. Though William Blake died before Archbishop Lawrence translated *Enoch*, the Egyptian and the Englishman seem to have shared a mystical vision. What a drawing Blake could have made of those measuring ropes in angelic hands ! What innocent tenderness he infuses into the picture he invokes from his "angel-guarded bed" of the spiritually-peopled night when "silent move

The feet of angels bright;
Unseen they pour blessing,
And joy without ceasing,
On each bud and blossom,
And each sleeping bosom.

"They look in every thoughtless nest,
Where birds are cover'd warm;
They visit caves of every beast
To keep them all from harm.
If they see any weeping
That should have been sleeping,
They pour sleep on their head
And sit down by their bed.

"When wolves and tigers howl for prey,
They pitying stand and weep;
Seeking to drive their thirst away,
And keep them from the sheep."

With Luke and John, Blake and Enoch shared a continuous consciousness of angelic hosts.

The later chapters of *Enoch* deal in quite another fashion with the history of the Flood. The prophet first foretells the birth of Noah, "an infant redder than the rose, with hair whiter than white wool and eyes like rays of the sun", who will save his sons when the Angel of Punishment opens the mighty waters. Enoch then goes on to relate Jewish history in terms of zoology: Cain and Abel browse about as black-and-red heifers; Abraham is a large white cow; Jacob is a white sheep, etc. As the Gentiles are assigned to less domestic animals, the Egyptians appear as wolves, the Samaritans as boars, the Philistines as dogs, the Midianites as asses, while the lesser tribes are kites, ravens and birds of prey. The Hebrew kings are the Good Shepherds, their conquerors the Bad Shepherds. Could it have been that in the days of the Long Captivity Jewish children were taught the history of their race in such seemingly harmless guise?

After this fantastic interlude *Enoch* closes majestically with prophecies which convey two great contributions to Jewish theology: the promise of Immortality and the mystery of the Incarnation. The immortal quality of the soul is acknowledged in the book shown Enoch by the angels in which is marked the reward of those men who have not been covetous of earthly riches, of whom God promised :

I will bring them unto the splendid light of those who love my holy name and I will place them on a throne of glory and they shall be at rest during unnumbered periods.

The Incarnation is foreshadowed in the verses :

They shall behold the Son of Woman sitting on the Throne of His Glory.
From the beginning the Son of Man existed;

and this one, even more magnificent :

All the Kings, the Princes, the exalted and those who rule over the earth, shall fix their hopes on the Son of Man and shall pray to Him and shall petition Him for mercy.

Though Uriel, Guardian of Clamour and Terror, may seem to hover over the world in this year of 1942, and the punishments of Raguel and Sarakiel are falling from the skies, *Enoch* bids man look up to where Michael the Patient is still watching the nations and Raphael waits to shelter the suffering in the healing cover of his wings. May some small angel messenger convey one vote of thanks to James Bruce of Kinnaird, Esquire, for bringing back *Enoch* to Oxford.

EUPHEMIA VAN RENSSLAER WYATT.

BRENTANO AND THE PRUSSIAN TRADITION

(On the Occasion of the Centenary of Clemens Brentano's Death)

CLEMENS BRENTANO was a native of the "freie Reichstadt", Frankfurt on the Main. He spent his youth and early manhood with his friend and future brother-in-law, Ludwig Achim von Arnim, who was one of the Brandenburg Junkers who strove for the rebirth of the Prussian spirit in the years of the Napoleonic domination. At the age of thirty-nine Brentano, son of a Catholic father and of a mother brought up as a Lutheran, found his way back to the Church ; he passed the last twenty-five years of his life as a pious penitent in prayer and meditation.

The concept of the "German Reich"—the idea of Prussianism—the rule of the Catholic Church : these were the three decisive powers underlying the history of the German mind which took on reality after 1800 in the German Romantic movement : Brentano's life, stormy and unbridled at its outset, aloof from the world at the end, reflects a whole period of development of the German spirit.

It is easy to describe Brentano's later years. After he had made his general confession in 1817 under the influence of a young girl, Louise Hensel, daughter of a Lutheran pastor who later on became a convert, and had renounced all worldly desires, he passed six years at the sick-bed of a stigmatized nun at Duelmen, and later portrayed "the Life of our Lord and Saviour according to the Visions of the Holy Anna Katharina Emmerick". On the literary side he only came forward with some fairy tales which he published in 1838 for the benefit of the poor. After the death of Anna Katharina Emmerick he spent some years in the Rhineland ; later on he lived in Munich, an outwardly unsettled, inwardly peaceful existence. This existence presents no problems, it is the quiet life of a man who had overcome the world, and who struggled in solitude for inner freedom between repentance and grace.

But before Brentano found the haven of the Church he was a Romantic poet. And under the spell of the romantic way of thought he helped to create one of the most important and significant developments : the linking up of the concept of the "Reich" and the idea of Prussianism. In the eighteenth century these two conceptions developed side by side—often even on opposing sides ; romanticism brought them together for the first time, and this event, which has frequently received the misleading title of "Restauration", marks the beginning of a spiritual current

which—badly misconceived—found its historical outcome in Bismarck's Reich.

The twofold root of modern German history has often been described; it is the history of the "Heiliges Roemisches Reich Deutscher Nation", and at the same time the history of Prussia. For Goethe as a youth the two terms were still historical reality; in his memoirs he describes the two opposite poles of "Kaisерlich" and "Fritzisch" political standpoints. For the romanticists, however, both the old "Kaiserreich" and the old Prussia were already legends. The Kaiserreich had outlived its fame, it could survive up to the Napoleonic era only by reason of its great mediaeval tradition, and as long as it still persisted the historical present overshadowed the legendary picture. But when there was no longer a "Heiliges Roemisches Reich Deutscher Nation", and in its place merely nation states which in some cases had no historical tradition but had been created more or less artificially by Napoleon, then there were no longer any bounds set to the pleasure of the depicting of myths. In the romantic era an individual who pronounced the word "Reich" did not think of Vienna or the Emperor Joseph, he conjured up before his eyes visions of Gothic cathedrals, mediaeval jousts, or the image of the Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa sitting in Kyffhauser or in the Untersberg—till his beard had grown three times round the table—when he would come again and "found the Reich". This was when the word Reich began to invest itself with its mystical significance—though already Luther's translation of the Bible had coined the term "Reich Gottes" for "Kingdom of God". And it was no coincidence that in the old Lutheran hymn "Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott" the last line, "Das Reich muss uns doch bleiben", when sung by German protestants, aroused sentiments in their hearts which were certainly more of this world than of the next: the Reich is a mission, given by God to the Germans. Luther certainly did not intend it so, nor was it the teaching of the Lutheran Church, but the peculiar double significance of the word "Reich" persisted in spite of this. And the romanticists, including Brentano in his "Maerchen vom Mueller Radlauf und vom Hause Staarenberg", continually came under the spell of the magic sound of the word "Reich".

Shortly after 1800 the word "Prussia" also gained an almost legendary quality. The Prussian State had been very considerably deprived of its sovereignty during the Napoleonic wars, and many Prussians of this epoch became very sensitive about having "fallen away from true Prussianism". This concept of true Prussianism later disappeared from the public consciousness

on account of the Western idea of the military regimented state and disturber of the peace of Europe. But at one period a true Prussianism really did exist—in Friedrich Wilhelm I's state. When this monarch undertook the task of reorganizing a small and badly neglected country he had to assign to his officials difficult and hard work in uncivilized districts without being able to reward them commensurately. He could only offer them one compensation—the feeling of superiority which is accorded to the “elect” who can regard themselves as being “above the common herd”. To serve the King of Prussia—so Friedrich Wilhelm I taught his officials—is a felicity which the chosen few willingly paid for by the sacrifice of worldly wealth. That is a typical attitude of religious sectarians, and Friedrich Wilhelm I could force this belief on his officials because he himself spoke from religious conviction. In other words: Prussianism in its original meaning is an attitude of mind which was born from the spirit of religious pietism. It held exactly the same place in German history as Puritanism did in English history. But it is the common fate of sectarians that the humble belief in the holy mission turns to pride and arrogance, and thus pietistic Prussianism gradually deteriorated; the belief disappeared, and what remained was the arrogance of a privileged caste. And then in 1806 this caste was defeated by Napoleon in the battle of Jena and Auerstedt. Consequently upon this there arose the call for a “regeneration of Prussianism”—Prussia became a myth as the Reich had become before, and the bearers of this myth were once again the romantic authors, above all the particular circle which was called the “Berlin Romanticism”, and to which Brentano and his brother-in-law Achim von Arnim belonged.

Neither, however, the idea of “Reichs-mysticism” nor that of Prussianism as conceived by the Romanticists suffice to explain Clemens Brentano's beginnings as a poet. His early writings are only to be understood by means of aesthetic terms, and—perhaps—by remembering his origin. For the Brentanos were a North-Italian family, and Clemens belonged to the first generation of this immigrated family which really felt rooted in the new homeland. The Brentanos came from Como and Tremezzo—like other Italian families, as importers and exporters—to Frankfurt, and until the middle of the eighteenth century they had to struggle against the resistance of the local traders. They were looked upon as “interlopers”, and lived in close quarters in a kind of voluntary ghetto, and were not regarded as citizens with equal rights. The poet's father, Peter Anton Brentano, was married in the first place to a cousin, Walpurga Brentano-Gnocco; when he as a still youthful widower, left with six children, looked

about him for a new marriage partner in 1775, the position of the Italians in Frankfurt was already so much more favourable that he could aspire to a German alliance : he married Maximiliane, daughter of the "Staatsrat" La Roche and of his wife Sophie, who was the first German woman novelist, and also one of the first supporters of higher education for women, and a close friend of Goethe and Wieland. Poor Maximiliane, whose path had crossed with Goethe's shortly before her parents forced her into marriage with the Italian widower (the Lotte in "Werther" is obviously modelled upon her), bore twelve children to the husband she did not love, and then in the autumn of 1793 she died as quietly as she had lived—the daughter of a famous mother and the mother of two outstandingly gifted children : Clemens and Bettina.

As Clemens grew up his grandmother's fame had already paled, and the time when Goethe had skated with Maximiliane on the Main was long past ; what he had to experience was the unyielding presence of the stern father who insisted that his son should be a merchant. So Clemens became the ne'er-do-well and obstinate boy who, while an apprentice, ornamented the business ledgers with drawings and poems, and proved himself as a disturbing element whenever he could in the family firm.

In 1797 Peter Anton died. He bequeathed his children a considerable fortune. Clemens deserted the merchant's calling and became student in Jena. He entered wholly into the circle of the Romantics, and devoted himself to literature. His early writings are still entirely untouched by the events of the time and the leading political ideas of the period. Any trace of "comment on the times" shown in them were just fashionable incidentals, single, detached remarks which Brentano adopted from his older friends, Schlegel, Schelling and the other members of the romantic circle, without attaching any peculiar meaning to them : he never was a philosopher to be attracted by theoretical speculations. His only interests were his own Ego, and the peculiar reflections in which he mirrored the world. He took himself seriously, and his early literary attempts, such as the novel *Godwi*, are entirely autobiographical. He also took literature seriously, and as he had a distinct sense of humour, and was able to caricature his own seriousness, he could produce some striking literary satires such as *Ponce de Leon*, a masterpiece of romantic irony. The sole philosophical thought which young Brentano grasped was the conception of friendship as understood by the Romanticists : "In our epoch to be capable to stand alone means to be a giant", he once wrote, taking the dogma of the Jena romantic group for his own that great thoughts only spring

from united strivings. It was this idea of romantic “συμψιλοδοψίαν” by which he was enabled to proceed from more or less idle writings to more serious work when he had found his companions—the poetess Sophie Mereau, ten years his senior, who married him in 1802 (and who died in 1806) and the friend Ludwig Achim von Arnim who in 1811, after a long courtship, became the husband of Clemens' sister Bettina.

Through his companionship with Achim von Arnim, Clemens Brentano realized for the first time the significance of political thought for the romanticist's work. He saw that one could not write without reference to one's age and its trends. He certainly attempted to dissuade Arnim from becoming a soldier, and throwing himself away in “a miserable quarrel about an acre of land”; but the “invisible church of art” which he aspired to serve no longer stood for the artificial manipulation of forms and styles, it was the serious work for the romantic periodicals which Arnim started in their Heidelberg period, and above all the work on the collection *Des Knaben Wunderhorn*. Here for the first time in Brentano's literary career the historical sense is to be seen. The two friends collected old folksongs, rewrote them, and prepared them for the press because they recognized in the songs of a bygone age the great inheritance of their present, the legend of the “great German idea” which under the yoke of Napoleon's rule was now shattered and lost. That was for the moment not yet “Reichs-mysticism” nor was it “the myth of Prussianism”—it was “Folk-mysticism”, which means the conviction that in the great tradition of folklore and folksong could be found the strength which might lead to the rebirth of the oppressed nation. The *Wunderhorn* was an educational deed, it was meant to be a summons to remind men of the noble past, and bring about a better future; and thus the two versions of the national legend became a part of the “Folk-mysticism”, the *Wunderhorn* suddenly was considered a mighty instrument to bring about the concepts of “Reich” and “Prussia”. Brentano, son of the “freie Reichstadt”, was principally concerned with German tradition, he was stirred by the thoughts of tourneys and Imperial splendour, of mediaeval festivals, and the peculiar magic of ancient forms—a world which had nothing of the prosaic sameness of his own time, but which was merry, festive and universal. Thus he became, quite unawares, a prophet of the “Reich”, and it was left to the readers of the *Wunderhorn* to picture this “Reich” for themselves, either as the mediaeval past or as the political future in which the deadly particularism of petty states would be overcome.

It was during the time when Napoleon was at the height of
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his power that Arnim and Brentano published the *Wunderhorn*. Thus the thought of unity joined itself unwittingly with the idea of the struggle against France; and that was the natural heritage of Arnim, descendant of Prussian Junkers. Brandenburg-Prussia—he was taught as a boy—took the initiative in the seventeenth century under the “Grosser Kurfürst”, and in the eighteenth century under the “Grosser Koenig” when the emperor was too weak to direct the policy of the Reich—Prussia would also know how to take the lead in the war against Napoleon. These thoughts of the Prussian Arnim influenced Brentano in his vision of the Reich—so unwittingly the idea of the future Reich springing from the Prussian spirit became a political conception. That does not mean that Arnim and Brentano were consciously the inaugurators of the nationalistic conceptions of their time; the combined work of the two friends shows clearly how in the romantic era the two legends were interwoven, and created the political idea which paved the way for Bismarck’s Reichs unity. Arnim, who, when a student in Goettingen, distributed patriotic war poems of his own composing to the soldiers, and planned to edit a periodical called *Der Preusse*, was now able to direct his enthusiasm to the thought of the mediaeval Reich, and to write his poem “Paracelsus” which extolled the old seer as herald of the coming Reich (a definitely mystical way of thought, for the old Swiss doctor Paracelsus had certainly not thought out any political dogma, on the contrary his “Reich” was a mere theological conception). On the other hand Brentano, who originally started off from the absolutely un-Prussian Reichs idea, now became—like his Brandenburg friend, like all the Junkers of the “Berlin Romanticism”—the poet of a cantata to the Prussian Queen Louise, and the author of a play *Victoria*, which was intended to be part of the victory celebration after the war of 1813. And his *Fairy Tales*, the most beautiful creations of romantic prose, are full of allusions to contemporary events; for example, when after the death of the “good king Laudamus” the king “Jerum” (Jerome) starts a reign of terror in the land of “Scandalia”.

“Berlin Romanticism” is the keyword which enables us to show in what a peculiar manner “Reich”, “Prussianism” and Church were welded together, and became the foundation of a political conception. By this term we understand a loosely connected group of authors who came together shortly after 1800 in the Prussian capital. They held political opinions in common, they stood in opposition to the tendencies of the government, they regarded themselves patriots, and were sworn enemies of Napoleon. They joined themselves loosely together

in various societies. First the "Nordstern", a literary club which gathered itself round the dramatist de la Motte Fouqué, the members very much impressed by the *Wunderhorn*. The *Nordstern* was linked up with the periodical *Pantheon*, which the Berliners and their friends then domiciled in Heidelberg (among them Arnim and Brentano) tried to make their party organ. And then there was the "Liedertafel", a society directed by Goethe's friend Zelter, which originally was founded in 1807 to encourage male choral singing. Zelter set to music for this choir many poems from the *Wunderhorn*, and soon the society was the centre for all the romantic Prussian patriots, and at its meetings there was really more concern with politics than singing. In 1810 Heinrich von Kleist started his periodical *Berliner Abendblätter*, to which Brentano was also a contributor, and which had similar aims to those of the Liedertafel. And one year earlier Arnim and Brentano came from Heidelberg to Berlin where Arnim, in 1811, founded one of the patriots most important clubs, the "Christian German Luncheon Club", whose members met twice a month to dine together in a famous Berlin tavern. There were always the same men: higher civil servants, poets and critics, and professors of the newly founded University such as Fichte, and Brentano's brother-in-law Savigny—and their head was Adam Mueller, the German Edmund Burke. Mueller struck out on all sides in his lectures about Frederic the Great, in his work *Elements of Political Science*, and in his paper *Phoebus* he attacked the liberal doctrine of Adam Smith, and also the theories of the French revolution. He fought against Schiller's and Goethe's Weimar classicism, as he considered it to be mere aestheticism, and not at all a model for modern Germans, and he fought against the group of the "older Romanticism", because the philosophic concepts of the brothers Schlegel and their friends seemed to him just as insufficient for a new political ideal.

Mueller's starting-point was the phrase: all human freedom consists in submission to Christ and to the Fatherland. There can be no question what the Church stands for in Mueller's conception—he himself went over to the Catholic Church in his early youth—but it is hard to decide what "Fatherland" stood for in his teaching. It was neither the rebirth of the old mediaeval "Reich" nor was it the revival of Prussia, it was a new Germany that was to form itself from the legends of Reichsmysticism and genuine Prussianism. This is the crucial point for German politics in the new century, this is the birth of all the good and evil developments of the nineteenth and even the twentieth century. The statutes of Arnim's Christian German Luncheon Club which was conceived along the lines of Mueller's

ways of thought, reveal the main tendencies : "Jews and Philistines" could not become members. That is to say, anti-Semitism was a trend of the programme of the Berlin Romantics, but it is important to realize what Mueller, Arnim and Kleist held against the Jews—not an unfounded race theory such as is taught by Fascism, but the falling away of a once chosen people from its mission : "the lost nobility became a curse, for all defiled nobility becomes depravity". That is a clear statement—but what is a "Philistine"? Clemens Brentano answered this question from the viewpoint of the Berlin circle of friends in his treatise : "The Philistine before, in, and after History". This amusing satire was read to the Christian German Luncheon Club in 1811, and was afterwards printed—it was the farewell of the romantic poet Brentano to the intellectual world in which he had lived, his last attack on the prosaic world which he had detested ever since the time when he had scribbled in the business ledgers of his father's firm. Philistines are people who "combine political cunning and low standards", who "are always concerned to destroy everything that distinguishes their fatherland from other countries". They "destroy whenever they can all customs and tradition; everything that no fate, not even death itself can cast away, the mysterious imprints by means of which the generations hand down to their descendants affection for and attachment to the spot on which they dwell are stamped out by the Philistines". That was directed against the shallow outlook of the enlighteners, and it is Adam Mueller's fulminatory manner against French "Rights of Man" and English economic liberalism. On the whole it was an appeal to national pride, and it can thus be said that here the roots of modern German nationalism are clearly to be seen.

And yet not altogether. For this Fatherland that should arise from Christian faith and Prussian spirit was certainly not the Germany which Bismarck brought into being sixty years later, it is really the romantic "Reich". This Reich, which Novalis dreamt of in his essay "Christianity and Europe", and which Adam Mueller visualized, was really not a military power formed under Prussian rule, but the regeneration of the old "Reich" through the spirit of "sense of duty" (born in Prussia), and through the European idea of the Church. The hoped-for German unity was to find its meaning in the idea of a Catholic Europe: "Of the five powers which make up the centre of modern history: France, England, Italy, Spain and Germany, each one in itself forms a political entity, and between these national states not an international law but the Christian religion will be the mediator which alone is worthy of this throne above

the living nations. Religion would give the great community of Europe its form and its visible character."

This is the conception of the Berlin Romanticism. It is of Prussian origin, that is to say it sees in Prussianism the seed of a German national state, it is at the same time anchored in the thought of the "Reich", which means of the Church, which means of European unity. The dreams did not mature. Kleist took his own life, Arnim became a solitary farmer on his estates in the Mark, Adam Mueller wore himself out in barren opposition to the tendencies of the time, and Clemens Brentano sat at the feet of the dying Katharina Emmerick, and transcribed her visions. Romanticism died, and with it the great conception of the fusion of Prussianism, Reichsidea, and Church in the unity of Europe.

WERNER J. MILCH.

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE AND HIS DAUGHTERS

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE was once the impassioned opponent of a critic who had ventured to criticize Madame de Sévigné. It might surprise her champion to know that a comparison would be made between him and the great Marquise in the sphere in which he, and the world, considered her incomparable.

Joseph de Maistre, however, is one of the Great Misjudged. It is true that his Catholic apologetics have emerged from a too-long seclusion on back bookshelves, his philosophic sociology, for all its anti-democratic bias, has of late regained much of the recognition with which it was formerly acclaimed.

It is the *personality* of the writer that time has so queerly distorted. Those of us whose education was considered incomplete without considerable acquaintance with the Maistre brothers, Joseph and Xavier, could not but regard the elder as merely an austere compiler of maxims, a heavyweight champion of the Papacy—both brothers as, no doubt, imposing, but imposingly dull.

The biographers of the time did little to remove an aura of tedium from the brothers' records; they reprobated, rightly but sententiously, the duel which led to Xavier's confinement to barracks and the writing of his famous *Voyage autour de ma Chambre*, and his other equally light-hearted aspects they ignored; Joseph was shelved, by his well-meaning Catholic eulogists, as what later generations would call a bore. The Maistres'

real personalities have emerged from the private letters and the Court and social gossip in diaries of the time. That Joseph de Maistre was the precise opposite to a bore is further proved from his own letters, including those to many women friends published after his father's death by his only son, the Count Rodolphe de Maistre. The letters have, indeed, much of the wit, charm and literary excellence of his great predecessor in the art, Marie-Françoise de Sévigné. He did not set out, as we suspect and rather hope, did the Marquise, to sparkle and enchant—his are a man's letters; he thought her incomparable rather on account of her talent than her character; for choice, he said, he would have married the daughter, then removed to a distance to get letters from the mother. . . .

But as well as being the learned and noble personage that the special pleading of his contemporaries alone depicted, Maistre was, through no fault of his own, not only a wit but a citizen of the world, and the Great World, an accomplished courtier and ambassador. Far from joking with difficulty, he loved laughter, and sometimes laughed at what his biographer-traducers might have considered unsuitable matter for one of his calibre—at any rate on paper. For if their ideal biography was a rather virulent *vie-de-sacristie*, they were still human beings in private life!

The Count de Maistre had not learnt the arts of diplomacy or social success. His upbringing had been rustic, if intellectual; Lamartine described his home a bright but modest country-house near Chambéry, open to the sun and the plains flanked by the snowy outposts of the Alps,

une vallée au couchant
Où la montagne aux grandes ombres
Verse la nuit en se penchant.

True that Chambéry was close by and that it was a capital with a great castle and dukes of its own, but the Dukedom (of Savoy) was only a part of the distant kingdom of Sardinia with its dull Court at Turin. True, too, that Chambéry prided itself on its culture and literary traditions; had it not produced *'romans de chevalerie'* and other earliest French printed books? Had not the first real French grammar—that of Vaugelas—emanated from its arcaded streets? The whole lovely neighbourhood was, indeed, steeped in literature. Lamartine had enshrined it in a classic, his *Lac* whose love-story—the one, that is, by which he is best remembered—had evolved on the shores of Lake Bourget and in the streets of Aix-les-Bains that run up from its skyey waters; Rousseau had left his trail of sentimental humanism at Chambéry itself, from *Les Charmilles*, above the city, his unfortunate

children had, one by one, been carried down to the poor-house. Strangely, too, Chambéry was proud of its spoken French, though France could detect its accent—Xavier de Maistre when a very old man, and on his first visit to Paris, still had a trace of his local speech.

Joseph de Maistre, almost before he grew up, knew more of most things than Chambéry culture could teach him. At his own home, besides the breeding implicit there, he had learnt the gravity which has obscured for us his lighter aspects, the Faith which underlay them, and laughter and love of friends. His mother, he said, was an angel, his father, the Senator, was rather what we have mistakenly supposed his son to be—*le père noble*, upright but rather grim, but his children loved him! Joseph's nine younger brothers and sisters were his boon-companions in the home of which Lamartine wrote with what sounds like nostalgic envy: "Never was a happier one!" This idyllic life had obviously to issue into one more strenuous. The Maistre fortunes were almost as modest as their blood was noble; the eldest son became what Sainte-Beuve called a *magistrat-gentilhomme* and entered upon a life of intensive study which was his best-loved recreation to the end; he had the genuine passion for knowledge. It was not till terrific upheavals ended a period which the young provincial had optimistically feared would prove "too calm" that he became one of the letter-writers of literature.

Besides the brighter qualities of style Maistre shared, in a certain measure, with Madame de Sévigné, he shared her devotion to a daughter which he expressed in letters. His life may be said to have been made up of paradoxes: he wrote books which became French classics yet he was not French, he was a magistrate but became a diplomatist, he was the father of two daughters both of whom he loved, but he never saw the younger of these two girls from the time of her birth till she was grown up, a *demoiselle à marier*. He sometimes wrote to this unknown Constance, but Adèle, the elder, was the more favoured; he had to write and apologize to friends for not writing; to the Baronne de Pont he said he was "condemned to rudeness" for want of a moment to spare; to Countess Trissino that "unable to write to anyone I now write to no one but my wife and children". Yet he could make time for Adèle, would leave his beloved books and, in spite of his incessant social duties—he said he lived in carriages—he sometimes spent four hours on a letter.

When he was about twenty-seven, Joseph de Maistre had met his future wife in the little circle of his capital. He already cut there something of a figure; if he had not much fortune he stood to make it, his powers of study and work were known, his person

and personality were admired. The influence of his father, the Senator, would, it was assumed, be brought to bear on so promising a career. None the less, he had to serve six years for Mademoiselle de Morand's hand and had then, with her, to live with his family on an income which, even in our days of reduced living, we should think preposterous. They had two children, and another on the way, when the storm burst on the European scene. The Bastille fell, the Revolution went its headlong way, its marauding armies, in '93, invaded Savoy. The "calm" Maistre had once deprecated ended for him for ever. For that once the little capital was *too* clever, it succumbed before the revolutionary "propaganda" and welcomed its authors, actually handing over the keys of Chambéry to the conquerors and "deliverers". Naturally the Maistres were not among the dupes; Joseph's brothers rejoined their regiments in Piedmont, he and his wife indignantly shook the dust of their deluded city from their feet and made for Aosta beyond the Alps, Piedmont was not yet invaded and the King was still in Turin.

From Aosta the family moved to Lausanne, where the Count de Maistre began an apprenticeship in diplomacy by accepting a confidential mission for his sovereign, the care of emigrés from Savoy and of volunteers on their way to the armies. His emoluments were probably negligible, for his chancellery was the kitchen of his house . . . Turin was not remarkable for its generosity.

Already the disruption of the family had begun, for the tiny Constance had had to be left behind with her grandmother. In leaving Chambéry for the second time, after a fruitless effort to secure his children's property, Maistre had warned his wife that they were renouncing everything they possessed; in Venice, where the family settled for a time, they reached the lowest depth of ill-fortune; they did their own housework, then a far more unusual experience than it would be today, and lived on the sale of any valuables they had been able to bring away from Savoy. When the King of Sardinia was restored to his throne, by England and Russia, the Count de Maistre was given the Regency of the Chancellery of Sardinia, a non-stop adventure. The island, never a good spot for a rest-cure, was, since the French Revolution, entirely out of hand: Maistre was the man for the job, and produced something like order in the island's affairs. In 1802 the French Republic ordered the return of all emigrés to the countries France had annexed; the Count wrote at once to protest; he was not French, and did not wish to be, neither would he enter any possession annexed by France that belonged to his royal Master, nor take any oath to that Master's

adversaries. The King, as a "reward", appointed him to St. Petersburg as minister plenipotentiary or, as it was often loosely termed, as ambassador. The return of Victor Ammadeus to Turin had meanwhile been so strongly vetoed by Austria (one of the Allied Powers) that the others had given in and the King's progress had been halted at Florence; for long the Count was the envoy of a dispossessed sovereign.

The family had regained something of its former dignity but at the cost of its chief's well-being. Maistre was not to see his wife and daughters for twelve years, his only son for six; as a mark of sympathy and favour the young Tzar, Alexander I, always a personal admirer of the Count de Maistre, then took Rodolphe into his own regiment of Guards.

In the son's edition of his father's *Letters* those to the Comtesse de Maistre are not included; the first "family" letters published are to the writer's daughters, for early on the tremendous journey which was to take the new Minister to Russia (at his own expense and one which was never refunded) the Count had sat down to address his daughters. Even before leaving Sardinia he had written to the youthful Constance, and there is something touching and at least as genuinely tender in the author's preoccupation with his unknown little child as in the brilliant Marquise's effusions to her daughter. "I absolutely must have the joy of writing to you as God has not given me that of seeing you," he wrote. "I cannot get over being so far from you . . . but take care, my dear child, you love your papa as if he were at your side: even though you do not know me I am none the less in this world . . ." There follows some most engaging advice; then, "I have heard, here and there, that a certain young lady spoils you a little, but these are reports of spiteful tongues. . . . If you hear anything of this you need only reply that spoilt children invariably turn out best. . . . As for me, my dear child, judge for yourself if I embrace you, if I press you to my heart, if I think of you perpetually. Good-bye, my heart, good-bye, my Constance. Dear God, when then shall I really be able to see you? . . ." To Adèle he had written from Rome about his new, supposedly brilliant, post: "To be happy I should have the family about me, but it is precisely this affection which gives me strength to leave you. *C'est pour vous que je me passe de vous.*"

Adèle, aged then about eleven, was a young person of parts and appreciated her father's letters and, we must suppose, something, at least, of their fun and subtlety. "You tell me," he writes in the next year, 1803, "that you love my letters extremely. All the worse for you, my dear child, for when a little girl loves a man's letters, it is an almost infallible sign that she loves the

man. So here you are, pretty well convicted of an inclination for an old gossip (radoteur) of fifty which is, with all respect, the excess of the ridiculous. However, everybody has their weakness, let us keep this one to ourselves." A year later he is writing her "the first sermon I shall have given you in my life". It was on a subject that greatly fretted this Admirable Crichton of learning—his Adèle showed signs of emulating him, and all the anxious father in exile rose up to protest. It was not that he did not want his daughters to be well educated. He did; one reason for his separation from them was that education in Russia, for young ladies, was too impossibly expensive and would cost them 10,000 francs each. But he was so masculine as to want their upbringing to be what he considered feminine. "The greatest defect for a woman is to be a man. To avoid so much as the idea of this unthinkable pretension of yours it is absolutely essential to consult Solomon, Fénelon and Molière, this trio is infallible . . ." and, of course, he must quote *Les Femmes Savantes*. Nor is he without a guile he would have learnt in the gay and sophisticated capital of Russia, if not elsewhere; there is, he tells Adèle, a "*coquetterie fine et très innocente*" in a young girl being seen to *sew* with fervour, for then the world would say, "Can you believe this same young girl reads Klopstock and Tasso?" (two of Adèle's authors), "and if she is seen reading them the same *gens du monde* might ask, 'Would you believe she sews like a fairy?'" But she can imagine, her father goes on, he is no friend to ignorance, only there is a happy medium, taste and instruction are for women, but not science. . . . He does not want his daughters to aspire to the sciences or, what would come to the same in effect, "to let it be thought they aspired". He felt the same about Latin and Greek which were so far from Greek to himself.

In all this it would seem he must have had some Awful Warning in mind, for a man steeped in all histories must have known that some of the great charmers of history have been quite as learned as Adèle could hope to be. But he did not want his daughters to be *des charmeuses*—what sane father does? But neither did he want them to be like Madame de Staël; that, I imagine, was the root of the matter. He had known the great Corinne at her own, and her father's, house at Lausanne. He had laughed at her pretensions, but on the whole had rather liked her, and she him and, can we doubt, she had even wished to add him to her train of admirers? He was extremely handsome and she had vowed, too, that he was one of the only three or four real politicians in Europe, and that meant much to her; she knew politicians—none better! He wrote years later to his friend the

Marquise de Priero, herself a novelist, of "that celebrated, or famous, woman who might have been adorable and chose to be only extraordinary". He preferred his Adèle to be—within limits—adorable. "One must not quarrel as to tastes," he added, "but to mine, she" (*Corinne*) "was greatly mistaken." He sends his thanks, none the less, for Madame de Staël's remembrance of him and begs Madame de Priero to assure the *belle dame* of his, which, he asserts, is by no means a fiction.

So he counts on Adèle to follow his advice. However, she is not to worry, he tells her, he is perfectly satisfied with her, only the thought of her is with him night and day "imagining what can bring your character to perfection. *C'est dans cet esprit que t'adresse ce petit sermon paternel. Ainsi garde toi de prendre des instructions pour des reproches.*" So determined was the Count de Maistre, however, on the matter of his daughter not becoming a *précieuse ridicule*, or even a blue-stocking, that he kept a copy of his sermon-letter in case the original got lost between the Baltic and the Alps, and told her so as being "most essential for your interests". He was already thinking of his daughters' marriages! There were, he told them candidly some time later, chances for their not marrying for they had no dowries; a reputation for pedantry should not, if he could help it, add to the disability. It was easier to find a husband even for a coquette than for a *savante*, he told them, for to marry the latter a man must have no vanity, which is rare, while to marry a coquette he need only be a fool! He was, at any rate, delighted when Adèle showed signs of a dawning femininity; he wrote to her: "Après un grand siècle je sais que tu sais que ton portrait m'est arrivé . . . mais dis moi donc, petite vaurienne, petite petite-fille d'Eve, que signifie cette grande crainte que le portrait ne me paraisse moins joli que toi? Est-ce que tu aurais de la vanité par hazard, ou la prétension d'être jolie? Pas possible! jamais demoiselle n'a eu de pareilles idées. Quoi qu'il en soit, le portrait a été trouvé fort joli par moi et d'autres; permis à vous d'en être fachée ou bien aise, à votre choix . . ."

It must be remembered that, failing a religious vocation, no honourable "future" but marriage was then open to women. Maistre wrote jokingly, as he so often wrote, but with his underlying preoccupation, to Madame de Priero, who had praised Adèle, that her letter had given him all possible pleasure: "C'est l'enfant de mon cœur . . . Mais dites moi donc, Madame la Marquise, vous qui lisez tant de livres . . . n'auriez vous pas rencontré une recette pour donner une dot à une jeune fille dont le père est ruiné?" Anxiety for the future, not only of his daughters but of his wife, added to the pain of separation from

them. It might be thought that, leading a bachelor existence, he might have saved for those he missed so intensely; the plain fact was that he had nothing on which to save. Accredited to the most effulgent court in Europe, he had not if he died, he said, enough to pay for his funeral; the King, to whom he was almost fantastically loyal, and who was never particularly straitened, left his envoy almost without means. In spite of the wit and gaiety of so many letters, there are others which reveal his secret anxieties. "I have just dismissed my footman," he wrote to a Chevalier unnamed, "for a simpler and cheaper servant. I shall see if there is any means of effecting other economies, and all my anxiety is that His Majesty should be persuaded of a truth which it may very well be has not fully penetrated his mind though I have often repeated it. . . . I have never exaggerated . . . I have nothing, what can be called nothing." A sum just received from Court would, when paid away, leave him precisely as before, "with nothing". For the Count de Maistre, the Sardinian "Ambassador", it was a sufficiently outrageous position, but he got away with it as far as the great world was concerned. His personality, his talk ("the most brilliant in Petersburg"), made him welcome everywhere, his great air could carry off any situation, but it did not pay bills, so he went without everything but food and books. What really mattered was his family a thousand miles away; he had begged the King to let them join him: "The torment this separation causes me is such I cannot express to you," he continued to the unnamed Chevalier, but there was a still more important aspect that his friend might put to the King: "If I died . . . while my family is far from me it would fall into the most terrible poverty . . . if my people were here, well or ill, in one way or another, more or less agreeably or disagreeably, they could get along." That was written in 1806, four years after his going to Russia, and *eight* more years were to pass before his wife and daughters were enabled to join him. Even his son's arrival in St. Petersburg was a fresh anxiety if not a monetary one, for the sixteen-year-old Rodolphe succeeded in going off to the wars almost as soon as he got there. "Il a le diable au corps," wrote his father, "et c'est un de ces diables froids, le plus diable de tous. If God keeps him for me, he is well started on his career. But I no longer live! No one knows what war is unless they have a son in it."

In one way or another his daughters too had *le diable au corps*; even little Constance, as she grew up, developed an alarming tendency—a New Woman complex. Her father, in his seemingly light-handed way, came down on this, as we say, like a ton of bricks. He laughed, he teased his Constance, he begged

her to learn to knit. "I know a lady here who spends fifty thousand francs a year on her toilette though she is a grandmother as I could be a grandfather if anyone had cared to help me. She is very amiable and loves me very much, *n'en déplaise à ta mère*"; even this lady had taken to knitting and had promised the Minister, at his request, *one* sock! He told Constance a few laughing home-truths, but he assured her she was mistaken—he had never said women were monkeys! "I swear to you by all that is most sacred that I always found them incomparably more beautiful, more charming and more useful than monkeys . . ." Whether Constance inherited enough wit to appreciate the neat ambiguity of this elucidation is not known; what her father had said, he concluded, was that women who imitated men were monkeys.

It is obvious that Joseph de Maistre wrote so often in seemingly light vein to his daughters of set purpose; their mother supplied every solid element in their education, and he had the utmost trust in her tact and capability, but he, as it were, added an element of gaiety to the edifice she so conscientiously built; even when he was most grave, his children would never have guessed from his letters how grave he could be, and was, to the public. He spared them the weight of his reputation, and, most certainly, any of the "magnificent anathemas" for which he was famous.

Joseph de Maistre never recovered any private fortune, but his daughters removed one anxiety from his heart, that of their future. They both married; Adèle a Monsieur Terray of whom little is chronicled; Constance, from afar, had announced her intention of never leaving her father after they once met. A delightful idea, he allowed, still . . . if a man, such as he could imagine, were to ask for her hand . . . She married the Duc de Laval Montmorency and so, apparently, remained more in the family tradition than the so-cultured Adèle. Constance had had her objections to marriage and its obligations, but her father had countered them with one of the witticisms always at the tip of his pen. "Le grand honneur," he said, "est de faire des hommes, et c'est ce que les femmes font mieux que nous."

The family reunion at St. Petersburg lasted three years; then, in 1817, the King acceded to his Minister's repeated requests and recalled him. Four years later Joseph de Maistre's magnificent health began to fail. He died at Turin with all the helps of religion. "*Je m'en vais avec l'Europe*" are said to have been some of his last words, the spirit of revolt let loose in '93 had, he had thought at the time, been the death-knell of all stability.

MRS. GEORGE NORMAN.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

The Present Age, and Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises. By Søren Kierkegaard. Translated by Alexander Dru and Walter Lowrie. (Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.)

WHAT Kierkegaard found rotten in the State of Denmark in 1848 might not be thought very relevant to our condition in 1942. It is true that his diagnosis already reads like a post-mortem. The tardiness of its appearance among us need not on that account distress us, for he was emphatic that our disease was incurable. "The levelling process will have to continue, and must be completed." There was no halting its devastation, and our salvation lay in accepting the fact. For though we must die, we need not be damned. On the contrary, in the understanding of the mortality of our disease and in the acceptance of its consequences lie our opportunity of rebirth and resurrection. That holds as good today as a century ago.

We need not deny that the diagnosis was an exaggeration, even a caricature. Kierkegaard's business, as he saw it, was not to console us vainly by drawing attention to such vestiges of health as remained in us. Nor need we deny that what he found wrong with the world was in great measure a projection of what was wrong with himself. He had inoculated himself with the world's disease in its most virulent form the better to understand and defeat it. Hence his century-old analysis of the sickness of Western Man remains more to the point than most of the up-to-the-minute efforts of mere "onlookers" which pour from our presses in bewildering profusion. He was less distracted by the kaleidoscope of ephemeral events and epiphenomenal symptoms. He exposed nethermost trends and radical causes.

The "levelling process" was his name for the disease. Three-dimensional man was becoming a two-dimensional shadow. Modern man, in gaining breadth, had lost depth. Become everything *in esse intentionalis*, he becomes nothing *in esse reali*—"existentially". The infinite extension of his field of vision itself inhibits participation and decision; he becomes the mere "onlooker" of a scene which is itself a fiction played by shadows likewise incapacitated. "Intelligence has got the upper hand to such an extent that it transforms the real task into an unreal trick and reality into a play. . . . More and more people renounce the quiet and modest tasks of life that are so important and pleasing to God in order to achieve something greater; in order to think over the relationships of life in a higher relationship till in the end the whole generation has become a representation who

represent—it is difficult to say *who*; and who think about these relationships—for *whose* sake it is not easy to discover.” Kierkegaard did not live to see the cinema as a parable of his thesis. Shakespeare could still see all the world as a stage, though St. Paul’s sense of a celestial audience which gave meaning and purpose to the spectacle was already receding. The modern world is all an auditorium.

The disease, then, is what Gill called irresponsibility, and Murry the loss of man’s immediacy with man. But Kierkegaard probed more deeply. Responsibility is a relationship which postulates an Absolute to whom response can and must be made. Man’s immediacy with man evaporates with the loss of immediacy with the unconditioned “Thou”. Irreligion, then, is the root of the trouble; for without it individual and society are alike flattened out into the mass. And the mass is an abstraction; an “It” which is not, and cannot be, a “We”. But religion had itself become an “It” and God a “He”. A mass “return to religion” is a contradiction in terms; for faith is always in the present and never in the past; and it is a relationship of which the individual alone is capable, and which, moreover, alone establishes the individual over against the mass. “The Faith” is itself an illusory abstraction without faith, and faith is only in the second person singular of the present tense. “The real moment in time and the real situation being simultaneous with real people, each of whom is something: that is what helps to sustain the individual.” And it is the indispensable prerequisite of society and community as opposed to mass-civilization. “It is only after the individual has acquired an ethical outlook in face of the whole world, that there can be any suggestion of really joining together.” Without it, culture must decay. For as Buber, elaborating Kierkegaard, has said, “Every great culture that comprehends nations rests on an original relational incident, on a response to the *Thou* made at its source. . . . If a culture ceases to be centred in the living and continually renewed relational event, then it hardens into the world of *It*.” What Kierkegaard and his disciples have argued theologically has been amply confirmed historically by Dawson, psychologically by Jung, and anthropologically by Malinowski and E. O. James.

If we are to profit from Kierkegaard we must read him with care and resist the temptation to apply our facile labels. He insists that the source of our trouble lies in the intellect, but he is the reverse of an anti-intellectualist. “Reflection is not the evil, but a reflective condition, and the deadlock which it involves by transforming the qualities which precede action into a means of escape from action.” There is no getting behind reflection; reflection must itself be used to get beyond reflection. There is no way back to the simplicities of pre-secularist ages of faith. But reflection itself, pondering its own

deadlocks and devastation, is forced to reflect that "after reflection, it requires a religious *impetus* to set goodness afloat again".

Similarly, though Kierkegaard would seem to exalt passion at the expense of thought, he is the very antithesis of a romanticist. Romanticism in effect destroys what it exalts, for it divorces passion from the realities of man's situation in the universe, cans it and screens it two-dimensionally for the production of vicarious mass-sentiment.

He likewise exalts the subject, but he is the most trenchant critic of subjectivism. For subjectivism in effect destroys the subject by its very preoccupation with it; subject thus isolated from object itself becomes non-existential, abstract object. So, too, he exalts the individual, but he is the very opposite of an individualist. (He would doubtless have welcomed Maritain's distinction of Person and Individual, and Jung's of Individualtion and Individualism.) Individualism, postulating equality without transcendental relationship, achieves flat undifferentiated identity, levelling out the individual in the mass.

Kierkegaard's is a profoundly pessimistic view of the present age. But in its very pessimism he finds the only ground for any optimism—and that the highest and only permissible optimism. "The individual no longer belongs to God, to himself, to his art or to his science; he is conscious of belonging in all things to an abstraction to which he is subjected by reflection, just as a serf belongs to an estate. . . . The abstract levelling process, that self-combustion of the human race, produced by the friction which arises when the individual ceases to exist as singled out by religion, is bound to continue, like a trade wind, and consume everything. But through it each individual for himself may receive once more a religious education and, in the highest sense, will be helped by the *examen rigorosum* of the levelling process to an essentially religious attitude." Thus, "the servants of the levelling process are the servants of the powers of evil, for levelling itself does not come from God, and all good men will at times grieve over its desolation; but God allows it and desires it to bring the Highest into relation with the Individual, i.e. with each and every man."

But there is danger lest we neglect the opportunity of so great a salvation, lest we prolong the levelling process by seeking to cast out devils by Beelzebub, perverting Christianity itself to a factor in the process. "Unthinkable among the young men of today is a truly religious renunciation of the world, adhered to with daily self-denial. On the other hand, almost any theological student is capable of something far more wonderful. He could found a society with the sole object of saving all who are lost." There are no more timely pages in this volume than those which expose the fallacies of the "principle of association". Christian Fronts and committees and mass-movements are no substitute for "the divine growth of

inwardness which ripens into decisions". On the contrary, "nowadays the principle of association (which at most is only valid where material interests are concerned) is not positive but negative; it is an escape, a distraction, an illusion".

In *The Present Age* we find Kierkegaard at the height of his powers. Here we see sketched the vision in which the "aesthetic" and the "rational-ethical" are not negated but harmonized and subsumed in the "religious". Declining years and polemical over-emphases were to upset the equilibrium. Already in the two "Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises" included in this volume the vision is dimmed, the antithesis so stressed that nature is not perfected but destroyed by grace. For all its deep flashes of insight into the significance of the Atonement and of martyrdom, the "Poetic Experiment" entitled *Has a Man the Right to let himself be put to Death for the Truth?* tends to be wearisome, with its repetitiveness and its labouring of the obvious. The *Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle* in its positive exposition of the nature of religious authority has hardly been surpassed, but in it, the antithesis between Faith and Thought is so expressed as to open the way to the most extravagant features of Barthian theology, and for a conception of obedience which is immediately destructive of much else that Kierkegaard stood for. There is justification for E. L. Allen's comment that, however inconsistently, he was sometimes "too concerned with sacrificing his reason to the God-Man to be able to follow the Master".

VICTOR WHITE, O.P.

Spanish Romanesque Architecture of the Eleventh Century. By Walter Muir Whitehill, F.S.T., Assistant Director, Peabody Museum of Salem. (Sir Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press, 1941. £3 3s.)

DURING the last fifty years architects and archaeologists, as well as students of ecclesiastical and monastic history, have devoted special attention to the origin and growth of the Romanesque architecture of the eleventh century. The Romanesque of that period was an outcome of the contemporary religious revival—mainly a Black-Benedictine movement—and, in Raul Glaber's famous phrase, it "covered Europe with a white robe of new churches". The study is as absorbing as it is illuminating.

Northern Christian Spain, from east to west, then reawakening to fresh nationhood after freeing herself from the Moors, was at once caught up in this revival, and it is in that region that the architectural outcome of the movement can still be studied to great advantage in numerous surviving ecclesiastical buildings. This has been

done with gratifying results by such prominent scholars, Spanish and foreign, as Gómez Moreno, Puig i Cadafalch, Pérez de Urbel, Kingsley Porter, Gaillard, Georgiana King, and, last but not least, by the author of this superb volume.

Produced with meticulous care and impeccable taste, the work is equipped with all the requirements of modern scholarship. Besides 308 pages of most instructive letterpress, there are 120 excellently produced plates out of text and 117 figures in the text. Moreover, there are three maps of eleventh-century Christian Spain and three large plans of the Cathedral of Santiago at Compostela. The book ends with a thoroughly representative bibliography (pp. 285-299), in which some 300 works are listed—fully two-thirds by Spanish writers—and with a good analytical index.

The author thus describes his aim: "I have attempted to bring together the material for a history of the early Romanesque architecture of the Catalan Counties, and the Kingdoms of Castile, León, Navarre, Aragón, and Galicia" (p. viii). This he fully and most competently achieves. He has evidently read practically all the available literature on the subject and personally studied on the spot most of the monuments he describes. The result is the most authoritative and up-to-date historical study of Spanish Romanesque architecture of the eleventh century. This, however, does not mean that the author's conclusions, especially as to the dates of certain monuments, are final. In several cases, as for example the dating of the lower cloister of Silos, further research is, we think, still required. It is a pleasure to add that in the hundreds of Castilian and Catalan names quoted throughout the book we have not found one single mis-spelling. It is also gratifying to note how generously the author acknowledges the competence of the Spanish writers who have preceded him in the same field and the help given him by others, particularly by the Benedictine monks of Silos.

A few points invite, if not open criticism, at any rate mild discussion. First, as regards the main division of the subject into two practically independent studies, namely (I) the Romanesque—or First Romanesque—of the Catalan Counties, and (II) the Romanesque of the rest of the Northern Spanish Kingdoms. Although this division has historical foundation, it is not such as to oblige the writer to make what amounts to two separate studies in the same work. The distinction is somewhat fictitious, and indeed tendentious. It conveys the idea, stressed by the author, who here follows the conclusions of Puig i Cadafalch—a great architect and scholar and a still greater Catalan nationalist—that during the eleventh century there was a complete separation between the eastern counties and the rest of Christian Spain, whereas at many points, including architecture, there was much interdependence. This the author

himself has to admit in some instances. For example, he writes (p. 262): "The influence of the Catalan style was a stream not to be dammed by frontiers." (See also pp. 238, 263, etc.) In the Catalan abbeys of that period we meet with names which are typically Spanish (not Frankish), like Ennego, García, Miró, Castellanus—to quote a few at random which are mentioned in the pages of this book. Then, again, Abbot Oliva of Ripoll, responsible for the most representative Catalan Romanesque buildings described by Mr. Whitehill, was in friendly correspondence with Sancho el Mayor of Navarre, and he was helped in his building operations by Navarrese money, as even that fervent Catalan, Dom Anselm Albareda, the present Prefect of the Vatican Library, has to admit in his work on the famous Catalan prelate, often referred to by Mr. Whitehill. Finally, it should be remembered that there were two pilgrimage roads to Santiago of Compostela: the best known and most written about came down from Central and Western France into Navarre, while another entered Spain via Portbou in Eastern Catalonia: this latter was followed by St. William of Vercelli, the Founder of Montevertine, and later on by St. Francis of Assisi. The Lombard influence, therefore, was by no means exclusively restricted to Catalonia.

In the reviewer's opinion a more obvious and more historical division of the book would have been arrived at by simply following the line of the kingdoms of Northern Spain from east to west—Catalan counties, Aragón, Navarre, Castile, León, Galicia, thus ending with the Romanesque glory of Santiago of Compostela. Unfortunately there are only a few references (Villanova, Puebla de Castro, Buil, on p. 263) to the buildings scattered over the Pyrenean district north of the Somontano Aragonés and reaching to the French frontier at Benasque and Boltaña. We confess to disappointment at not finding any allusion to such places as Ujué, Hirache, Eunate, Tudela, Sangüesa, Lumbier in Navarre, and Estibaliz in Alava. Some of these buildings, it is true, belong rather to the twelfth century, but in most cases they had already been started in the eleventh.

To a Benedictine reviewer Mr. Whitehill's work affords special satisfaction. To all intents and purposes the book is a history of the Black-Benedictine foundations in Northern Spain during the eleventh century. No less than fifty-eight major Black-Benedictine monasteries as well as many minor cells are passed in review. They include Cuxá, Canigou, Ripoll, Banyoles, Ovarra, La Peña, Siresa, La Serós, Leire, Nájera, San Millán, Oña, Silos, Arlanza, Frómista, Sahagún. Between 1925 and 1934 the present writer visited most of the places described by Mr. Whitehill and many others connected with ancient Benedictine history; the journey was tantamount to a pilgrimage to the most representative monuments of Romanesque architecture in Northern Spain. Most of those monuments eventually came under

the aegis of Cluny. Much the same happened outside Spain; for this reason, as we have elsewhere maintained,* it is not going too far to say that Romanesque architecture in general should be styled Cluniac architecture.

To all Benedictines, indeed to all lovers of art, the following description of the Benedictine cloister of the abbey of Silos in Old Castile cannot fail to give pleasure: "All who have seen it agree upon the one vital point—its supreme beauty. For the art of Silos is touched with the early dew of a fresh spring morning" (p. 155). "Hardly another great mediaeval monument has been so fortunate in modern times, for the monks of Silos, scholars and musicians, are perfect guardians for the cloister. . . . There one can spend long hours, studying, photographing, or merely dreaming, while the monks pass to and from the church, the library, the refectory, or the garden, and when, as on Sunday before the conventional mass, the community comes through the cloister in procession, with cross, candles, and incense, to make a station at the Virgen del Marzo, one realizes as never before the beauty of a cloister properly used" (p. 157).

A minor statement to which we would take exception is that on page 9, where Abbot Oliva of Ripoll is called *tout court* the founder of Montserrat. Dom Albareda has endeavoured to prove this, but in our opinion he has by no means succeeded yet.

Spanish Romanesque Architecture is a magnificent contribution to the history of art, to the history of Spain, and to the history of the Benedictines.

DOM ROMANUS RIOS, O.S.B.

Socialism, National or International. By Franz Borkenau. (Routledge. 5s.)

THIS is an extremely interesting book. As he has shown in his previous works, Herr Borkenau is most suspicious of the old socialist internationalism. At every test of strength nationalism has proved to be a stronger force than internationalism—not least so in the country, Russia, where professedly international ideals have triumphed. There can be little sense in mouthing an ideology that does not correspond to reality, and though Herr Borkenau gives reason and hope that there will be some abatement in the present exaggerations of nationalism, yet any scheme of reconstruction that does not accept, for better or for worse, the fact of nationalism is foredoomed to failure.

That being so, the solution does not lie either in a vague rhetoric of internationalism or in the denunciation of nationalism. We must

* See my monograph *The Cluniacs*, 1942, pp. 43-46.

ask rather what nationalistic forces exist that can be used for the rebuilding of the post-war world. Asking this question, Herr Borke-nau answers it by pinning his hope to an Anglo-American hegemony of the Western world. Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific, must, he thinks, be frankly allowed to go its own way. Europe, America, Africa—and—he might have added—Australia, will provide sufficient problems to occupy fully the statesmen of the white world. Such a nationalism would not, he argues, be an exclusive nationalism. The British and the Americans, like the Romans of the Empire, have discovered the secret of the absorption of the foreigner into their citizenship and their way of life, and there is hope that the men of Western Europe will become as proud of their partnership in the Anglo-American hegemony as was the barbarian-born of the third century of his newly acquired Roman citizenship.

There is probably as good a hope in this as in any scheme. Its difficulties are sufficiently evident. Will the Americans be found ready to accept this world leadership? The answer to that question can only be given by the 1944 Presidential Election. It is as yet by far from certain. Again, will the non-white inhabitants of the world be prepared to accept such a division of the world which allows to the white man with his dwindling birthrate an inordinately high standard of living? Will the people of Europe, at the moment of German collapse, be prepared to look to American leadership? What will be the influence of Russia? And if, as is likely, some look to Russia and some to America, may not that in itself be the cause of new conflict?

There is unfortunately one great gap in the parallel with the Roman Empire. The Romans absorbed the barbarians because, in addition to being stronger than they, they were also certainly their superior. It is a tragedy that the opportunity for Anglo-American hegemony should have come at a moment when, almost without exception, the leading Anglo-American statesmen are men lacking in culture, and when their lack of it has made them the laughing-stock of the Continent. It is difficult to accept the hegemony of an absurdity.

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS.

Is Modern Culture Doomed? By Andrew J. Krzesinski, Ph.D., S.T.D.
(The Devin-Adair Co., New York.)

THE author has the unhappy knack of making Truth look as near a lie as can comport with her divinity. Even when we must agree with what he says we are filled with a desire to disagree. Why is this? It is, we think, because Professor Krzesinski presents truth as a series of textbook propositions dry of the sap of life. And, even more, that he has no living understanding of what he, usually

with justice, rejects. Modern man does not possess a double dose of original sin. If he has largely turned from the depths to more superficial levels of human experience, this is an evil incidental to man's growth through adolescence from the naif wisdom of childhood to the wisdom not yet reached of maturity. And it is the excessive affirmation of the horizontal movement of the human spirit in reaction from and therefore an antithesis to a vertical movement which had, for its time, rightly, been too exclusive, a stage in the historical dialectic to the synthesis which will combine and reconcile both movements. We, therefore, who are trustees for the deeper truth attained by the vertical motion as it was met and enlightened by revelation, should combat any tolerant form of secularism, not by abuse or by slighting its positive insights and achievements, but by showing the necessity to ground and secure them by the profounder truth of metaphysics and religion. True there is a sinful pride of rebellious humanism. But it is often most powerful in the "good pagan" of noble character and idealistic aims. The author, however, seems to have eyes only for those bent on a life of animal pleasure. And it is by no means certain that their proportion is greater than it was in more believing ages.

We are, however, glad that Professor Krzesinski condemns with equal severity Bolshevik Russia and Nazi Germany. This at any rate is consoling when on all sides people are seeking to whitewash the former because self-defence has reluctantly arrayed it against the latter. It is less admirable that he is more concerned with abuse of the sexual instinct than with the far more disastrous abuse of the herd instinct.

We wonder why he groups the mechanist materialists attacked by Marx among the disciples of Hegel? It was surely the adoption of the Hegelian dialectic which distinguished Marxism from the earlier and cruder materialism.

Solidarity is censured as an evil. It is, in fact, the mean between individualism and "Socialism".

The author, in our opinion, has fallen into the opposite error to that of Professor Coulton. The latter opposes to a selective and idealized picture of modernity the crimes and follies of mediaeval man. The former, with eyes only for the worst in modernity, opposes to it by implication the idealized picture of a Christian society in the past which, save perhaps in the reservations in Paraguay, never existed. Both, therefore, falsify the truth. The recollection of Torquemada and John Stuart Mill should suffice to remind us that the relation between true religious belief and moral conduct is far more complex and difficult to determine than Professor Krzesinski suspects.

E. I. WATKIN.

Immortality. By Count Hermann Keyserling. Translated by Jane Marshall. (Oxford University Press.)

FROM his somewhat vague language it is not easy to determine exactly what is the immortality in which Count Keyserling believes. But it would seem to be no more than an immortality of life abiding everlasting as it passes through the succession of individuals it enlivens and discards. We fail to understand how such an immortality can console the hosts of broken victims, frustrated one way or another of earthly fulfilment, hopeless sufferers, men and women cut off in their prime. And this cult of life as such, regardless of the individual, is liable to degenerate into the cult of a life lower altogether than the spiritual and intellectual life the Count has in mind, the worship of biological life with its ruthless devotion to strength and efficiency which, as the Nazi ideology, is devastating the world today. Nor indeed does the Count warn us against this deterioration which has substituted for his school of oriental wisdom the labour camp and the battalion.

From the height or depth of his obscure wisdom Count Keyserling looks with contempt at Catholic theology and philosophy. They are but a grossly barbarous perversion of classical thought. One could wish that St. Thomas could have turned up one day at the School of Wisdom and challenged the Count to defend his views in logical debate. He would have had a surprise as salutary as unpleasant.

Yet the Count has a most powerful religious sense. He regards communion with "the Supreme Being", God, as man's noblest activity and profoundest wisdom. But he holds that not only the existence of the Divinity but, more surprisingly, even his own is an object of belief. It is rational thought of which he is sceptical. And in this also he prepares the way for the vitalist irrationalism of the Nazis. Faith may be built on knowledge guaranteeing the credibility of a revealer. But knowledge cannot be constructed on a universal faith.

Having made these criticisms the reviewer is left with the uneasy suspicion that he may have misunderstood, and that after all by the person whose immortality he denies Count Keyserling means only a superficial consciousness, below which there lies a deeper and a truer self beyond time and death, anchored in eternity. But why, then, call the former the person? We are inclined to think that this is, in fact, his intuition, what he really believes and lives by, but that he has misinterpreted that intuition in terms of the reasoned thought he treats so cavalierly. He is, in short, a religious and therefore a spiritual irrationalist as the Nazi is an irreligious and a biological irrationalist.

E. I. WATKIN.

The Gospel of the Infancy. By Father Eric Burrows, S.J. (Bellarime Series, No. 6.) (Burns Oates & Washbourne. 8s. 6d.)

AMONG the few distinguished contributions to Biblical learning, during the years of disturbance in the world, is this series of studies by the late Father Burrows. The book has its title from an outstanding piece of work on those lovely chapters Luke i and ii. Its appearance tells not only of our personal but also of our scholarly loss. The book, then, is a posthumous one. Its writer was he who rose to be a famous Babylonian scholar. By wise choice the editor has printed with the titular study a number of shorter ones which yield a sort of autobiographical gloss on the learned and theological progress of the author. Whilst we are waiting for his "Memoir", we can watch the growth of his spirit through exercises in theology to notes on Babylonian archaeology: from the first steps of his theological training to those splendid strides he took towards eminence in Babylonian learning. It is a fascinating matter to follow the growth of such a spirit, to speculate on what he might have done had he not taken the way he did. His *Archaic Texts (Ur Excavations, 1935)* will, however, quickly bring one's judgement to real balance. Eric Burrows went the way he had to tread. For him to have written one of the indispensable books in his own line of learning and to have achieved so finely in the kingdom of New Testament learning adds to the fascination of his work.

In the titular study to this book Burrows has written what no New Testament scholar can afford to overlook as he works on the Lukan text. Its approach is an enlivening one. Everyone knows that certain English and German scholars, during the last quarter of a century, have tried to prove that the Septuagint was the most influential book in the world, seeing that it was said to be the source of language and material of narrative for many of the sections of the New Testament.

Burrows' thesis is of a different order. He shows that the author of Luke i and ii composed a narrative in the style of the Old Testament, using for his principal model the history of the child Samuel (1 Sam. i-iii). This Lukan artistry he calls "imitative historiography".

Taking a hint from Resch's *Das Kindheitsevangelium*, which indulges in literal statistics, as showing how many times Old Testament material has appeared in the New Testament, Burrows records his numbers for Luke i-ii. Resch had found the *Samuel* narrative in those chapters, eleven times. Burrows finds that its verses have influenced the Lukan text between forty and fifty times. Resch, on the whole, keeps company with the dissipators of the historicity of the New Testament. The Burrows thesis is sure of the historical character of the factors in Luke i-ii. His more numerous view of

the relationship between them and 1 Samuel i-iii serves to point out solely how the writer of the Gospel used an Old Testament model for the setting out of his unexampled historical facts. Let the statistician say that Burrows' thesis is his view more elaborately stated, and therefore the Lukan chapters are "artificial". The Jesuit scholar will answer in this way: "Yes, the peculiar beauty of their structure is partly due to the author's artifice." The gentleness of the concession should warn his critic that his findings are as blind as his sense of history is numb, and that 1 Samuel was in literal bondage to Clio, who here was an handmaid to the Lord.

Burrows' view of the beauty in artifice of St. Luke is brought out by his analysis of his first two chapters. He finds in them a number of dramatic scenes or "mysteries", separated by short prose pieces which either are "directions" (to use a dramatic term) or are historical pointers to the significance of the scenes. He shows that this scheme need not be due to Luke's art as a dramatist. There can indeed have been no such deliberation by him, but only the natural upwelling of art and form in one having so wonderful a history to tell. It would tell itself as he dipped his pen into *Samuel's* ink.

There is a neat riposte, for Harnack's opinion that the *Magnificat* was attributed to Elizabeth by St. Luke, in Burrows' discovery that the Septuagint version of the son in 1 Samuel has a textual addition at verse 8 of chapter ii "which suits the case of Elizabeth so perfectly (better than any other detail in the canticle) that it would be a real difficulty that St. Luke made no use of the version if it was in his model text". Burrows' thrust is dually effective. It disposes of the Elizabethan attribution, and as well the mythographic influence of the Septuagint.

On the side of language, Burrows comes to the interesting conclusion that the *Magnificat* is more easily related to the Hebrew than to the Greek text of *Samuel*. In only one instance can he find relationships rather with the Greek than Hebrew, and there the conclusion is uncertain. These illustrations from the book are meant to turn students to its findings. They will find themselves in the hands of one who, if it had been his destiny, could have taken rank as a master-exegete.

As paper and space are precious in these days, we can glance only at other features of this book. There are exquisite hints in his essay, "The Doctrine of the Shekinah and the Theology of the Incarnation", which the exegete and the theologian should ponder. The study on the "two Adams" shows at least his deep interest in Philo. Lest a suspicion arises, where the book has not yet been read, that Burrows might be over-enticed by that singular writer, it should be said that he had fortified himself by work upon certain portions of the Talmud. His readers have the engaging problem left to them as to his equating

of the Talmud and Philo. They ought to find new stimulus here to tackle the primary problem of St. Paul's use of the two Adams.

Altogether the book is of the sort which offers spiritual food to the scholar and a model to the student. Father Sutcliffe is an ideal editor. To learn how he, as a scholar, can produce a delicate joke which has a right place in such a book as this, let the reader turn to page 92 and its note. The editor and publishers are to be congratulated upon a flawless piece of work. The book is the man in his simple nobility.

V. BURCH, D.D.

The Screwtape Letters. By C. S. Lewis. (Geoffrey Bles. 5s.)

MOST readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW will already have read either *The Screwtape Letters* itself or reviews of it. This notice therefore need do little more than reinforce the general recommendation. It may do so, however, with the personal sincerity of one who has found himself warned and enlightened by it.

Mr. Lewis has chosen to cast his moral instruction in the form of letters supposed to be sent by one devil to another, by one employed in the administration of hell to a smaller one engaged in the temptation of a human being. They form an *exposé* of the methods of temptation. It is, of course, not so much the direct kind of allurement, which we all recognize, as the indirect kind, which we do not always recognize, with which they are concerned. Thus, in discussing the possibility of encouraging cowardice, Screwtape writes:

There is, of course, always the chance, not of chloroforming the shame, but of aggravating it and producing Despair. This would be a great triumph. It would show that he had believed in, and accepted, the Enemy's forgiveness of his other sins only because he himself did not fully feel their sinfulness—that in respect of the one vice which he really understands in its full depth of dishonour he cannot seek, nor credit, the Mercy.

In another letter, Screwtape writes: "For a long time it will be quite impossible to remove spirituality from his life. Very well, then; we must corrupt it." It is this work of corruption which the letters principally exhibit, to the great advantage of any who choose to learn from it. The corruption of charity, the corruption of humility, the corruption of faith are dangers greater perhaps than the chances of flat denial. One intellectual method of this corruption is called "Christianity and . . ." "You know, Christianity and the Crisis, Christianity and the New Psychology, Christianity and the New Order, Christianity and Faith Healing, Christianity and Psychical Research, Christianity and Vegetarianism, Christianity and Spelling Reform. If they must be Christians let them at least be Christians with a difference." Another is to encourage thought or emotion

instead of action; another the pursuit of "the negative unselfishness" instead of the positive Charity; another the mistake of a natural delight for a supernatural grace (or indeed the opposite).

I allow that Mr. Lewis's *Screwtape* is highly intelligent, almost too intelligent for a devil, everywhere except in the centre. One of the pleasantest things in the book is his failure there, his incapacity to understand what his Enemy "is really up to". "We know that He cannot really love; nobody can; it doesn't make sense." It is "sense" based on the belief that He can of which Mr. Lewis's book is full.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

The Wool Trade in English Mediaeval History, Being the Ford Lectures.
By Eileen Power. (Oxford University Press, 1941. 7s. 6d. net.)

THE great loss suffered by scholarship through the death of the author is brought vividly home by this book. This account of the wool trade of mediaeval England was not left by her in book form, but in the state of lecture notes, and it is only thanks to Dr. Power's habit of writing out her lectures in full that publication was made possible. It is also because of this that no footnotes appear in this volume, an inevitable deficiency which makes one look forward to the new edition promised in the introduction, in which the material accumulated in many years of research will appear as footnotes and appendices. It was very sad that the author did not live to write the book she had planned on the wool trade, a subject for which she was so admirably fitted and equipped; this work, valuable as it is, hardly compensates us for the loss of it.

The Ford Lectures are an annual course of six history lectures delivered in the University of Oxford during the Hilary term. Dr. Power was Ford Lecturer for 1939, and this book gives us the lectures delivered by her in such a capacity. Needless to say, she could hardly have chosen a more interesting and stimulating subject. The history of the early-English wool trade is a subject endowed with great potentialities, and it is pleasant to be able to record that these potentialities have been made use of to the fullest extent. The author's scholarly and literary gifts appear here at their best, with the result that this important topic is presented to the reader in a clear and attractive fashion. Because of this the book will appeal not only to professional historians and economists but also to cultured laymen. Readers of *Mediaeval People* will find in this work that same lightness of touch, charm, and sound scholarship which characterized that deservedly successful book.

A very clear introduction shows the prominent place occupied by England in the wool trade of mediaeval Europe. English wool was

mainly exported to Flanders and Florence to be transformed into fine cloth, and to such an extent did the Flemish and Florentine industries depend upon imports from England that any stoppage of them meant unemployment for a large number of workmen. The dominating element in English economy during the later Middle Ages, the wool trade implied an elaborate sheep-farming organization, the structure and routine of which are concisely described. By relying mainly on monastic cartularies and manorial rolls Dr. Power succeeds in providing us with a very original and convincing picture of the rise, heyday, and decline of this truly national industry, a picture in which the particular importance of ecclesiastical institutions in sheep-farming is sensibly stressed.

The English wool trade consisted originally of English producers and foreign exporters, the latter being generally Flemish and Lombard financiers. But this foreign monopoly of the export trade fell into English hands early in the reign of Edward III, to merge eventually into the Staple.

Having dealt with its structure and machinery, Dr. Power goes on to show the great importance of the wool trade as an item in the royal revenue. She lays particular emphasis on what the wool tax meant to the Crown, and ascertains upon whom the incidence of this tax actually fell. Particularly valuable is her account of the rôle of wool merchants in constitutional development. Equally important and illuminating is her account of the causes which stimulated the rise of the Staple, and her analysis of the various interests involved in it. The Staple was actually a compromise, the outcome of long-protracted disputes between conflicting interests. That this compromise was only effectuated as late as 1399 shows how many difficulties had to be overcome.

It would doubtless be difficult to decide to which of a series of equally important and equally fascinating lectures should preference be given. But it is certain that, so far as the layman is concerned, the last lecture, in which the rise and structure of the English middle class is bound up with the wool trade, will possibly prove the most interesting and stimulating of all.

It is perhaps a pity that no mention is made of the influence of the wool trade upon ecclesiastical architecture, an influence which is amply testified to by many a magnificent church in the Cotswolds and in East Anglia. But of course this would not have been strictly within the subject-matter of the lectures. A small point calls for criticism. On p. 106 it is stated that Dante placed the inhabitants of Cahors in hell because of their usury. This is not so. All that Dante did was to employ the term *Caorsa*, the Italian form of *Cabors*, in order to refer to the place in the *Inferno* where usurers were punished, *Caorsa* being then synonymous with usury. On the other hand, all

the usurers described by Dante in the 18th canto of the *Inferno* were from Florence with the exception of one, the Paduan Reginaldo degli Scrovegni.

This is an admirable book which no one interested in English economic, constitutional, or social history should miss. I cannot conceive that there will be any lecturer in English mediaeval history who will not urge his undergraduate classes to read it, or will not study it carefully himself.

R. WEISS.

German With Tears. By Peter F. Wiener. (Cresset Press).

HERR WIENER's short book is a Vansittartite study of what the author describes as German education. The author maintains he made a careful study of his subject. But this claim is unfounded. Herr Wiener, in Germany, was a student of law, and his practical contact with German education was limited to the experiences of a schoolboy and undergraduate mostly in republican Germany. Afterwards, he read quantities of Nazi text-books and Nazi books on education. He has no knowledge worth speaking of of German history in general. Most of his pre-Nazi quotations, both from German and English authors, are second-hand, and where he steps in with his own judgement he is almost invariably wrong. Here are a few instances : he falls an unconscious victim to the Prussian school-legend that Prussia, under Frederick William I, was the first European Power to invent conscription, which in fact Prussia's neighbour Sweden had introduced nearly a century before (p. 13); he calls "Treitschke, Moltke, Wilke great national heroes before Hitler" (p. 88), failing to explain who this strange, hitherto unknown animal Wilke is, and including Treitschke in the list, for heaven knows what reason, while omitting, among others, Bismarck; he quotes the driving of seven professors from Goettingen University in 1837 as a particularly atrocious case of German intolerance (p. 77), unaware as he is that those Liberals were driven out by an English Tory prince and three of them got chairs immediately in Prussian, and the rest in other German states ; he maintains that Fichte was driven out from Jena because he taught anti-Christian doctrines, including the opinion that the "German state is god". Some knowledge of German classical philosophy would have taught him that even in his most nationalist period Fichte never taught such nonsense ; when Fichte, in his youth, was an atheist, he was not a nationalist, and when he had become a nationalist he had, at the same time, become a believer in God ; no popular outcry was raised against his dismissal, as Herr Wiener pretends, and none could have been raised because there were no organs whatsoever of any public opinion ; Fichte's later appointment to Berlin University was therefore not due to this non-existent

outray, but to the most solemn retraction of his former views and his conversion to religion, a fact of which Herr Wiener is apparently unaware. Yet he could have found this conversion discussed at length by two of his pet witnesses, Heine (*Letters on Germany*) and Schopenhauer (*Ueber die Kathederphilosophie*). Four mistakes in one paragraph! More than such slipshod irrelevancies Herr Wiener cannot offer. For his methods are of the simplest. There are long accounts of the horridness of Nazi education—most of them only too true, but all of them perfectly well known before, though Herr Wiener cannot emphasize too much the astounding novelty of his revelations. All this can be got much more thoroughly, and in a much more serious form, from any older author on the subject, such as Mowrer, Rauschning, Erica Mann, or G. Filmer's recent *Education for Death*. Interspersed with it are a few disconnected remarks of the type quoted above, covering only a few pages altogether, but deemed to be sufficient proof that things were always nearly as bad as they are under the Nazis, a thesis showing complete loss of balance on the part of the author, and contributing nothing to the understanding of either pre-Nazi or Nazi Germany.

I do, however, believe that the book is worth reading, not for its contents, but because it reveals with unusual clarity a certain "Prussian" type which it is useful to know. Herr Wiener, after stating that he is "neither a politician, nor a historian, nor a diplomatist, but a simple and insignificant schoolmaster" (p. 87), goes on to say that it is his "difficult and responsible job" to teach German—not simply to the boys of Rugby, but "to the youth of this country". That was difficult, because in Herr Wiener's opinion "no one here realized what was going on in Germany". Yet he does not blush at the thought of Churchill, Eden, Duff Cooper, Herbert Morrison, Harold Nicolson, and thousands of others.

Herr Wiener, to be sure, is not like "these poor German refugees who, in their criminal blindness and understandable unhappiness, try to make their former country an ideal which has never existed so far" (p. 34). The only remaining question is why he did not speak out earlier about his dreadful discoveries. Some of those German refugees, already at school and university, fought German fascism inside Germany. The name of Herr Wiener did not occur among them. Nor was he prominent in the struggle against Nazi propaganda in this country during the difficult years before Munich. He rushed into print for the first time, as far as I can make out, in 1940. But despite the essential importance of his revelations about things unknown before, he has not found life easy in this country. "You see," he says, "as a teacher I am not really allowed to teach what I want and what I feel the youth should be taught" (p. 4). "I have made myself more disliked, more unpopular, and perhaps even more ridic-

culous with the responsible educationalists of this country than any other young and unimportant teacher has done before." Even in ridicule Herr Wiener cannot help excelling every competitor. But we believe that even here he exaggerates. "The real trouble," he continues, "is the examiners, these highly intellectual and often very ancient retired schoolmasters or 'varsity dons, who have lived for generations in a fools' paradise, out of touch with the grim realities of the world", but now the grim realism of Herr Wiener will teach them that they must abandon their paradise.

I suppose this will be sufficient. It will go a long way to prove that Herr Wiener is a typical embodiment of all that is, with good reason, most irritating to other nations in a certain type of German manners and behaviour.

FRANZ BORKENAU.

A Thousand Shall Fall. By Hans Habe. (Harrap).

HERR HABE, connected through his family with the Vienna paper *Die Stunde*, was, before Austria's fall, a journalist writing for the (anti-Nazi) Fascist Heimwehr movement. He joined the French Army, saw some fighting, was taken prisoner and escaped. This is the tale of his adventures. Politically it contains little that is new. As a thriller, it has its value. Also, if his story is to be taken as literal truth, he must be more cunning than Ulysses, more daring than Richard Cœur de Lion, and more miraculously lucky than the heroes of *A Thousand and One Nights*.

FRANZ BORKENAU.

Stalin und das ewige Russland. By Walter Kolarz. (Lincoln's-Prager, London).

THE preface of this highly interesting pamphlet, of only 46 pages, contains an expression of gratitude to Wenzel Jaksch, the leader of the German social-democratic party in Czechoslovakia. So I suppose the author is connected with that party which, in its struggle against Marxist orthodoxy, has produced more than one original idea. The author's main thesis is the one upheld by Berdyayev and others: the continuity between pre- and post-revolutionary Russian history. He combines this view with a well-defined political attitude, that of intense friendliness to the new Russia, coupled with an equally determined hostility against Western communism and the Comintern. If one understands the new Russia well, he says on his last page, "it is no contradiction but only logical to fight against the communism nuisance

in the West and at the same time to maintain a positive attitude towards Russia herself". "Today," the pamphlet concludes, "one must, in the first place, be grateful to Russia, help her, and also love her as that part of mankind which was destined to make the biggest sacrifices for the freedom of the world."

The value of Kolarz' contribution, however, does not so much consist in a statement of these basic views which he shares with many others, but in the astounding wealth of material which he has succeeded in compressing into a very short space. He does not deal at all with what takes pride of place in Communist propaganda, Russia's economic development. After a clear and succinct survey of the main ingredients of the historical individuality of Russia and the Russian people, he devotes himself almost exclusively to the study of the new Soviet patriotism and its links with the age-old devotion to "great, old, holy Russia". He makes a special study of two problems: the national minorities and the recent developments in Soviet literature. Concerning the first, he reaches the highly significant conclusion that, however close the links with the past, "the Soviet-Eurasian idea is incompatible with a merely racial interpretation of Russian political aims and makes the recurrence of such an idea impossible. Any return to Pan-Slavism would involve the necessity, for Soviet Russia, to grant to her other racial groups the right to constitute themselves on parallel lines. A new rise of Pan-Slavism would automatically bring to life again the ideas of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Mongolism, those very ideas whose destruction was one of the first tasks of Russian policy towards the minorities." He believes that the new Soviet patriotism is Eurasian in character, and that the future of Russia, in home as well as in international politics, lies in the synthesis of Slavonic and Asiatic ideas and interests. He does not expressly draw the conclusion that this involves a smaller amount of Russian involvement in Western affairs than was previously the case. But he insists that Stalin is infinitely more Russian than was Peter the Great.

What he says about literature is even more novel, though less easy to sum up. The upshot of it is that Russian patriotism was always at work close below the surface of Soviet literature, but that by now the classics (with the one significant exception of Dostoevsky) are again accepted as unquestioned models, except in so far as Eurasianism has created new problems. He also claims that most of the Soviet literature which is translated into Western languages is only vile propaganda stuff, and that a different choice would give an infinitely higher significance to what is written today in Russia.

From all this he concludes "the more widely known the real present-day Russia will be, the less scope there will remain for communist demagogery. The communist parties will have to disappear as anachronisms as Russia becomes more and more patriotic and less

and less marxist-communist in the old sense—and the climax of this development is already very near.” With this conclusion I fully agree. I should only add that, before the climax of this development is actually, and not only nearly, reached, the present current in Russia, whose overwhelming strength I do not doubt, will still have to move some distance. The test will be Russia’s attitude towards religion.

It is regrettable that so valuable a study should have been published in German. In view of its general interest, and of the bilingualism of the refugee community in this country, I cannot see any valid reason for a decision which prevents it from being as widely known as it deserves to be.

FRANZ BORKENAU.

King Alfonso. By Robert Sencourt. (Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.)

THERE are men who sum up the spirit of a nation and an age, and who captivate the imagination of their contemporaries. Such was the late King Alfonso XIII of Spain. Born in 1886, already a King, reigning until 1931, his romantic history, his many-sided interests, his vivacity and “simpatia”, and especially his outstanding personality, made him one of the most popular figures in the Europe of his time. But above all he was in many ways typical of Spain, which he loved supremely, thus fulfilling a high ideal of kingship, which, as Mr. Sencourt points out, should always incarnate the qualities of the nation.

This interesting book is well introduced with chapters on “The Dignity of Spain” and “The Historic Background”, which show the King in a setting apart from which it would be impossible to understand him, and there are many stimulating passages on the role of kingship and its importance today. Catholicism is rightly seen for what it has always been in Spanish history—the one, supernatural force which unites the Spaniards and brings out all that is best in the Spanish character; which, when withdrawn, leaves only anarchy and revolution. There are passages of much beauty on the Catholic Church and on the Spanish character. The treatment which is given to the Carlist question and to Liberalism (in the doctrinal sense) is good. Mr. Sencourt rightly appraises in Traditionalism its strong core of Catholic principle and its healthy social organism, whilst describing in Don Alfonso the more “progressive” and modern outlook which characterized him. Also the King’s love of England, his sportsmanship, and still more his great personal humanity and charity during the war of 1914–18, all receive the notice they deserve.

The scenic descriptions in the book, if at times somewhat too flamboyant in style, are nevertheless very good of their kind.

Mr. Sencourt is, on the whole, fair to the much-maligned and misunderstood Church of Spain, but there are curious remarks about "bigotry" and "clericalism" which do not square with the fairer appreciations, and are unsatisfactory. Also, the treatment of Canalejas and his difficulties with the Church leaves much to be desired; the old bogeys of the intransigence of Pius X and Cardinal Merry del Val are trotted out again without much discernment. Nor is quite a true picture given of the suspiciousness of the clergy towards the "valid reforms in education such as those of Don F. Giner de los Rios", which, with their strong savour of "laicism", were hardly of a nature to allay the misgivings of those whose business it was to guard the Faith in a Catholic country.

We think the remark on page 270 about the King and Don Juan at Dartmouth—"Free from narrowness, he sent his son to an Anglican ceremony in the church"—an unfortunate one. Obviously what is here referred to is simply the passive assistance at an official ceremony which may occasionally be a duty of courtesy on the part of any Catholic in this country, but the phrase as it stands is capable of quite another interpretation, which we should like to see corrected in a subsequent edition.

We should have liked to see more appreciation of Don Alfonso's great Prime Minister, Don Antonio Maura, and a fuller treatment of the causes which prepared the way for such great upheavals after the fall of the Monarchy. But an interesting attempt is made to find in the Portuguese solution a key to the difficulties which confronted King Alfonso. The problems raised by the Directory of Primo de Rivera are fairly stated.

The real nobility of the King's self-effacement and of his bearing in exile are well brought out. "He nothing did common or mean" at that terrible moment, showed no bitterness or pettiness afterwards, desired only the good of Spain. Whether his generous action in absenting himself in 1931 was the wisest possible is, as the author admits, a matter for debate in view of all that happened after, for subsequent events have shown that the bloodshed feared by Don Alfonso for his people was not averted. But, however that may be, there can be no doubt that the King bravely did what he felt to be his duty, at the cost of the greatest sacrifice which he could make. The enemies of order in Spain, however, knew well what they were doing when they started their campaign against him; without the monarchy Spain cannot be her true self.

The King's eminently Christian death in Rome will remain an inspiration to all who read of it. "España! Dios mio!" were his last words as he kissed the crucifix. To his successor, a man worthy of those great traditions, he has bequeathed a memory which will always live in Spain. The speech of Don Juan at the funeral is aptly added

as an appendix. All who would know what manner of man the new King is should read it, for therein lie the seeds of Spain's fairest hopes for the future.

ALFONSO DE ZULUETA.

Germany in Peril. By Erich Meissner. (Oxford University Press.
7s. 6d. net.)

In the space of 120 pages Mr. Meissner has set out the elements of the German problem more clearly and more fully than other writers who have produced enormous volumes on the subject. He has also brought out the fact that it cannot be isolated from the general European crisis. The essential problem is that of restoration, "to check the process of disintegration which has torn the masses away from the soil, to revive our ancient traditions. . . . Man must be given back his home". Though the author is rightly opposed to a facile solution, and to over-simple statements, his argument would appear to lead to the practical conclusion that Prussia must be reintegrated in Germany, and Germany in Europe; not, however, before Europe herself has rediscovered her foundations.

Mr. Meissner is content to analyse the contrary process of disintegration, especially as it developed in Germany. The breakdown of religious unity at the Reformation was one of the root causes, but that was not peculiar to Germany. The rise of Prussia, "a mentality and not a nation", in the middle of the eighteenth century, was a unique phenomenon; but it was contingent, was not the inevitable outcome of the German nature and might at several points of time have been prevented from developing further. Prussian militarism was not unattractive to austere and noble minds who feared the enervating effects of pleasure-seeking, but it became altogether too rigid and made far too little allowance for the gentler side of human nature. After 1806 Stein and others tried to bring Prussia into the orbit of the German nation; they were truly German patriots, opposed to Napoleon and to the domination of their country by revolutionary France, but they were also Europeans and Christians. They failed partly because the Weimar spirit then affecting the educated classes was, in spite of its beauty, deeply hostile to Europe's Christian roots. (Mr. Meissner brings out with notable success the significance of Faust's *Im Anfang war die Tat*.) Another reason was that Austria—*toujours en retard*—failed to take her chance to lead Germany after Napoleon's downfall.

An excellent chapter on Austria, paying tribute especially to Stifter's writings, shows how much nearer that country is to the European roots. The revival of interest in Stifter just before 1933

is an indication of the contribution which Austria may still make to the restoration of Germany in Europe. Capitalism allied with Prussian militarism secured the triumph of Bismarck's Reich and the further uprooting of Germany from Europe. Within two generations Capitalism had lost its self-confidence and an instability was created which might have occasioned repentance and the overthrow of Prussianism, but became, in fact, one of the reasons for the success of Hitlerism. Any attempt to get at the basic principles of National Socialist philosophy Mr. Meissner regards as a waste of time; Hitler is "a prospering quack". The real menace lies in the alliance of his movement with more formidable powers, Prussia and the Philosophy of Nihilism.

All is not yet lost, but Allied victory alone will not overcome the enemies of Germany and of Europe; and it is the decisive hour. If Mr. Meissner does not exaggerate the strength of the Christian resistance, he draws attention to certain neglected aspects of it, to the many unknown sufferers for Faith's sake in the concentration camps, to "the voice of ancient Germany" which was heard in the works of Guardini and other Catholic authors. Particularly important is his explanation of the origin of State intervention to provide for the education of children after the destruction of family life through the industrial revolution, and the salutary reminder: "State education should always be considered an evil, though certainly a lesser one than the evil of neglect." Naturally, Catholics do not share the author's fear that the Church may lose her power to transform the world, but his criticism should make them examine their conscience as to whether they are doing all that is possible under the influence of grace to maintain our ancient and Christian civilization.

EDWARD QUINN.

The Shakespearian Tempest. By G. Wilson Knight. (Oxford University Press. 6s.)

WITH the publication of *The Shakespearian Tempest* in the Oxford Bookshelf series, Professor Knight's three major works on Shakespearian interpretation become available in a uniform edition. This book is the logical continuation demanded by the interpretations contained in *The Wheel of Fire* and *The Imperial Theme*. It also marks a decisive advance in that it presents a final unification of the imaginative categories exposed in the earlier volumes. The symbols there brought to light by the poetic vision with which the interpreter is always insisting that poetry must be viewed had already begun to reveal themselves as falling into two classes, the one standing for discord, the other for harmony, alike within the life of man in itself and in

relation to the universal stage on which the dramatist saw it. That classification is an intellectual rather than an imaginative one. Its possibility is derived from the unity of human nature and the consequent response of the human imagination to the intellect which uses it. Its actuality in these pages seems to the present writer to call for a modification of Professor Knight's reiterated view of the superiority of the imaginative to the intellectual vision. Such a modification, however, will not affect the author's proper interpretative work; it will concern only his explanation of what he is doing, and it is certain that in fact the validity of his method in interpreting Shakespeare is in no way impaired by his interpretation of that method. Indeed one great gain from his insistence on the imagination as of primary importance in the understanding of its own poetic work is that where another might have embarked on a dry and often dubious elucidation of imaginative symbols in abstract terms, Professor Knight by reducing all explicit elucidation to a minimum, distils page after page of a pictorial and symbolic richness which is diluted for the Shakespearian audience by the contemporaneous appeal of plot and characterization with which other critics have chiefly concerned themselves. In this connection it would be interesting to see to what extent a play produced in accordance with Professor Knight's suggestions in another work would alter the balance and content of the audience's appreciation.

The method, however, seen in its fullest development in *The Shakespearian Tempest*, inevitably provokes questions which cannot be answered by the use of the imagination alone. Imaginative symbols can only be classified intellectually, or let us say in terms of a total human experience in which the intellect provides the elements of understanding. Left to itself or thrust into the foreground of this experience the imagination is incapable of explaining the reduction of its symbols to the ultimates of tempests and music. That those two are master images in the work of Shakespeare, Professor Knight makes completely evident. The appositeness or inevitability of such a type of division he does little more than suggest. For that one has to transcend the concrete and see these images as standing for nature and art, for control of man through his surroundings by a power that is uncontrollable and in the last resort incomprehensible, and control by man of those surroundings. In these data we have an explanation of the fluidity and apparent contradiction in Shakespeare's use of symbol of which Professor Knight with faultless objectivity shows himself well aware. Storms, for instance, are not always hostile to man's fulfilment, nor are they invariably associated with his disintegration. It is this recognition of the fluidity of symbolism which accounts for such a sentence as: "The sea here" (in *Antony and Cleopatra*) "is scarcely impregnated with tragic significance, since

the play as a whole has not a tragic significance at all." The imagination and its phantasies remain the servants and not the masters of the whole conception. The truth is that the tempest-discord symbol is the expression of a power which man repeatedly sees as hostile to himself, but which is not in the last resort discordant with his perfection. The harmony which man can make and hear only provides an illusion of felicity. To gain the reality he has to submit in faith and obedience to the sometimes apparently inimical action of a higher power which sweeps away the tinklings of his petty heavens and leaves him overwhelmed, a tragic figure. It is no surprise to come to Shakespeare's tragedies and find that in them the image of the storm comes most truly into its own as more than expressive ornament and rather an integral part as well as the most perfect summary of the drama.

But tragedy and conflict are not the sum of the poet's vision, and so in the final plays the music symbol, from one point of view so much inferior to the other, can be used as the more ultimate of the two. Symbols are of their nature loosed from any one level of experience, and one bears no inalterable relation of dominance to another.

A reviewer of an anthology of Shakespearian criticism, in *The Criterion*, once interrupted his praise of Professor Knight's work with the criticism that he comes perilously near equating the Shakespearian with the human imagination. That is by no means an over-statement and in no way a condemnation. The appeal of a great artist is universal, and it is a specially powerful strain in Shakespeare's work which Professor Knight succeeds in disengaging from the concrete artistic whole. In his concluding chapter he foreshadows the more extended application of his method to other authors of which *The Burning Oracle* is so successful an example and of which we are led to believe we may shortly hope to see more.

Ivo Thomas, O.P.

Chariot of Wrath. By G. Wilson Knight. (Faber. 10s. 6d.)

MILTON's idea of and ideals for a free England are sure to prove of general interest at this time. Milton took a passionately keen and vociferous part in the politics of an age when emotions released by the break-up of the mediaeval common Christian order were becoming more and more definitely fixed on the national destiny, and when differing views on the relation of authority to freedom within the nation were opposed in action as well as controversy. Milton himself conceived the contemporary problems in terms of opposites

which it was his purpose to unify. It was not sufficient for him that there should be a mere displacement of energy on to another focus. "Milton's writings are a record of continual disintegration and the will to reinstatement." The dualities which this book is most concerned with are those of Church and State, power and goodness. Milton is most obviously concerned with the former, Mr. Knight with the latter, though he is at pains to keep his own views in the background. However, he sets Milton to answer a question of his own (the author's) choosing. Must power and goodness be on opposite sides in the world conflict, and if not, then how can goodness become powerful? It is a tempting question, but one which put in this way leads to a somewhat indefinite and labyrinthine argument. It would not be asked if a consciousness of righteousness were not associated with an awareness of a lack of effective strength, with the result that effective strength is at the same time desired as the necessary complement of righteousness and repudiated as its opposite. Mr. Knight perceives that such a division of conscience is intolerable and with Milton struggles out of it in chapters entitled "Crown and Christ", "War in Heaven", and "The Campaign of Peace". His remedy is an imaginative discovery and grasp of the appropriate symbols which will attract and carry the latent energies of the good cause. These, as he abundantly shows, were for Milton symbols of royalty, in spite of his political tenets. "Milton was no democrat; his royalistic instincts were ineradicable—so was his religious fervour." For it is also recognized that liberty and authority, goodness and strength, can only be harmonized in the light of the teaching of religion on good and evil. Only from that transcendent standpoint can a way be seen out of this psychological and practical *impasse*. The book would be far more plainly convincing and helpful if it had been clearly recognized that the question really being asked was not: How can we reconcile two things falsely conceived as opposites? but, How can any man, on either side in the conflict, find the energy to attain his ends? The confusion between moral and physical goodness, which by not being brought out maintains the insistence of the question right through the book, is thus removed, for morality is no longer immediately relevant, and at the same time the answer given, viz. by using his imagination, is more evidently an answer to the question asked. As a Milton anthology and commentary, its primary purpose, the book gives one great pleasure.

IVO THOMAS, O.P.

The Classics and the Man of Letters. By T. S. Eliot. (Humphrey Milford. 8d.)

MR. ELIOT's presidential address to the Classical Association is refreshingly different from the run of such things; his claims, his statements, his prose, are sober and dignified, with no trace of professional unctuousness. His main thesis is the importance of some kind of classical education for the ordinary man of letters, who without genius or profound scholarship may be expected to have more acquaintance than others with the thought and writings and history of the past, and the ability to apply it aptly to the questions of his own time. Given the immense influence of the classics on Europe in general and England in particular, the English man of letters needs a classical groundwork in order to understand, to interpret, and finally to continue, the main tradition of the literature of his own country. Something of the same groundwork should be shared by his audience if his work is not to be limited to a clique and fall into snobbishness or eccentricity. In practice, extended reading of translations should be possible to many who lack time or aptitude for acquiring the original languages.

To this modest and measured case I can offer no serious opposition. But I should like to make two observations which Mr. Eliot himself would perhaps be willing to accept. One is that the focus of classical studies has by now shifted so much that considerable classical knowledge may be unaccompanied by any clear understanding of what the classics meant for our ancestors. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sappho and the *Oresteia* were less read, and no more esteemed, than the Anthology and the pseudo-Anacreon; the Greek and Roman civilizations were scarcely distinguished; and it was possible to refer to Helen as Nell and to Antoninus Pius as Anthony Pie. For those who in any case will take their classics at second hand it would be an excellent plan to work solidly through the translations of this period, where the choice of material sprang from contemporary ideas and influenced those of the generations following. Such a course implies omnivorous reading of a kind which deserves to be revived; to which might be added the willingness to look in historical works both for entertainment and for edification.

The other point is that such a groundwork should not be allowed to pass as self-sufficient. Prescinding from the general (and fundamental) question of a sacred or secular direction in education, it remains clear that Christianity is more integral than the classics to European culture; hence, as far as books are concerned, knowledge of the Bible and of the chief theological and devotional classics is as necessary to an understanding of our past as it is obviously lacking in most men of letters today. And the general knowledge postulated

by Mr. Eliot will be badly incomplete if it does not reach out to Dante and to the major things of the East. To be taken aback by the name of Asoka, to imagine Hinduism to be a kind of Buddhism, should be pieces of ignorance unimaginable in a man of letters; yet I have known them to co-exist with "a sound classical education".

WALTER SHEWRING.

Collected Poems. By Walter de la Mare. (Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.)

THE richness of Mr. de la Mare's verse has always been a riddle. Make one choice from these collected poems, and his themes are always of natural things—youth, age, love, death. Make another, and they are of praeter-natural—death, ghosts, fairies, landscapes and voices beyond earth's. The method of all the themes is also double—it is sometimes a light and sometimes a laden sound. Few poets can so gently reduce life to a small wail; few can so thicken not-life—or not-our-life—with the semblances of earth. Few indeed can so frighten the reader, and if (now that we have read him often) we know the corner where the fright hides and are prepared for it, yet the old fright lives in memory and so truly that we are not quite sure whether its advent was then or is now. All poets ought perhaps properly to be praised in verse, preferably of their own kind, so that the reader might show how much he had gained, how well he inhabited the new world opened to him. This might be possible with many, for many (even good poets) have trifles and tricks of their trade. With Mr. de la Mare it is almost impossible; he has no tricks, and even his trifles fall through his own quiet. "Quiet does quiet remain"; we cannot break it.

One would think he must be whimsy or folk-lorish; no. There is nothing of the Dear Brutus wood in his forests. His children only do not grow up because he does not choose to record their growth. *Ann*, *A Child Asleep*, *Louisa Looking at Death*, and others, are children who would certainly grow up, unless indeed they were caught in that other praeter-natural world, and even then they would grow according to its own alien laws. It is in accord with this realism that Mr. de la Mare is one of the few contemporary poets who can make abstractions real. Two gifts of verse separate us from the Augustans: the length of the line, for they did not need to hurry to their rhymes, and the power of their personifications. The Romantics kept, to an extent, this second gift. The personifications of the *Ode on Eton College* and of the *Ode on Melancholy* are alike mighty; less so those of the *Elegy in a Country Churchyard* and even of *Adonais*. Mr. de la Mare is almost the first poet since Keats to restore those

ancient myths. It was a Roman tradition; we do less than justice to our past if we neglect it. "A distinction," Mr. C. S. Lewis has written, "which is fundamental for us—the distinction, namely, between an abstract universal and a living spirit—was only vaguely and intermittently present to the Roman mind." In reading Mr. de la Mare's poems we recover again that Roman freedom—"bright Fear's lean taper", "blest Melancholy's house", "Here's the cave where Sorrow dwells".

These personifications and those other universal images which are called the Witch, the Wanderer, the Traveller, the Princes of Arabia, and the rest, inhabit both the natural and praeter-natural worlds. In one poem, *The Last Chapter*, Mr. de la Mare invokes the rarest of them: "Pace, still, for pace with your companion goes." All his poems bear for us this sense of a wild and strange companion; they are his steps and voice.

"What did you say?"
 "I? Nothing." "No? . . .
 What was that sound?"
 "When?"
 "Then."
 "I do not know."
 "Whose eyes were those on us?"
 "Where?"
 "There."
 "No eyes I saw."

"Speech, footfall, presence—how cold the night may be!"
 "Phantom or fantasy, it's all one to me."

Set by this a stanza from *Dreams*:

Voyager dauntless on Newton's sea,
 Year after year still brooding on,
 His algebraical formulæ,
 The genius of William Hamilton
 Sought the square root of *minus* one;
 In vain; till—all thought of it leagues away—
 The problem flowered from a dream one day.

The two stanzas are not opposed. The images of this verse are as frail as the one, as certain as the other. Indeed this is the very poetry of the square root of *minus* one. What one (to pursue the word)? the friend, the beloved, the world? To rediscover the One of which, as a minus quantity, Mr. de la Mare's poetry is the square root would need a book. Every reader must do it for himself; it is the distinction of this poetry that it is indeed a root; our hearts and minds can thrive on it.

CHARLES WILLIAMS.

Friedrich Hölderlin: Gedichte. Edited and selected by A. Closs, M.A., D.Phil. (Duckworth. 6s. net.)

THERE is ample justification for a new edition of Hölderlin's poems at the present time, when they are being quoted along with many other masterpieces of German literature to prove that Nazi ideals have been upheld even by the intellectuals and the artists. It is true that Hölderlin is deeply and essentially German and that all his poetry is an expression of that yearning for the infinite, of the desire to plunge into the unknown, which is typical of the German spirit but which is also, in one way or another, the theme of the greatest poets of all ages and of every land. And if he is impatient of conventional forms, of the ordering of tones, it is because he strives to express the highest tone and seeks the perfect form.

His outlook has been described as *der Pantheismus der Empfindsamkeit*. Exulting in nature, he hopes to find in it God, and through God attain to humanity. Like many of his contemporaries, he looks to ancient Greece for the highest perfection of instinctive as of reasoning nature. Under the influence of Pindar, and in verses closely resembling Goethe's *Lied der Parzen*, he sees man as restless, blind, ever and again hurled into the unknown, while the gods live at ease, fanned by the kindly breezes, on Olympus. But in another mood he finds contentment, for he has known the life of a god:

*Willkommen dann, o Stille der Schattenwelt!
Zufrieden bin ich, wenn auch mein Saitenspiel
Mich nicht hinabgeleitet; Einmal
Lebt' ich, wie Götter, und mehr bedarfs nicht.*

This reaching out towards the highest and his incapacity to express himself in the usual and more commonplace forms led inevitably to a certain loneliness. But it was possible to overcome even this, as he explains in a verse which is surely more generally true than Galsworthy's description of "the feeling which renews itself every morning in people who live lonely lives, that they are not lonely, until the day, wearing on, assures them of the fact". On the contrary, says Hölderlin, this is only the experience of the young:

*In jüngern Tagen war ich des Morgens froh,
Des Abends weint' ich; jetzt, da ich älter bin,
Beginn' ich zweifelnd meinen Tag, doch
Heilig und heiter ist mir sein Ende.*

That noble soul, driven to madness in its search for God, loving and exalting the divinity discoverable in nature and in man, could

not fail to be attracted by the God of Christian teaching and the authentic supernatural. Hölderlin, too, suffered, however faintly and distantly, the burning of heart of the disciples who walked with Christ to Emmaus. In *Der Einzige* (a poem which, unfortunately, does not appear in this collection) he is bewildered that the Master should not be amongst the ancient gods:

*Warum bliebest
Du aus? . . .
Denn zu sehr,
O Christus, häng ich an dir.*

Patmos recalls the memory of St. John:

*Des Sebers, der in seeliger Jugend war
Gegangen mit
Dem Sohne des Höchsten, unzertrennlich; . . .*

Thus he comes inevitably also to the spirit and the unique attraction of the Son of God.

The selection of poems, in the original spelling, is representative, arranged so as to indicate the development of Hölderlin's powers. Dr. Closs's introduction admirably fulfils its primary aim of considering the lyric poet rather than the personal life of the man. But, in a book which for many will be the first and only means of contact with Hölderlin's work, more biographical details ought to have been given. The place of Susette Gontard in his life and her profound influence on his poetry is not very satisfactorily indicated by the equation with Diotima in the chronology of the years 1795-8.

EDWARD QUINN.

Joseph Conrad. By M. C. Bradbrook (Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.—Any profits accruing to the author from the sale of the book will be given to the Polish Refugee Fund.)

Miss BRADBROOK's book on Joseph Conrad-Korzeniowski, though not large in size, is rich in content. It deserves a warm welcome not only from the British but also from the Polish reading public. It certainly ought to be translated into Polish, especially in these days when the countrymen of this great writer are deprived of the possibility of reading the numerous studies and monographies on Conrad which were published in Poland before the war.

The author points out very truly that for twenty years Conrad was one of the most highly appreciated and widely read writers in

England and America. Although his works are now somewhat less popular, as is the case with famous writers among the generation that follows, he may come into his own once more, just as Thomas Hardy has done.

Miss Bradbrook has done a great deal to guide the present-day reader in his choice of Conrad's works and to gain insight into their contents and the soul of the author. She has consulted the various biographies of Conrad and literary criticisms of his work. Her quotations from his works, letters and reminiscences are very aptly chosen. She has given a deep and excellent analysis of Conrad's writings and the development of his creative mentality. He wrote against a background of national characteristics, which remained unchanged, and influenced every stage of his life, a fact which is particularly important because Conrad's works are almost all based on his personal experiences and reminiscences.

Miss Bradbrook has divided Conrad's works into three periods. The first (1895-1904) is when he was under the influence of Flaubert. She calls it "The Wonders of the Deep". His writings during that period are mainly on the lives of sailors, of merchantmen sailing unceasingly over the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic, and of lonely white officials—English and Dutch—among the Malays in the great jungles of the Sund Islands.

During the second period (1905-1914) Conrad was to some extent under the influence of Henry James, on whom he wrote an essay. At this time he reached his peak both as regards perfection of writing and skill and of his creative work as regards insight into the innermost soul of his heroes. The latter were usually men with certain fixed principles who had not lost faith in basic ideals, but who had lost confidence in themselves and their own ability to adhere to these ideals.

The third period (1914-1924) covers the last ten years of Conrad's life. This she terms "Recollections in Tranquillity". His writings at this time are chiefly reminiscences written in his old-established way, and in them the "lion's claw" of his genius is no weaker than of old. These include *The Rover* and *Prince Roman*.

Finally Miss Bradbrook very justly described Conrad-Korzeniowski as a European "of the future", a type which should undoubtedly come into being after the victorious conclusion of the present war.

She writes: "Conrad's work is relevant today because it was produced in that simpler Europe which existed before 1914. It was written in the presence of general standards of public sanity to which we never returned in the post-war years. Yet by the peculiar history of his country, his family and himself, Conrad knew horrors almost equal to those of today; and in this peculiar commanding position he was fitted to be an example of a 'good European', a type which belongs not to

the past but to the future. In himself, he knew and loved Poland, France and England: he loved England most proudly, France most warmly, Poland most deeply. His reconciliation of their conflicting claims and the sympathy with the best of what was common to the three is his final triumph of reducing the complex to the simple and the one which deserves the gratitude of all."

How well he knew and understood the mentality of the British people is shown by something he said in the early days of August, 1914, before the violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans and before the entry of Great Britain into the war. This quotation given by Miss Bradbrook reads: "I can tell you what I am absolutely certain of. It is this: If England comes into the war, then no matter who may want to make peace at the end of six months *at the cost of right and justice*, England will keep on fighting for years, if necessary. You may reckon on that." "What, even alone?" asked someone across the room. "Yes, even alone. But if things go as far as that, England will not be alone."

J. B.

All the Day Long. Bishop James A. Walsh, Co-founder of Maryknoll.
By Daniel Sargent. (Longmans. 10s. 6d.)

THIS is a somewhat disappointing book. There is no more interesting and few more important stories than that of the American Catholic missionaries in China. There is every reason to think that the importance of that story will grow still further with the coming years. Victory in this war will inevitably leave China for the first time a strong and united nation. As a strong and united nation, China of the future will be enormously more powerful than Japan of the present. Whether she uses that power to challenge, or to co-operate with, Western civilization is perhaps the gravest of all the grave questions for the answer to which we are now waiting. The answer obviously largely depends upon the Christian missionary and the extent to which the Chinese can be made to take seriously the Christianity of the Western world.

No life threw more light upon that great question than that of Bishop Walsh. Yet there is in this book no analysis of the Chinese situation. It is, on the other hand, swollen out to a somewhat inordinate length by anecdotes about the not very remarkable boyhood of young Walsh in Boston and about the early austerities of Maryknoll, which did not differ gravely from those that are common among first religious houses. This is a pity, for, though such writing is in the tradition of popular journalism, Dr. Sargent is something very much better than a popular journalist. Many pages of scholarly

writing in his other books have shown how high is the level of which he is capable, and it is disappointing that he should here have fallen short of that high level.

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS.

And the Floods Came. By Arnold Lunn. (Eyre & Spottiswoode. 15s.)

THIS is a sequel to Mr. Lunn's *Come What May*, and it records his war-time experiences under bombardment in London and on an Atlantic convoy, and his propagandist activities in Ireland and America. Mr. Lunn is indeed happy in his opportunity. Like Voltaire with God, if a cause did not exist for him, he would have to invent it, and Hitler is indeed his benefactor by supplying him with so worthy an object for his energies.

The Irish and the American chapters will perhaps be to most readers of the greatest interest, but it is unfortunate here that Mr. Lunn wrote at a time when the issues were still a good deal simpler than they are today. No unbiased critic can dispute his uncompromising and justified denunciation of the Crooked Cross as the enemy of the Christian faith, and he has and can quote abundant authority for all that he has here to say. His point about a holy war is also a just one. Whatever our failings, at least ours is a culture within which Catholicism can exist, and the question is not so much what we are fighting for as what we are fighting against. New worlds are not automatically created by victory in war. One fights in order to survive, and, if one survives, what survives is much the same amalgam of good and bad as existed before the conflict began. After the war, God willing, there may be an opportunity for building something new and better, but the war is not in itself a builder. Therefore it is amply sufficient if we are asked why we are fighting to say that we are fighting against Hitler.

But it is unfortunate that Mr. Lunn should have written his book before the Russian intervention, for that does introduce a complication, to which, answerable though it be, it would yet have been interesting to have read Mr. Lunn's answer. It may be that we have passed into an age in which it is no longer sensible to look to consequences. The future is too wholly unpredictable. If so, then the wise course is to stick to the virtues of truth and courage and to say with the Patriot,

"Tis God shall repay,
I am safer so,"

For, as Mr. Lunn quotes of the Athenians, "It is not fitting that we should be consenting with those that have burnt the statues of our gods and our shrines, and cast them out upon a heap. And even if we would there be many things preventing us, our Greek blood and speech, common temples and sacrifices, and like ways of life. If Athens betrayed these things it would not be well."

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS.

Immortal Sergeant. By John Brophy. (Collins. 8s. 6d.)

THIS is a novel about the war, and a good one. It tells the story of a British patrol in the Western Desert which is cut off from the rest of the army by the German advance. The patrol is dive-bombed and has its Bren-carrier and most of its equipment and supplies destroyed. It attacks an Italian armoured car; then, after nearly perishing from hunger and thirst, it reaches an oasis only to find Germans landing by aeroplane. It fights the Germans, and the battered remnants are finally rescued by a French tank on its way to join the Fighting French and brought to Cairo.

It is an exciting account of desert warfare, but it is a good deal more besides. It tells the story of Chamberlain's England and of the transformation of the men of that England into the new army. The personnel of the patrol provides an excellent opportunity of presenting a cross-section of the new army: Sergeant Kelly, the only professional soldier among them, "a bit of a rough, a hard-bitten relic of a British army which belonged to the past"; Colin Spence, the Oxford graduate with two novels to his credit; Cottrell, the bad soldier, the adherent of some obscure religious sect, battening on queer little magazines; Symes, the Berkshire shepherd; Pilcher and Cassidy, the two tough suburbans.

When Kelly dies, his mantle falls on his corporal, Colin Spence, and it is through his eyes that the contrast between two different worlds is presented in a series of flash-backs. This is pre-war England:

There had been parties, noisy, clever-clever, with too much to drink and too many cigarettes to smoke: men in suède shoes and corduroy trousers; men with infantile mouths half hidden behind new beards; women with geranium and fuchsia-red finger-nails orientally pointed, their eyebrows shaved off and replaced by streaks of waxy pencil. . . .

This is the desert:

They stumbled along with the uncertain, weary rhythm of their legs beating like a pendulum through their thoughts, which were sluggish,

slow, ponderous and unreal. The skin burned on their bodies caked with sweat and dirt. Their eyes, bleared and dazzled, were drawn towards the surface of the sand immediately ahead, and then, when they jerked their heads up, stared without comprehension or interest at the wide endlessness of the desert.

The difference in style of these two passages brings out very well the differences between the England of Chamberlain and the England of Churchill, but it is, perhaps, the weakness of the book that the novelist dwells too much on what is happening at home. The love affair of Colin Spence is competent but commonplace and there are times when it interferes with the more vital experience of war. The banality of the first of the two passages quoted above is intentional and effective, but can the same be said of this?

He wanted to write books, to understand life—elusive, complicated and perplexing enough in peace—more fully and more deeply.

The descriptions of war in the desert bear the stamp of experience and are indeed of outstanding excellence; but some at least of the book seems to be composed out of materials which are the stock-in-trade of nearly every successful novelist.

MARTIN TURNELL.

Advisory Bodies. A Study of their Uses in Relation to Central Government.

1919-1939. With a Preface by Sir Arthur Salter. (Allen & Unwin, London. 18s.).

CENTRAL Government of a modern mass-state of the non-fascist type is to an ever-increasing degree based on delegated legislature. Parliament in its role as a vigilant guardian of the rights and duties of the public on the one hand, Government executive and administration on the other, have in recent years based important decisions on the work done by Advisory Bodies.

The present publication follows the history and scope of the work done by these bodies from 1919 to 1939. The editors, Mr. R. V. Vernon and Mr. N. Mansergh, and their equally able collaborators, have restricted their inquiry "to a survey of advisory bodies designed to assist the central permanent organs of government to fulfil their functions with expert advice from outside the machine". Nevertheless a wide field of research has been covered. Advisory bodies have been and are being used by many Government departments, and it is invaluable to have all this material now together in such an impressive volume.

All studies of the work prove conspicuously that "the consideration of outside opinion is a means of effecting a continuous penetration of the machinery of government by the spirit of democracy, and thereby making of it something more than a piece of machinery—a vital organism".

Political scientists and sociologists, apart from administrators, must congratulate the authors for having produced a book which is much nearer to the complexity of a modern state than our usual text-books.

The volume offers material for further consideration. The problems of the fundamental change of present-day democracy, the future of party politics, the relationship of advisory bodies to political élites, lie obviously outside the scope of the authors. Yet urgent problems like these require answers—in the light of their thorough investigations.

J. P. MAYER.

Topics. Walter Shewring. (Hague and Gill. 5s.)

THREE of these collected essays are concerned with education. They make the very important point that education should be for living. If life must be as it is, then education must proceed so that a man can make the best of life as it is; if life ought to be otherwise, then it is not waste of time to speculate on what education ought to be to suit a man for it. Indeed, since men live as they are educated, such speculation, if carried into practice, might well help to make life rather more what it should be. But with a strange pessimism Mr. Shewring writes: "Education itself I believe to be impossible for most people in our abnormal society"; nevertheless he sets to work to make the best of a bad job. His argument is that education is training for vocation, but the earning of money, which is the chief goal of most work in our society, is not a vocation and is therefore exclusive of education. So the author offers some sensible suggestions for Christianizing and vitalizing the curriculum and for helping the few who can escape to do so. It would be possible, one would think, to educate the young so that they could create something that could be called a vocation, rather than teaching them how to accommodate themselves to a life of avarice with least harm to themselves. Making the best of a bad job seldom means doing a good one, and the improvements which the author suggests would probably only exaggerate the irrational duality of work for money, leisure for culture, about which he writes in *Art, Work and Distributism*. They might indeed actually make it intolerable and untolerated. How-

successful they would then have been!—but not if they stop short at producing a Christian leisure.

Of the other essays, *Murder in Books* will have the widest appeal, and should be possessed by all initiates of the mystery of detection.

Ivo THOMAS, O.P.

The Fool's Progress. By Rom Landau. (Faber & Faber. 5s. net.)

MR. ROM LANDAU was for a time liaison officer with the Polish Air Force in this country, and from his experience of foreigners, derived at that and at other times, he has compiled this little book about the English. He is full of admiration for us and also full of comprehension of the foreigners' difficulty when confronted with the curious problem of the Englishman, or, as he calls him, John Smith, or the Eternal Schoolboy. The truth is certainly that which Mr. Belloc once expressed by saying that the Channel is by far the largest frontier in Europe. It has caused us to live without fear of our neighbours to an extent that is quite incomprehensible to those who are separated from their neighbours by only a land frontier, and from this fearlessness spring, as none can today help but see, both great virtues and great vices. From it springs the excellent humour of the Englishman, which enables him to forgive and to forget, and sometimes to forget too easily. From it springs the comparative absence of class hatred and the evident presence of class distinction. For the Englishman feels that he has very much more in common with a fellow Englishman than he can possibly have with any foreigner through any mere identity of economic interest. At the same time this common Englishness is so manifest that it is in no need of artificial organization in order to emphasize it. From his insularity springs, too, the unwillingness of the Englishman to learn from foreigners—his unwillingness to ape foreign fads and also his unwillingness to go to school with foreigners in matters such as religion, where nationality should obviously in reality play but a very subordinate part.

"Of all the great Western nations the British alone have built up their civilization more or less unconsciously," truly writes Mr. Landau. The fact precedes the analysis, and nothing but trouble comes if the attempt is made to alter the fact to fit the analysis. It is perhaps but another way of saying that the English are of all the nations pre-eminently the nation of poets as opposed to the nation of philosophers. It has never been their mood, whether through arrogance or through humility, to think that all others should be like them. Yet Mr.

Landau is surely justified in claiming that British character and British civilization are more closely interconnected than are the characters and the civilizations of any other nation and that "we may admire or we may hate British civilization, but if facts have a stronger appeal for us than propaganda we cannot help being thankful for it".

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS.

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
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
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
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